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LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY 
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 
DEPARTMENT OF DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY 
ABSTRACT PhD Anne Nelmes 
Overcoming Misconceptions: Using Bridging Analogies to Cue Scientific 
Ideas 
Pupils come to physics lessons with some scientifically wrong ideas, sometimes 
referred to as misconceptions but often just misplaced conceptions; correct in 
some contexts but not in others. It is often difficult to change these 
misconceptions. 
Analogy has long been used to aid understanding of scientific concepts. However, 
the jump between analogue and target is sometimes too great, possibly because the 
similarity of the features compared is not significant enough. To improve mapping 
of similarities, bridges can be used which are part way between the analogue 
(anchor) and target. The anchor usually involves concrete phenomena where the 
pupils' intuitive ideas agree with the scientific view. This research looks at the use 
of bridging analogies in overcoming misconceptions in several topics. The 
conclusion is that, short-term, `traditional' teaching gives better results whereas 
the bridging analogy approach may give better long-term retention of concepts. 
Rather than trying to overtly use analogy, it may be more effective and less time 
consuming to cue the right idea using analogy on a very low key level, without the 
pupils realising that an analogy has been used. The idea of cueing correct ideas 
comes from work done by diSessa and others on phenomenological primitives (p- 
prims). These are small knowledge units which are cued to an active state to 
explain phenomena. It is hoped the correct p-prim will be cued by use of the 
analogy and, if cued repeatedly, will strengthen. Again, research is carried out in 
several topics. 
The results are interesting. Generally, during the bridging analogy approaches, 
there is an increase in the sense of the scientific explanation for the experimental 
group even though they do not know why they have become surer of that 
explanation. However, the control group has sometimes shown a decrease in the 
sense of the scientific explanation. 
Although cueing p-prims is quick and easy to do using low-key analogies, it only 
works in the short-term and pupils need to understand concepts for long-term 
success which may be done more effectively using bridging analogies taught in a 
more overt manner. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Misconceptions 
Consider the idea that objects `require an unbalanced or net force to keep them 
moving at a constant velocity'. This is a common student misconception and many 
such misconceptions are extremely difficult to change (see, for example, Driver et 
al, 1985). 
The term `misconception' is not always the best one to use when discussing 
students' conceptions. It implies that they are always wrong and always need 
replacing. This is not necessarily the case. There has been a recent trend (Duit, 
1993) to accept that students' intuitive ideas are important and `work' for the 
student in everyday life. They can be extremely difficult to change and teachers 
should perhaps aim to teach children when it is appropriate to use which type of 
conception. It may be more acceptable to use the following terms instead: 
alternative frameworks, preconceptions, everyday conceptions, pre-instructional 
conceptions, or intuitive ideas. 
In this research, the word `misconception' is used to mean a conception which is 
not scientifically correct and which interferes with progress in understanding 
science. 
Misconceptions are rife in physics, as pupils have had multiple experiences with 
the subject matter before ever having had a single physics lesson. They have had 
11 or more years in which to build up a myriad of conceptions that work, more or 
less, be they right or wrong, based on everyday experiences, especially 
kinaesthetic ones. 
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Misconceptions can also occur due to the fact that everyday language often differs 
from the precise use of words in scientific language. For example, the word 
`work' in science is only used when a force produces motion whereas there is a 
much more general meaning when the word is used in everyday language. 
There exists an argument as to whether misconceptions are produced against a 
background of somewhat stable naive theories (see, for example, Vosniadou, 
1994) or whether students construct answers based on much smaller, elemental 
pieces of knowledge (see, for example, diSessa, 1993,1996; Minstrell, 1992). 
What answer is produced will depend on which knowledge element is cued which, 
in turn, will depend to a large extent on the exact context of the question. Many 
methods have been used to try to bring about conceptual change (see Section 1.2) 
and one of these is the use of bridging analogies (analogies used as stepping- 
stones to bridge students' and scientists' conceptions). With respect to the above, 
it seems timely to review the use of bridging analogies and investigate to what 
extent they succeed in different topics and how they work especially when used in 
a low-key manner. The results may go some way to resolving this argument. 
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Specific research problems and questions 
¢ To investigate whether scientific misconceptions can be overcome by 
the use of bridging analogies. 
It is easier to understand a close analogy than a distant one. Pupils may not be 
willing to accept straightaway that A is analogous to C but, by introducing B, they 
may agree that A and B are analogous as are B and C. Thus, they may become 
more confident in the analogous relationship between A and C. The anchor- 
bridge-target model aims to start where the student is and finish where the 
scientist is, having crossed the chasm using conceptual bridges usually going from 
the very concrete to the rather abstract. 
¢ To analyse the bridging analogy process using phenomenological 
primitives (p-prims). 
P-prims are the very basic notions that pupils hold which have arisen from their 
interaction with the world. When faced with having to explain a phenomenon, p- 
prims are `cued to an active state' depending on the context. Whether they remain 
active depends on the subsequent chain of mental events. An example of a p-prim 
is Ohm's p-prim. This is where effect, resistance and effort are linked: 
Increased effort (same resistance) 
Decreased effort (same resistance) 
Increased resistance (same effort) 
increased effect 
decreased effect 
decreased effect 
This can apply to many situations, e. g. pushing harder against a weight to increase 
motion and increasing current through a resistor by increasing the potential 
difference. If a pupil is asked to explain a phenomenon, something in the question 
may cue this p-prim, which they will consider as an explanation in its own right 
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not needing any further justification. (See Section 1.4 for a more detailed 
discussion of p-prims). 
If the anchor in the analogy process cues a scientifically correct p-prim which is 
then kept in an active state by the bridges until the target is reached, this could be 
why bridging analogies are successful? Alternatively, the introduction of analogy 
could cause the pupils to consciously use the analogy to solve the target problem. 
Therefore, one question is: 
¢ Do p-prims account for any success in this bridging analogy method 
or does the introduction of analogy cause more conscious thought 
processes? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Literature review 
Introduction 
Section 1.1 of the literature review deals with constructivism and constructivists 
since this provides the theoretical perspective to this research. The general ideas of 
constructivism are considered together with those of certain constructivists who 
are felt to be most relevant to this work. These constructivists include von 
Glasersfeld, Piaget, Kelly, Dewey, Vygotsky and Bruner. Some constructivist 
theories which have stemmed from them are also reviewed. 
Section 1.2 concerns teaching strategies. These have a constructivist flavour and 
are generally split into two types: discontinuous and continuous. Discontinuous 
strategies usually involve some sort of cognitive conflict whereas continuous 
strategies tend to start with a student's correct conception, even if it is rather 
unrefined and not particularly `scientific', and go from there. Various strategies 
are discussed together with their advantages and disadvantages. In addition, 
metacognitive approaches are reviewed. This section is included as it helps to 
clarify and fix the teaching strategy to be used in this study. 
Section 1.3 deals with student conceptions, primarily those that have been termed 
misconceptions. A general introduction is given followed by a detailed look at the 
misconceptions considered in this research. 
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In section 1.4 criticisms of misconception research are discussed, particularly its 
seeming disparity with constructivism. Alternatives to misconceptions research 
are reviewed in detail, primarily fine-structure theories such as facets and 
phenomenological primitives (p-prims). Possible links between misconceptions 
and p-prims are made 
Section 1.5 discusses analogies. It starts by giving some examples of where 
analogies have famously been used in the history of science. It then goes on to 
explain more generally about what analogies are, listing their advantages together 
with the attributes that go to make a good analogy. Disadvantages of analogies are 
included. Theories of analogies of the type A: B:: C: D are given followed by a 
discussion on models of teaching analogy. A discussion of analogy and 
unconscious contextual clues follows and it is this which promotes the suggestion 
of using analogy in a low-key manner to cue p-prims. The part on textbook 
analogies gives information on how the analogies used in this research will be 
analysed. The section concludes with a discussion on analogies as advance 
organisers and the links between analogies and models. 
Section 1.6 reviews how analogies fit in with the ideas of constructivism. 
Section 1.7 introduces the work done on bridging analogies as this is the specific 
teaching strategy chosen. 
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1.1 Constructivism and constructivists 
This research is approached from a constructivist perspective, one which views 
constructivism in its broadest sense, incorporating the ideas of von Glasersfeld, 
Piaget, Kelly, Dewey, Vygotsky, Bruner and others. In this section, constructivism 
and its meanings are briefly reviewed and the work of various constructivists is 
examined. It deals with the theories of how children learn in order to provide some 
ideas about what a `deep or meaningful learning' approach might involve. 
`Traditional' methods of teaching made two suppositions. One of these was 
'decomposability'. This means that knowledge and skills can be broken into 
component pieces. The second supposition was `decontextualisation' which 
means that these component pieces can be used in any context (Resnick, 1989). 
These ideas were based on behaviourist psychological theories formed in the early 
part of the twentieth century. The simple skills could be taught and assessed 
separately with the idea that the separate parts could be combined later to develop 
into complex skills (Gipps, 1994). This is known as the `building block' model 
where learning is seen as sequential. Although the idea of decomposability may 
work for some learning, it is of little use for problem-solving since the parts do not 
add up to the whole. It is the interaction between the component pieces and 
knowing which to use that is important for this type of complex skill. For 
example, an unstructured mathematical problem needs more than basic arithmetic 
skills. Although a pupil may be expert at addition, multiplication etc. he or she 
needs to know where and when to use these basic skills and how they fit together. 
It is now becoming accepted that basic skills are strengthened when carrying out 
higher-ordered skills. 
The second assumption of decontextualisation follows on from the first of 
decomposability. If complex skills could be decomposed into discrete simple 
skills then these should have applicability in all contexts (Resnick and Resnick, 
1992). However, it is now being more acknowledged that skills and knowledge 
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are intertwined with the contexts in which they are learnt and practised and there 
is limited transferability (Gipps, 1994; Resnick and Resnick, 1992). One study 
which Gipps (1994) mentions is that of Wolf et al (1992). Trainees in the Youth 
Training Scheme were given tuition on problem-solving tasks either within their 
own discipline or of different sorts and a control group was given no preparation 
at all. Although both experimental groups fared better than the control group when 
carrying out problem-solving tasks outside their discipline, the group which had 
had an assortment of training out-performed the group which had had training 
only within their own discipline. The conclusion reached was that varied practice 
improved generalised learning. 
Current learning theory has its origins in relatively recent work in cognitive 
psychology and constructivism which involves networks and connections. 
Learning does not involve merely recording information and data but interpreting 
them. Learning is regarded as adaptive where schemata are continually 
restructured in the light of new experience and ideas presented (Driver, 1989). 
Constructivism - an introduction 
It is difficult to define constructivism since it is a rather vague term encompassing 
many views. It can be said to originate from Ausubel's often quoted statement - 
"The most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already 
knows. Ascertain this and teach him accordingly. " (Ausubel, 1968 p 406) 
However, this in itself is not a definition and is open to many interpretations. 
Strike (1987) proposed two principles to sum up constructivism: 
1. `The mind' is actively involved in constructing knowledge. 
2. Concepts are invented rather than discovered. 
The first principle, taken with Ausubel's statement, seems to constitute the 
essence of constructivism: that learning is the active application of `the mind' 
dependent on incoming information interacting with existing conceptions. 
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Radical constructivism - von Glasersfeld 
Radical constructivism often uses von Glasersfeld as a reference position. His 
views have been summarised in the following two principles (Glasersfeld 1989, 
p. 162). 
Principle A: The `trivial constructivist principle': "knowledge is not passively 
received but actively built up by the cognizing subject. " 
Principle B: The `radical constructivist principle': "the function of the brain is 
adaptive and serves the organisation of the experiential world, not the discovery of 
ontological reality. " 
Duit (1993) adds the third principle of `viability': it is only the successful 
conceptions that remain. 
From these principles, it may seem that the `mind' and scientists are at odds. The 
mind wishes to build up ideas so that it has control over the world (whether or not 
these ideas are absolutely correct does not matter so long as they work in the 
context in which they are used). However, from a positivist perspective, scientists 
wish to build up a picture of what is ontologically correct, i. e. to find out the true 
nature of reality and how it works. They believe that there is a universal truth, 
unchanging over time and independent of the observer. If science itself is viewed 
from a constructivist perspective, then the `mind' and scientists seem more 
compatible. From this viewpoint, according to Driver et al (1994), "the objects of 
science are not the phenomena of nature but constructs that are advanced by the 
scientific community to interpret nature" (p 5). Science does not aim to give truth 
but to provide a path for interpreting phenomena and coping with the world 
(Kearney, 2002). 
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A major criticism of this flavour of constructivism is the lack of social context 
(Matthews, 1993). It seems to be the individual making sense of the world with no 
input from others and this has led to the criticism that the pupil, in the radical 
constructivist view, is actually cut off from the rest of the world. (e. g. Marton and 
Neuman, 1989). However, von Glasersfeld (Duit, 1993) does realise the 
importance of the social context although he does not enlarge on it in his writing. 
Others have said that it even leads to the denial of the existence of a real world 
outside the individual (e. g. Matthews, 1993). Earnest (1993), however, believes 
that it is consistent with there being a real world but that an individual can have no 
certain knowledge of the reality. 
O'Loughlin (1992) states that constructivism rejects the essentially mutual and 
social character of meaning making and that it is unsound because of its failure to 
deal with the crucial matters of culture, power and discourse in the classroom. 
Others, e. g. Vygotsky, who would still call themselves constructivists, have tried 
to address these issues. 
Interactionism (genetic structuralism) - Piaget 
Introduction 
Piaget was interested in genetic epistemology - the development of knowledge. He 
was one of the first researchers to theorise that children construct their own 
knowledge which is different from that of their parents - knowledge that has to 
evolve and change to become adult knowledge (Bliss, 1993). He also introduced 
the so-called clinical method. A clinical interview (Posner and Gertzog, 1982; 
White, 1985) usually contains a task where the pupil has to work with some 
physical objects. The optimal task is simple and concept-orientated. After the task 
has been completed, the researcher can then ask questions of the pupil concerning 
what they have said or done. This is to explore understanding and should be 
carried out steering clear of leading questions. Later in the interview, alternatives 
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can be suggested to the interviewee to see how secure their original concept is. A 
transcript of the interview is usually informative about what prior knowledge and 
misconceptions a pupil has. Although Piaget is not universally as highly regarded 
now as he once was, there are significant ideas to be gained from his work. 
Piaget's interest lay not in the individual subject but in the epistemic subject - 
"that cognitive nucleus which is common to all subjects at the same level" (Piaget, 
1971, p 139). He wished to study what was universal between children and not 
their individual differences in order to learn about the structure development of 
knowledge rather than psychological issues with individuals (Bliss, 1995). This 
has led to criticisms of his theories as not being entirely applicable to individuals 
and, of course, pupils are individuals (Bliss, ibid). 
Piaget's stage theory 
Piaget proposed that mental structures exist which change as the child develops. 
These he puts into his theory of qualitatively different stages describing the mental 
development from birth to adolescence. The stages are: 
" Sensorimotor 0-2 years Simple reflexive behaviour precedes the capacity 
to form schemata (beginnings of symbolic thought). 
" Preoperational 2-7 years Symbolic thought usage develops together with 
growth of imagination. 
" Concrete Operational 7-11 years Logical thought about physical 
processes develops together with the capacity to perform operations such 
as conservation. 
" Formal Operational 11+ years Ability to think hypothetically and 
abstractly develops. 
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All the stages are experienced but at different ages according to the individual 
child. There was also included the idea of stage mixture. Children might 
understand conservation of length before conservation of quantity but they both 
need the same type of logical operation. This was referred to as `horizontal 
decalage'. 
Two critics of Piaget were Brown and Desforges (1977,1979) who felt that the 
theory was inadequate where it could be tested but that it was mostly untestable. 
They saw the idea of `stage' as being merely definitional and `horizontal decalage' 
as a way of dealing with awkward anomalies. 
Limitations on Piaget's theory include the fact that domain-specific descriptions 
are few, certainly in the stage of formal operational thinking and this makes it 
difficult when dealing with secondary education. Learning has been claimed by 
several researchers to be domain-specific rather than the more general operational 
schemes that Piaget identified in the formal reasoning stage (Carey, 1985). It was 
once thought that problems are-context free (Resnick and Resnick, 1992) whereas 
it is now felt that there is a close connection between skills and contexts. Research 
by Simon et al (1994), for example, found little consistency in children's 
responses between similar problems set in different contexts. 
Students tend to differentiate their knowledge into domains and teachers should 
aim to help them to integrate these domains (Linn and Songer, 1993). Too much 
differentiation leads to isolating tiny areas of understanding and not being able to 
deal with problems in different contexts. This is easy to do when work is not fully 
understood. If the cognitive goals are not easily reached using constructive 
processes then pupils may resort to memorisation techniques. 
Yet another stumbling block is that formal operational thought may not be 
attained by up to 80% of 16 year olds (end of compulsory education in England) 
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(Shayer et al, 1976). Even well educated adults find tests much easier when they 
are based on concrete examples (Johnson-Laird et al, 1972). 
More recent evidence (Donaldson, 1987) has shown that children are not as 
egocentric as Piaget supposed. Often, the experiments that he set up had little 
meaning for the child who did not always understand what was required. When 
they were made less abstract, the findings showed less egocentricism. One 
example of this is a situation set up by Hughes (1975). It consisted of two walls 
which made a cross and two dolls, one of which was a policeman and the other a 
small boy. The object of the experiment was to see whether a child could place the 
boy doll so that the policeman doll could not see him. This required the child to 
consider the viewpoint of the policeman and thus not be egocentric. The children 
(three-and-a-half to five years) tested using this were 90% successful in their 
answers. Thus, when the task makes sense to a child and he or she fully 
understands what to do, there is evidence that the child can show an ability to not 
be egocentric. It was felt that Piaget's tasks were often complicated and confusing 
for the children interviewed. 
Children are also better able to reason than Piaget gathered from the results to his 
experiments. Again, failure of the experimental set-up, including the exact 
wording of the questions, may be to blame for lack of convincing results 
(Donaldson, 1987). 
One of the greatest criticisms of Piaget's underestimation of childhood reasoning 
powers comes from learning language (Donaldson, 1987). Piaget thought that 
children under seven were extremely limited in their reasoning powers. However, 
they use grammar rules before that age. This is not just mere copying but building 
up and using grammar rules. A child might say, "I goed to the seaside". This 
shows that they have constructed the usual rule for the past perfect tense by adding 
`ed' to the verb. Chomsky provided an explanation of this by introducing the 
`language acquisition device' (LAD) that is supposed to be highly specific towards 
27 
language development. However, it does seem unlikely that language develops on 
its own without other complementary skills. Macnamara (1972) proposed the 
concurrent acquisition of being able to make sense of or interpret situations that 
involve direct human interaction. 
Piaget as a structuralist 
Piaget saw the fundamental ideas of structuralism as being useful in finding 
similarities between different types of knowledge. 
Piaget notes three main ideas concerning structure. These were wholeness, 
transformation and self-regulation. Wholeness meant that the structure was more 
than a sum of the parts. Transformation meant that the laws of structure are both 
structuring and being restructured. Self-regulation meant that there was self- 
maintenance and closure. 
Structuralism sees phenomena as interlinked rather than isolated and the shift in 
focus is to examine the relationship between the phenomena. For example, in the 
social sciences, structuralism downplays the role of the individual subject whilst 
stressing the structured nature of the human condition with its inherent 
restrictions and organization (Piaget, 1971), hence Piaget's concentration on the 
epistemic subject. 
Piaget as a constructivist 
In general, criticisms have been about Piaget's stage theory rather than his 
constructivist approach. 
Not only did Piaget want to know about the structures of knowledge, he wished 
also to know how they developed. This developmental or genetic structuralism is 
what Piaget called `interactionism' which he later interpreted as a kind of 
constructivism. Constructivism for Piaget entailed the child constructing his or her 
own logical ideas through interaction with the environment (Bliss, 1993). 
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Piaget identified various processes that he regarded as being innate, universal and 
age-independent. These are assimilation, accommodation and equilibration. 
Assimilation refers to the process of incorporating new information into existing 
schemata. However, new data do not always fit into existing schemata and there 
must be an adjustment of thinking in order to deal with this; this is the process of 
accommodation. The processes of assimilation and accommodation are 
intertwined and both are always present to some degree in each interaction of 
external data and schemata. The whole process of dealing with new information is 
known as equilibration. This can be summarised as in Figure 1. 
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EXISTING SCHEMATA NEW DATA / 
+ EXPERIENCES 
DOES NEW DATA / 
EXPERIENCE FIT 
INTO EXISTING 
SCHEMATA? 
yes 
EXISTING SCHEMATA 
CONTINUED - 
ASSIMILATION 
EQUILIBRATION 
SCHEMATA 
MODIFIED - 
ACCOMMODATION 
Figure 1 Piaget's processes of assimilation, accommodation and equilibration 
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This model has been criticised by several authors. Brainerd (1978) said that it was 
merely descriptive without being explanatory. Olsen (1978) argues, however, that 
Brainerd is approaching the problem from an empirical-positivist viewpoint rather 
than from a structuralist view of Piaget. The two can be valid but not compatible. 
Piaget influenced much of what still takes place in science laboratories. His idea 
that mental activity is internally focused led to the hypothesis-testing approach 
where the pupil is meant to discover concepts by applying logical thought to the 
results of their own experiments. `Hands-on' science became important and 
teachers came to assume a supportive role (Trumbell, 1990). A specific example 
of Piaget's influence was in the Cognitive Acceleration through Science 
Education (CASE) project (see pages 53-54) which was designed to speed up the 
cognitive development of children - in Piagetian terms, to accelerate their progress 
from concrete to formal operational thinking. It was based partly on Piaget's 
`cognitive conflict'. The concept that the stages of cognitive development are the 
same for all children led to curricula that depended heavily on the developmental 
level of the students rather than their previous experience, individuality, or the 
social arena. 
In summary, Piaget established a tradition by developing the clinical method. He 
also held the idea that children's ideas are fundamentally different to those of 
adults. His ideas of assimilation, accommodation and equilibration put the child at 
the centre of the teaching-learning interaction. 
Individual constructivism - Kelly's theory of personal constructs 
Kelly also had a constructivist approach although he focused more on the 
individual than the epistemic subject of Piaget. 
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He used the model of `man-the-scientist' (Kelly, 1955) since each person needs to 
be able to predict and possibly control everyday events in much the same way as 
scientists predict and control events. In order to do this, a person views the world 
through "transparent patterns" or constructs, which we use to "fit over the realities 
of which the world is composed" (ibid, pp 8-9). The fit is sometimes poor but 
necessary if one is to make any sense of the world at all. The constructs are 
revised as they are tested against the outcome of events. 
Each person makes their own constructs that are unique to that person although 
they may share common ground with others. 
He also took the opposite view from Piaget about self-regulation. Piaget thought 
that the child was not aware of the processes of the construction of cognitive 
structures whereas Kelly held the view of conscious self-regulation of the child. 
Kelly versus Piaget in science instruction 
Translation of Piaget's ideas into teaching seems somewhat easier than those of 
Kelly. Since Kelly concentrates on the different construct system of individuals, 
teachers would have to be aware of all these in order to prepare individual 
teaching/learning plans and strategies. Piaget's ideas provide us with a more 
general, average view although this has its own problems. One of these is that, if 
pupils of the same age are being taught, Piaget would lead us to believe that they 
are not all at the same stage. In any case, will the same strategy work with all 
pupils even if they are at the same stage? 
Learning in interactive environments - Dewey Roschelle, 1995) 
Whereas Piaget focused on the growth of structure, Dewey concentrated on 
experience - reflecting on experience is an active transaction and depends on prior 
knowledge. When we are confused or uncertain about an experience, we make use 
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of 'inquiry'. This uses, according to Dewey (1938), reflection on experience and 
experiment to transform schemata and perception in order to bring coherence, co- 
ordination and meaning to our transactions. 
Dewey believed that time, tools and talk were effective ways to allow inquiry to 
succeed. Challenging experiences are necessary to transform prior knowledge but 
Dewey did not see placing explicit conflict between prior knowledge and 
scientific concepts in children's minds as being an appropriate way of proceeding. 
He believed that inquiry happens, not in the head, but in interaction with the 
environment and with others. He was very much a social constructivist. 
Sociocultural constructivism - Vygotsky (Roschelle, 1995) 
Piaget could be said to have minimised the importance of social interaction 
whereas Vygotsky felt it to be of utmost importance. 
His main attitudinal difference from Piaget is that, whereas Piaget saw the driving 
force for development as being internal, Vygotsky felt it to be external, being 
provided in the main by the teacher. Learning was, for him, a two-way social 
interaction between teacher and child (and between children). This interaction 
largely depended on language as a tool. Language takes a central role in his theory 
of the development of thought processes, in both their formation and 
reorganisation (Howe, 1996). Because of this two-way interaction involving 
verbal communication, Vygotsky has cast the teacher in a far more important role 
than Piaget ever did. 
Vygotsky saw children as having spontaneous concepts which are not in conflict. 
These grow upwards in generality and, in doing so, allow the possibility of more 
systematic reasoning. While this is occurring, scientific concepts from the 
scientific community, e. g. teachers, feed downwards in order to deal with the 
spontaneous concepts. The intertwining which occurs does so against a 
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background of social interaction in which one of the main tools is language. 
Vygotsky introduced the term of `zone of proximal development' (ZPD). This is 
the area between what the child can do without help and with help in the form of 
social interaction. The child is forever being drawn upwards with his or her prior 
knowledge being restructured during social discourse against a cultural 
background. This is shown in Figure 2. 
34 
4) 
N 
rZ 
a ss, 3 a °' 
ä) 
U 
Cd 
a) 
H 
I- 
Q 
a N 
N 
crs 
Ö 
aý3 
Nv 
w 
HFj 
1 
.i 
ir 
I 
Q 
N 
I 
1-4 ¢ 
Ü 
ý H ý ) 
N 
O 
N 
Q) 
'C3 
cý 
X 
O 
O 
N 
O 
N 
Cl) 
O 
bA 
N 
N 
bA 
M 
One way to help the pupil in this upward journey is to provide `scaffolding'. An 
example would be to allow the child to concentrate on just one aspect of a task. 
Teachers provide the scaffolding which can link a child's present level with his 
potential level. This support is gradually removed as the child reaches the new 
level (Gipps, 1994). This can be extended to scaffolded assessment. This needs to 
be interactive where the teacher can question and probe the pupil to try to allow 
him to reach the next level. The degree of help required would be a good 
predictive indicator of potential within a domain (Brown et al, 1993). Of course, 
the major problem with interactive assessment is that it needs to be on an 
individual basis and, to be economically viable, it is unlikely that assessment, for 
accountability purposes at least, will ever be like this (Gipps 1994). Another way 
to assist would be for the teacher to reason aloud about a problem so the pupil can 
learn by imitation. A third way is to use `mediational means' to increase the 
pupil's ability to compare their understanding with that of others and perhaps then 
begin to act on it. An example of mediational means is giving the correct 
terminology about a topic so that when a pupil uses a scientific word or term it is 
being used to mean the same thing as when other pupils or the teacher use it. An 
example is the word 'force'. It is important that both the pupils and the teacher use 
the word with the same scientific meaning otherwise many misunderstandings and 
misconceptions can occur. 
Bruner 
Bruner was a psychologist and in the 1960s he developed a theory of cognitive 
growth, approaching the subject from a different angle to Piaget. He was 
concerned more with environmental and experiential factors influencing an 
individual's intellectual growth. He suggested that development is in gradual 
alterations in how the mind is used. 
In his landmark book, The process of education (Bruner, 1960), he viewed 
children as active problem solvers who were always ready to learn a topic, even a 
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difficult one, albeit on a simplified level. This led to the idea of the spiral 
curriculum. "A curriculum as it develops should revisit these basic ideas 
repeatedly, building upon them until the student has grasped the full formal 
apparatus that goes with them" (ibid p 13). Pupils may not fully appreciate all the 
steps of an argument but may intuitively grasp the conclusion at an early age. The 
necessary gaps can be plugged when the topic is revisited. 
For Bruner, a major aspect of teaching and learning was that of structure rather 
than facts. 
The teaching and learning of structure, rather than simply the 
mastery of facts and techniques, is at the center of the classic 
problem of transfer... If earlier learning is to render later learning 
easier, it must do so by providing a general picture in terms of 
which the relations between things encountered earlier and later 
are made as clear as possible. (Ibid, p 12). 
He also felt that motivation for learning should be in the topic itself rather than in 
passing examinations or gaining a good mark. 
As Bruner developed his theories he became more influenced by Vygotsky's ideas 
and placed learning within a social and cultural context. 
Information Processing Psychology (Roschelle, 1995) 
In the second part of the 20th century Information Processing models were 
suggested, using the analogy of the mind as a computer of symbolic data. The 
more successful models were based on Piaget's ideas of accommodation where 
schemata are modified and assimilation where data are made to fit existing 
schemata. Unfortunately, these models have not worked well where there are 
many misconceptions, as the brain cannot be completely reprogrammed as can a 
computer. Nor are computers competent at social interaction. However, 
Information Processing is useful in allowing prior knowledge to be described 
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precisely and it can also provide the learner with tools such as `semantic 
networks' and `tree diagrams' to reflect on prior knowledge and understand 
associations and hierarchies. 
Situated Learning (Brown, Collins and Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988) 
Roschelle (1995) explains that Situated Learning has been only recently 
introduced as a theory (towards the latter part of the 1980s), partly in response to 
Information Processing's apparent lack of focus on the physical and social 
context. Situated Learning incorporates the ideas of Dewey that all learning 
happens during experiential transactions and Vygotsky's ideas that learning 
happens within a social context. 
Brown (2000) refers to Bruner's observation that being a physicist is more than 
being able to recite and use the explicit knowledge of the field. There is a lot of 
implicit or tacit knowledge that physicists have. This includes things like being 
able to decide what is an interesting problem, being able to approach it as a 
physicist would and deciding whether a proof is just acceptable or excellent. To be 
a competent physicist one must be able to see the interaction between the explicit 
and implicit knowledge. This can only happen within a `community of practice' 
where ideas and ways of working and approaching the subject are shared 
(Breslow, 2001). 
In Situated Learning, enculturation is thus a very important concept and it focuses 
on participation in a community-based culture rather than on knowledge per se. 
Lave and Wenger (1989) have suggested that learning takes place on the edge of 
the community ('legitimate peripheral participation'), e. g. schools and clubs. From 
the periphery, the learner moves slowly towards the centre. 
There is debate as to how different scientific knowledge is from ordinary 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge does often seem different from ordinary 
38 
knowledge and, indeed, traditionally philosophers have attempted to search for a 
differentiation but without much success (Roschelle, 1995). A different view 
comes from others such as Latour (1987) and Knorr (1981) who maintain that the 
characteristics of scientific knowledge come from the shared practices of scientific 
communities. Scientific knowledge is not some different sort of knowledge 
altogether but it is the refinement of ordinary knowledge. Prior knowledge is 
moulded into scientific knowledge using the social interaction of the scientific 
community. This, of course, fits in with the ideas of Situated Learning; a learner is 
slowly transformed into a scientist by being part of that community. 
Framework for this research 
Ausubel 
Von 
Glasersfeld 
(radical 
constructivism) 
Piaget 
(growth of 
structure in 
epistemic 
subject) 
Kelly 
(individual 
subject) 
Dewey Vygotsk Bruner 
(experiential y 
interaction) (social 
intejaction) 
Information Processing 
Psychology 
Figure 3 How constructivist theories relate 
Situated 
Learning 
Figure 3 shows how the various constructivist theories discussed relate to each 
other. The stance for this research is from the theories of several constructivists 
already mentioned. Piaget's concrete and formal operational stages are used as 
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being the levels of most of the 12-13 year-olds in the sample being studied. 
Learning is seen as taking place in a social context with teachers providing the 
Vygotskian scaffolding necessary to allow the pupil to successfully reach the next 
level. However, learning is also perceived as occurring during Dewey's 
experiential interactions and reflections on them. 
There were certain limitations as to how these constructivist theories could be 
used in the context of this research. The background of the author was in the 
physical sciences and a decision was taken to approach the research using a quasi- 
experimental design, that is, using control and experimental groups, interventions 
and controlling other variables as much as possible. The data produced would be 
subject to statistical analysis using t-tests. One of the disadvantages of this 
approach is the partial lack of social interaction. This is a major drawback since 
many modem constructivists such as Vygotsky and Bruner, who promote the idea 
of social constructivism, see the interaction in the classroom between teacher and 
pupil and between pupil and pupil as being of paramount importance. Since the 
groups are to be treated the same apart from the actual use of the bridging 
analogies, much of the normal topic discussion needs to be carefully controlled. 
Although the teacher will discuss the differences and similarities between the 
anchor, bridging analogies and the target with the pupils where appropriate, there 
can be no discussion between pupils. The pupils will not be able to discuss their 
thoughts and answers among themselves. This is not meant as a rejection of social 
constructivism but is a consequence of the methodological approach chosen. This 
limitation needs to be considered when the conclusions are drawn. 
The use of bridging analogies (see chapter 1.7) in this research is seen as 
providing scaffolding in the Vygotskian sense to bridge the gap between the 
anchor at the pupil's level and the target at a higher level to provide a basis for 
understanding a topic. However, they are not full explanations but these can be 
given when the topic is revisited in line with Bruner's spiral curriculum. 
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1.2 Teaching and learning models and approaches 
Constructivism and teaching 
Although constructivism is a theory or, to be more exact, a collection of theories, 
of the development of knowledge, it does not dictate exactly how the knowledge 
should be taught. However, learning and teaching must be closely aligned and 
constructivism suggests several teaching strategies and ideas. Some of these are: 
refection, metacognition, discussion, images, ideas in different contexts, 
questioning, hands-on investigation and analogies. Constructivism has paved the 
way for various teaching models. Conceptual change is the generally accepted 
term for learning science from the constructivist angle (Duit, 1999). Scott (1992) 
suggests that there are three levels involved for the teacher: 
1. There must be a learning environment to support conceptual change. 
2. Teaching strategies must be chosen. 
3. Specific learning tasks must be selected which fit into the teaching strategy 
framework. 
When considering the possible teaching strategies, prior conceptions and intended 
learning outcomes must be considered. In addition, the intellectual steps that the 
student ideally will actually make should be viewed. 
Even when pupils have supposedly learned a new idea they will still tend to revert 
to their previous conceptions (Linn and Songer, 1993). It is as if they have 
accepted the new ideas superficially but their previous notions are too well 
embedded to be permanently changed. Posner et al. (1982) believe that several 
conditions must be met in order for a conception to be fully accepted and retained 
by a pupil. First, there must be some sort of dissatisfaction with the current 
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conception held. After that, they consider that the new idea must be intelligible, 
plausible and fruitful. In other words, the pupil must understand the concept and 
see that it makes sense as an alternative to his or her prior ideas. However, this on 
its own is not enough. The pupil must have some incentive to accept the 
conception. It must be able to explain or predict things in a better way than before. 
It is only then that the pupil will permanently replace his or her previous ideas 
with the new. In their theory, dissatisfaction must come first, followed by 
intelligibility. If the new concept is not intelligible, plausibility will not follow. 
Finally, the pupil will not find the idea fruitful unless it is intelligible and 
plausible. 
There are two main types of strategy available for conceptual change as viewed 
from the constructivist angle (Duit, 1994): 
1. Discontinuous - revolutionary - usually containing cognitive conflict 
2. Continuous - evolutionary - starting from students' conceptions and using, for 
example, bridging analogies or re-interpretation of students' concepts (e. g. 
electrical energy is used up in a bulb, not current). 
Scott et al (1992) suggest that the former strategy stems from Piagetian theory of 
accommodation whereas the latter follows from the work of Vygotsky with its 
`scaffolding' provided by the teacher. 
1. Discontinuous 
According to Posneret al. (1982), there are two main processes that are involved 
in conceptual change and these are assimilation and accommodation although it is 
to the latter that reference is usually made. In the traditional conceptual change 
method based on their work, the teacher makes the pupils' conceptions explicit 
and then uses examples to promote cognitive conflict and dissatisfaction. After the 
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dissatisfaction is acknowledged, the correct, scientific explanation is given. In this 
way, accommodation takes place. Thus, the rather general Conceptual Change 
Model (CCM) sees learning as deconstructing misconceptions and constructing 
scientific conceptions instead. 
In this model, a pupil's `conceptual ecology' is supposed to mediate intelligibility, 
plausibility and fruitfulness of a concept. Conceptual ecology was a term coined 
by Toulmin (1972) to cover the explicit and implicit beliefs held by the pupil. 
Strike and Posner (1992) extended this idea to encompass such things as 
"anomalies, analogies and metaphors, exemplars and images, past experiences, 
epistemological commitments, metaphysical beliefs and knowledge in other 
fields" (Duit and Treagust, 2003, p 674). 
Pupils may even hold conflicting ideas about related phenomena (Driver et al, 
1994) although Engel (1982), Hewson and Thorley (1989) and others do not 
believe that children can hold two conflicting ideas simultaneously. These two 
views may not be at odds since a pupil might not see the phenomena as being 
related and so having different explanations for each is simply an example of 
domain differentiation. 
The CCM is deeply rooted in Piagetian constructivism ideas but is seen by some 
to be too narrow. Tobin (1989), from a radical constructivist position, points 
towards constant negotiation as the important process together with `minds-on' 
activities and plenty of discussion. Driver and Oldham (1986) coming from a 
more sociocultural perspective produced the Constructivist Teaching Sequence 
(CTS) where pupils compare their ideas and the scientific ideas. The teacher's role 
is to introduce concepts, symbols and conventions of the scientific community. 
First, the pupils are motivated to learn the topic and then they make their thoughts 
on the topic explicit through discussing, drawing posters or writing. Following 
this is the restructuring phase in which pupils and teacher exchange and elucidate 
views by discussing, promote conceptual conflict with demonstrations, and 
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evaluate different ideas. The pupils can then use the new ideas in different 
contexts, both fresh and familiar. Reviewing of the ideas then takes place so the 
pupils can see how their concepts have changed. 
Recently, more emphasis has been put on amalgamating theories of learning; 
integrating ideas from radical constructivism and social constructivism (Duit and 
Treagust, 1998). Although each individual constructs his or her own concepts, it is 
against a backdrop of social and cultural factors. The individual is unique among 
many. 
A selection of methods of teaching using this broad band of approach is 
summarised in Table 1 together with the general method. 
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A deviation from this general method was introduced by Rowell and Dawson 
(1985). This involves a direct comparison between students' ideas and a scientific 
idea in trying to solve a problem. Further problems are then examined in as wide a 
range of contexts as possible. 
The status a particular conception has in an individual's mind is important. 
(Hewson, 1982; Hewson and Lemberger, 2000; Hewson and Thorley, 1989). It is 
useful when analyzing how students' conceptions change over time. Hewson sees 
dissatisfaction as occurring when two conceptions are compared. If the new 
conception does not promote dissatisfaction, then it is assimilated in conjunction 
with the pre-existing conception (conceptual capture). However, if dissatisfaction 
does occur, then it will depend on which conception has the higher status as to 
whether there is conceptual exchange (accommodation). Even if there is, the 
original conception is never entirely extinguished and may be brought to the fore 
later. This sounds very similar to diSessa's theory of p-prims (see section 1.4) 
Furuya (1993) has found that many students are not aware of their misconceptions 
and their knowledge and ideas are isolated mini-concepts not building up to a 
whole theory. They are not consistent in their answers to different questions (in 
this case, mechanics questions). He proposed a strategy called the method of 
elaboration which included the following: prediction, reason, experiment, 
prediction, correct or not, and reason. This differs from normal procedure in the 
way that problems are treated simultaneously rather than consecutively to form a 
system of concepts rather than isolated ones. 
2. Continuous 
These methods are based on the students' own correct, if naive, conceptions. They 
are used as the starting point in the teaching process and are manipulated in such a 
way that they become more scientifically correct. The selection in Table 2 
indicates the variety of approaches. 
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A rather different type of approach has been devised by Niedderer (1987). In this 
approach, established in the New Philosophy of Science (Brown, 1977), there is an 
attempt to allow pupils to realise that there is everyday knowledge and also 
specialized knowledge, for example, scientific knowledge (Scott et al, 1992). 
They learn the differences between the two and the approach consists of six steps: 
1. Preparation: previous teaching about the topic and ideas and tools to be 
used. 
2. Initiation: the problem (open-ended) is introduced. 
3. Performance: this may include thinking of questions or hypotheses, 
planning and carrying out experiments, discussions of theory and bringing 
together findings. 
4. Discussion of findings: this takes place as class discussion. 
5. Comparison with science: A comparison is made with similar historical 
and/or modern ideas. Possible reasons for differences are discussed. 
6. Reflection: pupils think about difficulties or questions that have occurred. 
Evaluation of teaching strategies 
McCasland (1987) found that `bright' children resisted conceptual conflict 
curricula more than other pupils. This seems to be in direct contrast to Dreyfus, 
Jungwirth and Eliovitch (1990) who found that "bright successful students reacted 
enthusiastically to cognitive conflicts. " They especially liked the 'flabbergasting 
effect' of the approach. However, "unsuccessful students .... 
have been shown to 
develop negative self-images, negative attitudes towards school and school tasks 
and high levels of anxiety. " Because of this "they tried to avoid the conflicts. They 
were most characteristically apologetic when confronted with a conflict which, to 
them, seemed to represent just another failure" (pp 565-566). Stavy (1991) 
supports this latter view claiming that this type of approach can lead to loss of 
confidence for the pupil and also, sometimes, regression. 
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Cognitive conflict strategies do seem to be at odds with the ideas of 
constructivism. Constructivism depends on previous conceptions but if these are 
erroneous it is difficult to see how new correct knowledge can be constructed. 
This has been called the `paradox of continuity' (Roschelle, 1991). 
Some strategies require pupils to suggest alternative ideas and the teacher may 
have to suggest the scientific view, if it is not forthcoming from the pupils in order 
to bring it to the students' notice. Far from being a disadvantage, Scott et al (1992) 
consider this to be a vital part of science education. Teachers have the task of 
initiating pupils to the `ways of science'. 
The learning environment must be supportive of these strategies. Often, pupils 
who are not used to these teaching methods do not consider discussion of 
conflicting ideas as necessary or important since all they want to know is the 
correct answer (ibid, 1992). 
A further problem in cognitive conflict strategies is whether the pupil appreciates 
that there is a conflict. Even minor changes in emphasis when discussing a 
problem can lead to pupils giving different explanations and they see no conflict 
in this (Minstrell, 1992). 
It is relatively difficult to assess the success or otherwise of cognitive conflict 
methods since they are different in their aims from traditional methods. 
Wandersee et al (1993) are optimistic about such intervention studies but criticise 
the methodology in terms of "small sample sizes, untested methods, anecdotal 
records and relatively non-rigorous research designs lacking control group 
comparisons" (quoted in Duit, 1994, p 19). They add that hardly any of the studies 
have been replicated. 
Continuous strategy methods are more teacher-led but include negotiation with 
pupils. This is a process providing scaffolding in the Vygotskian sense (see page 
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36). The pupils are carefully led to a deeper and broader understanding of 
scientific concepts from a rather tenuous but correct position. More details on the 
success or otherwise of this type of strategy, in particular, bridging analogies can 
be found in the section 2.1 which deals with previous research on this subject. 
Guzetti and Glass (1992) seem confident of the success of this type of intervention 
(continuous or discontinuous), having carried out a meta-analysis of 70 
intervention studies. 
Most methods, whether of the continuous or discontinuous type, involve making 
the pupil aware of their conceptions. In contrast, Jung (1989) has investigated 
ways of changing conceptions without the pupil being aware of their 
preconceptions. However, Duit (1994) maintained that this type of strategy does 
not allow the students to be in control of their learning and to reflect on it in a 
metacognitive manner. 
Metaco. nition 
There are several interpretations of metacognition but the basic meaning is 
`thinking about thinking', an ability associated with higher order thinking. It can 
be regarded in two main ways. One way is as a `going-beyond' present reasoning 
ability. Adey and Shayer (1994) have suggested that this meaning is akin to 
`construction zone activity'. This term was introduced by Newman et al (1989) 
using Vygotsky's idea of ZPD. However, Adey and Shayer have rejected this 
meaning and have concentrated on the notion of `going-above' and being able to 
look at, name and reflect on one's reasoning strategies. A possible reason for the 
confusion in meaning is that a `going-above' often follows a `going-beyond'. A 
new rule or concept can be followed by a realisation of having discovered the rule. 
An advantage of being able to metacognise is that a pupil can take strategies 
learned and used in one context and transfer them to another context. Without this 
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ability, complex thinking strategies would have to be reinvented for each and 
every context. 
Review of Thinking Skills Instruction Programmes (Aden and Shaver, 1994) 
Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT - de Bono 
de Bono (1976) introduced a set of 60 lessons for pupils aged 12+. It is based on a 
collection of heuristics for thinking which becomes part of a pupil's strategy in 
solving new problems. It is context-independent and promotes divergent and 
lateral thinking. One problem with CoRT is that the pupils who would benefit 
most from the materials would be in the early formal operational stage or above 
i. e. an above average 14-15 year-old (at least one standard deviation above 
average), since it is only then that they could make good use of divergent thinking 
(Hudson, 1966). Although it became popular, the evaluations of the method have 
not yet proved it to be effective. 
`Philosophy for children' - Lipman 
Lipman, a philosopher who thought that reasoning patterns of discussion and 
argument lay at the heart of effective thinking, introduced `philosophy for 
children' in America. It is based on a metacognitive approach where the child's 
reasoning is made explicit and has remained popular since the early 1970s in the 
US. It is aimed at children of 10-16 years old. Evaluations have found it to be 
successful in teaching logical reasoning and there were significant (p < 0.001) 
gains in standard maths and reading tests (Lipman et al, 1980). However, there do 
not seem to have been any long-term follow-up evaluations. 
Instrumental Enrichment (IE) - Feuerstein 
This generally successful project was introduced to try to improve the self- 
concept, motivation and intellectual processing ability of Middle Eastern Jewish 
immigrants to Israel who had been traumatised by the holocaust. Feuerstein used 
the psychometric model of mental abilities (spatial relations, verbal reasoning 
etc. ), Piaget, Information Processing Psychology, Cognitive Psychology and 
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Vygotsky's idea of ZPD. The programme was context-independent but 
encouraged bridging to school subjects. 
Applied IE 
Context-delivered interventions include Mehl's (1985) attempt to teach physics to 
a group of first-year medical students. This was based on an IE approach and was 
successful for the part of the course that had been treated this way. However, the 
students do not seem to have been able to generalise their thinking ability to other 
parts of the course. 
Another example of applied IE is that of Strang's study that supported Mehl's 
results (Froufe, 1987; Strang and Shayer, 1993). This study concerned the 
teaching of chemistry to 14 year-olds using IE. They found that some of the pupils 
benefited a lot although some did not. The conclusions reached were that IE might 
have relevance in science teaching in concept understanding and in problem 
solving. 
Review of Intervention Studies (Ader and Shayer, 1994) 
There have been various intervention studies that have attempted to speed up the 
change from concrete to formal operational thinking. Many occurred due to the 
broader ability range of those entering universities in the US in the seventies. 
More students than before were still at the concrete level. These interventions 
were mainly Piaget based and included `Forum for Scientific Enquiry' and 
ADAPT. 
Some projects aimed to train pupils in one or two formal reasoning patterns and 
were not particularly successful in allowing pupils to transfer higher thinking 
patterns taught in one context to another. 
Further studies have shown that, if pupils have the necessary thinking skills at 
concrete level but find these are not enough for solving a problem, they will 
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construct higher forms of reasoning that can be generalised. This is an example of 
metaconstruction where students construct their own ways of dealing with 
problems. 
Cognitive acceleration through science education (CASE) 
One of the more successful approaches towards improving achievement in science 
education has been through cognitive acceleration. CASE (Adey, Shayer and 
Yates, 1990) seems to have had far reaching effects beyond the implementation of 
the intervention in terms of both time and curriculum area. The project introduced 
activities taking up a quarter of the science timetable. These activities were 
science based although not necessarily part of the usual science curriculum. The 
pupils were aged 11-13 and covered a wide ability range. There were also control 
classes who carried on with their normal science lessons presumably being able to 
spend longer on each topic than the experimental classes. After two years there 
was no further intervention and all the classes were taught their normal 
curriculum, sometimes not as separate class groups and, indeed, sometimes not 
even in the same school. 
Careful methodology was used in the project. Before embarking on the materials, 
both control and experimental groups were tested for their reasoning ability and 
again after the intervention, this time together with a science achievement test. In 
the long term, their GCSE (examinations taken at age 16) results were analysed 
for as many of the control and experimental pupils as possible. The results of their 
examinations in English and maths were included as well as their science results. 
The immediate post-test results were encouraging but it was the long term GCSE 
results which were most supportive of the intervention as the pupils of some of the 
experimental groups had, on average, achieved better grades than those in their 
matched control groups. This was significant for the girls who had started the 
intervention at age 11+ and for the boys who had started at 12+. This was true in 
all the subjects analysed. 
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The success of the project has led to many schools adopting the CASE philosophy 
or, at the very least, using some of the materials available (Adey, Shayer and 
Yates, 1989). 
The key principles involved in the approach are based on the work of Piaget, 
Vygotsky, Feuerstein and others and are: cognitive conflict, reflection on thinking 
(metacognition), bridging (transference of a thinking skill learnt in one context to 
another context) and reasoning patterns. Higher-level thinking has been shown to 
have various characteristic sorts of reasoning. Some of these are control of 
variables, proportionality, equilibria, ascribing probability values to cause and 
effect relationships and understanding correlational relationships between 
variables (Adey, Shayer and Yates, 1990). The success of the approach owes 
much to the teachers having special training (Harlen, 1999). 
Adey and Shayer (1994) have put together a set of desirable characteristics that 
any intervention to accelerate higher order thinking should have. These are (Adey 
and Shayer, 1994): 
" Duration and density 
" Concrete preparation 
" Cognitive conflict 
" Construction 
" Metacognition 
" Bridging 
Summary 
There are many aspects to consider in finding ways to permanently change pupils' 
conceptions. Against a background of constructivism, there seems to be a choice 
between continuous and discontinuous methods. Both of these have advantages 
and disadvantages, and both have met with limited success. More general thinking 
skills need to be addressed including the concrete to formal operational thinking 
changeover. 
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1.3 Students' conceptions and misconceptions 
Kelly (1955) suggested that misconceptions are difficult to change since it would 
mean that one could not predict and have the possibility of controlling events if 
one were at some mid-way point between casting off the misconception and 
accepting the new conception. In fact, pupils may be reluctant to voice their ideas 
in case they had to test them before they were ready. 
Smith, diSessa and Roschelle (1993), looking at research on misconceptions, put 
together several common threads (whilst recognising a wide diversity of ideas) as 
follows: 
" Students have misconceptions. 
" Misconceptions originate in prior learning. 
" Misconceptions can be stable and widespread among students. They 
can be strongly held and resistant to change. 
" Misconceptions interfere with learning. 
" Misconceptions must be replaced. 
" Instruction should confront misconceptions. 
" Research should identify misconceptions. 
The following misconceptions are under scrutiny in this research. 
Heat misconceptions 
1) Thermal equilibrium (Heat 
Scientific view - If objects are in a room of constant temperature 
for long enough, 
they will all attain and stay at room temperature. The objects will be in thermal 
equilibrium. A metal object may feel cold when touched because of heat transfer 
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from our warmer bodies to the colder metal object. Because metal is a good 
conductor of heat, heat transfer takes place quickly leaving our hand feeling cold 
Misconceptions - Many pupils do not subscribe to these ideas. Engel Clough and 
Driver (1985) studied 84 students over a full ability range (aged 12-16) from three 
city comprehensives in England. One of the tasks given was as follows. Students 
were presented with a metal and a plastic plate which they were told had been in 
the room overnight. Initially, they were asked whether a thermometer held in 
contact with the plates would read the same or differently. They were then asked 
to explain why the metal plate felt colder. For this task, only 6% showed an 
understanding that different substances feel different because heat travels through 
them at different rates. Some said that metal is naturally cold, possibly because of 
its smooth, shiny and hard surface. Some stated that the metal attracts cold or 
loses heat to the surroundings. Jara-Guerrero (1993), in his work with rural and 
urban elementary school children (aged seven to 11) as well as with high school 
students also identified the idea that objects have their own temperature. Brook et 
al (1984) found that students thought of the cold feel of the metal as being due to 
coldness entering the body from the metal. Of their sample of 300 fifteen-year- 
olds, 15% understood heat transfer when it was towards the body but only 6% 
understood it when it was away from the body. This may be partly due to everyday 
language. A person may say, "The oven burned me" which suggests that the oven 
has actively passed its heat to the person. No such statement applies to the passing 
of heat away from someone, in everyday language. 
The conceptions of the older students were found to be more deeply rooted than 
those of the younger ones and thus more difficult to change. Jara-Guerrero (op. 
cit. ) proposed introduction of the concepts at a much earlier stage than usual. 
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Radiation and absorption (Heat 2) 
This misconception was chosen from direct experience. In tests and examinations, 
pupils often cannot recall the fact that good radiators of heat are also good 
absorbers of heat. Although this linkage can be demonstrated, it cannot easily be 
explained to 12-13 year-old pupils. This means that it is difficult for them to retain 
the information, as they have no model of what is happening. Pupils may associate 
it with `good conductors are poor insulators' and retain the misconception of 
`good radiators are poor absorbers' and vice versa. 
Light Misconceptions 
Reflection and scattering (Light 1) 
Fetherstonhaugh and Treagust (1990) found, in their study of 47 pupils (aged 13- 
15), that approximately 25% believed that light remains on a mirror during 
reflection. Anderson and Smith (1983) discovered that, although about 60% of 
their sample of 227 thought that light does bounce off mirrors, they did not think 
that it bounced off other objects. Only two percent used the concept of scattering. 
This idea that mirrors reflect but other objects do not may come from everyday 
language in that people refer to reflections off mirrors but generally not to 
reflections of other objects. Guesne (1985) also found that most of the 13-14 year- 
olds in her sample thought that light is reflected by a mirror but stays on a piece of 
paper. However, in a written test situation, they were more likely to give a 
scientifically correct answer. In the interview situation they were relying 
predominantly on their visual perception as they were shown the mirror, torch and 
paper in action. This may be one example showing where practical work is 
capable of strengthening rather than replacing misconceptions. Alternatively, it 
may be a case of `teaching to the test' or rather, in this case, the children giving 
the answer, in a test situation, that they think the `teacher' wants even if it not 
really what they believe. 
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Teaching to the test 
This is done to improve test results. If specifications are highly detailed, then there 
is a risk that: 
we start out with the intention of making the important 
measurable and end up making the measurable important 
(Wiliam, 1998, p 165). 
Teachers (and pupils) can make educated guesses at what will be asked since 
timed written assessment can test only certain aspects of certain topics (Wiliam, 
ibid) and this makes it very tempting to narrow teaching to only these few topics 
(Smith, 1991). Although this may have the desired short-term effect in that the 
results to that particular test may be improved there is no guarantee that the pupil 
has understood the relevant concept. He or she may just have been taught to 
answer a certain type of question. Certainly it is important to learn examination 
technique but if there is too close a match between teaching and testing this can 
destroy the measurement value of the test (Linn, 1981; Gipps, 1994). In order to 
retain it, then the concepts must be tested in new contexts. As Shepard (1991, p 9) 
says: 
Tests ought not to ask for demonstration of small, discrete skills 
in isolation. They should be more ambitious instruments aimed 
at detecting what mental representations students hold of 
important ideas and what facility students have in bringing these 
understandings to bear in solving their problems. 
Haladnya et al (1991) has pinpointed several sources of `test score pollution' 
(where the test score is changed in a way which is not associated with the 
construct being measured) and one of these is how the teachers prepare students 
for tests. 
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That this practice does indeed increase test scores can be seen from the `Lake 
Wobegone' effect. Cannell (1987) discovered that all 50 states in America had 
reported that their students had scored higher than average on the standardised 
tests, obviously a ridiculous state of affairs. Cannell suggested that one of the 
reasons for this might be teaching to the test and Phillips in his evaluation of the 
report (1990) agreed that test familiarity may well be one of the causes. 
It is disputed as to whether teaching to the test is a good or bad practice. Tyler 
(1934) states that measurement of classroom achievement should be based on 
instruction (Airasian, 1988) whereas, since tests provide an idea of what is 
important, then `teaching to the test' is sometimes acceptable (Airasian, 1987). 
Crooks et al (1996) and others have used `impact' to describe this process. They 
point out two threats to validity associated with impact. These are benefits which 
are not achieved such as progression, feedback and motivation and actual negative 
impact which might include a focus on learning facts at the cost of higher 
cognitive level results or, in other words, teaching to the test. 
Colour (Light 2) 
Zylbersztajn and Watts (1982) conducted a study where 150 thirteen-year-olds 
were asked why red light was seen to come from a red projector slide. Only two 
2% used transmission ideas while about 50% assumed that the light had been 
changed somehow; some of these offering dyeing as a possible mechanism. 
In Anderson and Smith's (1983) study of 227 pupils, 61% thought that colour is 
just the property of an object and the light only helps our eyes to see the object. 
They thought that we see the object's colour rather than the colour of the reflected 
light. Presumably, this is, at least partly, due to the fact that objects are commonly 
defined by their colour - people (even scientists) commonly refer to 
`a red car' 
rather than `a car which is red when viewed in white light'. 
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Forces misconceptions 
Balanced forces (Forces 1) 
A principal difficulty with learning the scientific view about forces is the strength 
of the pupils' existing conceptions. As has been indicated before, this is an area 
with which children are `familiar' long before they come to school. It is this 
familiarity which has strengthened their misconceptions. In the topic of forces and 
motion much work has been carried out into children's `alternative frameworks' 
e. g. Driver (1989); Bliss et al (1989); Clement et al (1989); and Pfundt and Duit 
(1991). This topic of forces, probably more so than most other science topics, 
contains concepts that are almost contrary to common sense. 
We should not express too much surprise at the ideas held by children and some 
adults since it is only relatively recently in the whole history of scientific thought 
that such notions have been replaced in scientists' minds - notably by Newton. 
Earlier scientists and philosophers held views that were very similar to those held 
by pupils today. 
Gunstone and Watts (1985) in Driver et al (1985) have reviewed the research 
work in this area and have picked out various similarities while at the same time 
acknowledging that there are many differences, not least in the psychology, 
philosophy and methodology used. These general similarities that they found were 
as follows: 
" Forces are animistic An example could be that of an object `trying to fight its 
way upward against the will of gravity' (Watts, 1983). 
" Constant motion needs a constant force Newton's 1st Law states that an object 
will continue in a straight line at a constant speed until acted on by another 
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force. Pupils `know' that this is not true because they do not always recognise 
retarding forces such as friction (Gunstone and Watts 1985). Many pupils 
believe that a force is required to keep the object moving. It is not only children 
who have these ideas. Various studies with university physics students have 
shown evidence of this `rule' (Viennot, 1979; Clement, 1982). 
"A movinbody has a force in the direction of movement This can be thought of 
as similar to either Aristotle's view or that of Buridan in the fourteenth century. 
If an object were thrown up into the air, Aristotle thought that the air around 
the object forced it on its way. Buridan's idea was that the force was internal to 
the object and it was this `impetus' which pushed the object until it was used 
up and the natural downwards motion took over. 
" The amount of motion and force are directly proportional Watts and 
Zylbersztajn (1981), for example, found that many pupils thought that as a ball 
is thrown upwards the force on it grows less until there is no force at all when 
the ball is momentarily stationary. Thereafter, gravity pulls the ball down. They 
see the force as having been `used up' at the maximum height of the throw. In 
their study of 125, fourteen year-olds from comprehensive schools in Reading 
and London, England, they found that about 85% associated force and motion. 
This alternative framework Watts and Zylbersztajn have paraphrased as "if a 
body is moving there is a net force acting on it in the direction of movement. If 
a body is not moving there is no force acting on it" (p 362). 
"A stationary body has no or only one force acting on it Many pupils deny that 
forces are acting in an equilibrium situation. Since this is one area in which the 
research is focused, the existing literature will be reviewed in a little more 
detail. 76% of 112 American high school students (chemistry and biology 
students who could take a physics course the following year) thought that when 
a book was lying on a table, the table does not push up on the book (Clement, 
1993). In their review of the literature, Driver et al (1994) found this notion to 
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occur in other studies. Even some of those who accepted an upward force 
thought the downwards force would be greater because otherwise the book 
would float away. Erickson and Hobbs (1978) found very few references to a 
`reaction' force in their study of children's ideas about equilibrium. 
Sometimes the `reaction' force is associated with friction as Stead and Osborne 
(1981) discovered. Anecdotally, the author's own preliminary research showed 
this. Having studied a topic on friction the previous year, many were all too 
ready to suggest friction as being an opposing force to weight. 
Stretching (Forces 2) 
This misconception was chosen, again from direct experience. One of the GCSE 
(examination taken by sixteen year olds in England and Wales) coursework 
investigations in the sample school was concerned with stretching materials. 
Several pupils chose original length as the independent variable and extension as 
the dependent variable. Some were surprised to see that the extension and original 
length are directly proportional, thinking instead that the extension would be 
independent of the original length. In fact, most pupils avoided this choice of 
variable due to this misconception probably since they prefer there to be some 
interdependence of variables. 
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1.4 Misconceptions or phenomenological primitives (p-prims)? 
Although the idea of misconceptions has been, at least until recently, uppermost in 
the field of research into pupil reasoning, there are questions as to whether it is the 
best tool for analysis and further investigation. Few would deny that 
misconceptions seem to exist but how have they arisen? In addition, 
misconceptions research does not help towards a theory of how pupils learn. 
Smith et al (1993) assert that much of misconceptions research is inconsistent 
with the ideas of constructivism. If we are to accept the idea that pupils construct 
new knowledge using existing knowledge, it is difficult to see how existing 
misconceptions can act as a basis for this. Nor does it explain how a small shift in 
emphasis in a question can lead to differing answers (Steinberg and Sabella 
(1997). Smith et al (ibid) suggest that one of the main faults of misconceptions 
research is the fact that it looks only at contexts where there is a failure in pupils' 
conceptions and does not look at the large number of contexts where those same 
conceptions work adequately. 
There are criticisms of misconception research for being embedded in the 
framework of scientists where scientific terminology and meanings are used rather 
than those of pupils (Viennot, 1985). An example is the use of the concept force; 
this can mean different things to a novice and expert. It should not be interpreted 
that they mean the same thing by using the word. 
Smith et al (1993) also criticised the `replacement of misconceptions with 
scientific conceptions' idea. In their review of misconceptions research, they 
found much of it to either explicitly or implicitly refer to replacing conceptions. 
Often, this replacement is based on a one-to-one process but it is suggested that 
this is not sound. If there is to be a one-to-one replacement, then this can only take 
place if misconceptions are simple, neat, independent elements that can be 
replaced (Figure 4a). It is likely that they are more complex than this and cannot 
be simply replaced. In Figure 4b the `misconception' is shown as being an overlap 
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of many related ideas. The `correct' conception is also an overlap of related ideas 
although not all the same ones as the misconception. 
Figure 4a Simple replacement view 
ideas ideas 
*1 
Figure 4b More complex replacement view 
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Smith et al (1993) have looked again at the main threads that they identified in 
misconceptions research (see p 57) and have revised each as follows: 
1. "Students have misconceptions" becomes "novice conceptions are 
faulty in many specific contexts, but casting misconceptions as 
mistakes is too narrow a view of their role in learning" (p. 69). Smith et 
al (ibid) suggest that novice and expert knowledge systems share many 
features in terms of form and content and that comparisons have not been 
fairly conducted. 
2. "Misconceptions originate in prior learning" becomes "misconceptions 
are faulty extensions of productive prior knowledge" (p. 70). It may be 
better to term students' conceptions as productive or unproductive rather 
than right or wrong. The conceptions they have are right in certain 
contexts; it is just that they have, perhaps, over generalised the contexts in 
which they are relevant. This fits in with constructivism in that new 
knowledge is refinement of previous knowledge as the mind interacts with 
incoming information. 
3. "Misconceptions can be stable and widespread among students. They 
can be strongly held and resistant to change" becomes 
"misconceptions are not always resistant to change. Strength is a 
property of knowledge systems, not individual misconceptions" (p. 71). 
It is not always difficult to change misconceptions with the right teaching 
approach as is shown, for example by Brown and Clement's use of analogy 
(1989). 
4. "Misconceptions interfere with learning" becomes " `interference' is a 
biased assessment of the role of novice conceptions in learning. 
Though they may be flawed and limited in their applicability, novice 
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conceptions are also refined and reused in expert reasoning" (p. 71). It 
is possible to pick out productive conceptions and use them as anchors to 
further learning (Clement et al, 1989). 
5. "Misconceptions must be replaced" becomes "replacing 
misconceptions is neither plausible nor, in all cases, desirable" (p. 72). 
Mere replacement of concepts again goes against constructivist views as it 
presupposes that different conceptions can be added in a kind of tabula 
rasa way. Different conceptions will need to be added as modifications to 
present knowledge in a way such as bridging analogies with their 
anchoring conceptions. The present `misconceptions' should not, even if it 
were possible, be erased as they will serve to be useful in different 
contexts. 
6. "Instruction should confront misconceptions" becomes "instruction 
that confronts misconceptions is misguided and unlikely to succeed" 
(p. 73). Pupils need to have confidence in their abilities and confrontation 
will not help this. Nor is it likely to succeed, as it will confuse them even 
more. Their conceptions are valid in some contexts. Surely it is more 
helpful to gradually lead them forward using more productive anchoring 
conceptions. 
7. "Research should identify misconceptions" becomes "it is time to move 
beyond the identification of misconceptions" (p. 74). Research is needed 
to find out how experts have come to their understanding in various areas. 
Vosniadou (1994) and others believe that pupils have a set of specific well- 
developed coherent theories which interlink with other theories set against a 
background of a framework theory which regulates the way in which phenomena 
are processed. This framework includes pupils' epistemological and ontological 
ideas about the world. Work has been done on naive theories. For instance, 
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McCloskey (1983) stated "people develop on the basis of everyday experience 
remarkably well articulated theories of motion" (p 301). These theories are very 
similar to the impetus theory which was an acceptable theory in the Middle Ages. 
He came to this conclusion from several experiments that he and his colleagues 
carried out. They put together various problems on motion which they then tested 
on students who answered problems before being interviewed in depth. The 
students had studied physics to various levels. McCloskey maintains that 11 out of 
the 13 students interviewed had a well-developed, if naive (scientifically), theory 
of motion which they used in the explanations they gave. This theory he called a 
naive impetus theory and it is based on two main ideas about motion: 
1. Setting an object in motion imparts an internal force or impetus to it which 
maintains the motion. 
2. The object's impetus gradually slowly dissipates of its own accord or due 
to outside influences. Because of this the object slows down and stops. 
McCloskey quotes from the interviews to support the use of an impetus theory 
although he does suggest that there are individual differences in the students' use 
of the theory. To exemplify the first idea: 
Momentum is 
... a 
force that has been exerted and put into the ball 
so this ball now that it's travelling has a certain amount of force ... 
(p 307). (This was from a student who had completed one year of 
college physics). 
A comment in accordance with the second idea is: 
I understand that [friction and air resistance] adversely affect the 
speed of the ball, but now how. Whether they sort of absorb some 
of the force that's in the ball ... I'm not sure. 
In other words, for the 
ball to plow through the air resistance or the friction, if it has to sort 
of expend force and therefore lose it, I'm not sure .... That seems to 
be a logical explanation. (p 307) (This was from someone who had 
never taken a physics course). 
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Vosniadou has similar ideas about children's ideas. She claims that there is a 
framework theory of naive physics (Vosniadou, 1989b) which restricts the course 
of acquiring knowledge about the physical world. This framework is not open to 
the conscious mind or to hypothesis testing. Against this background are specific 
theories which are groups of interconnected propositions or beliefs about the 
properties and actions of material things. These specific theories are produced 
from observation or from information given by the culture surrounding the subject 
and lead to the beliefs which can, in turn, further constrain the knowledge 
acquisition process. 
The specific theories lead to mental models which are used during problem 
solving activities. They are generated to give explanations and predictions. An 
example of the interrelationship of a framework theory, specific theory and mental 
model is shown in Table 3. 
Misconceptions occur when pupils attempt to resolve contradictory bits of 
information, thus producing a faulty mental model (Vosniadou, 1994). One 
example of this is where some young children think that the Earth is a flattened 
sphere. This they get from trying to assimilate the idea of a sphere (that gravity is 
not up and down on the Earth but towards the centre) with their observations that 
the Earth is flat rather than curved. Assimilation will not work in this case; there 
needs to be a complete revision of basic tenets not a partial one. In other words, 
accommodation needs to happen. 
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However, diSessa believes that, although uniform results are sometimes obtained, 
mostly there is not the systematicity of a scientific theory (diSessa, 1993). 
Individuals are not systematic in their ideas and views differ between people. 
Even potentially promising candidates like the impetus theory are too limited in 
context. 
There are other researchers, for example Hammer, 1996, diSessa, 1993 and 
Minstrell, 1992, who suggest that pupils, rather than accessing stored ideas or 
constructs as the misconceptions advocates believe, actually construct ideas at the 
time. These ideas will be based on other knowledge (Hammer, 1996). An example 
of this could be the `misconception' that it is hotter in summer than winter 
because the Earth is nearer to the Sun in summer. For this to be a misconception, 
it must be part of the pupil's knowledge system. Alternatively, it could be seen 
that the pupil uses elemental pieces of knowledge such as `moving nearer to a heat 
source (the Sun in this case) would make something (the Earth in this case) hotter' 
to construct an answer there and then. 
Work done by diSessa (e. g. 1993,1996); Minstrell (1992); Tirosh et al (1998); 
and Hammer (2000) has suggested the use of these small elemental pieces of 
reasoning. These elements are, on the whole, common to both expert and novice 
alike; the difference comes from the ability to use the elements at the right time in 
the right context. 
Minstrell (1992) denotes these pieces as facets which he draws from students' 
comments as they reason, predict and explain and he places the facets into clusters 
for different topics. His facets are practitioner based with the idea of diagnosing 
faulty reasoning and with a view to remedying it. The facets can be content-based, 
strategy-based or reasoning-based. He clusters together facets which are associated 
with a particular idea. The goal facets are the scientific ideas being aimed for and 
the mental model facets are the general ideas which could be referred to as 
misconceptions. Alongside these are more specific facets originating from the 
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mental model or even resulting from a faulty understanding of instruction. An 
example of one of these clusters is shown below (Minstrell, 1999) 
" 410 Balanced forces on an 'at rest' object (vector sum is zero). Goal 
411 At rest and constant velocity are relative. 
facets 
" 412 "Balanced forces" cannot apply to both constant velocity and constant 
position conditions of motion. 
0 418 Constant position requires a bigger "preventer force. " 
" 418-1 Requires a bigger "hold back" force. 
" 418-2 Requires a bigger "hold up" (support) force. 
Mental 
" 419 Constant position requires a bigger "hold to/hold down" force model 
facet 
He explains the apparent disparity between answers to questions that physicists 
would perceive to be almost identical by suggesting that different emphases in the 
questions promote the application of different facets. He concludes that there is a 
fair amount of consistency in pupils' answers viewed from this angle rather than 
that of the physicist. An example he gives is as follows. One facet pupils may use 
is `passive objects do not exert force'. Minstrell and Stimpson (1986) analysed 
answers students gave to several questions involving the relative sizes of forces 
during interactions. One of the questions involved a bowling ball colliding with a 
bowling pin. Some students chose the answer `only the ball exerts a force' and it 
was decided that these students had chosen this answer because the ball was 
considered to be active while the pin was passive, triggering the above facet. They 
then looked at how these students had answered the other six questions. The 
percentage of those who gave answers which suggested that particular facet 
averaged at 88% showing high consistency. 
Minstrell claims that that many of pupils' facets are useful and correct in some 
contexts but they tend to be over- or under-applied. Instruction can build on 
pupils' present facets to limit or generalise their contextual use as appropriate. 
During instruction new facets may added, facets may be modified to extend or 
restrict their application and more complex interfacet relationships are built. 
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Minstrell has introduced the DIAGNOSER (2002) program to diagnose problems 
and prescribe routes of instruction. 
diSessa (1993), along the same lines as Minstrell, concentrated on part of physics 
knowledge that he denotes as sense-of-mechanism. This is concerned with 
interaction with the physical world and allows us to predict and explain events. 
He called his theory `knowledge in pieces' and the knowledge elements that go to 
make up the sense-of-mechanism construction he called phenomenological 
primitives (p-prims). These are the very basic notions that pupils hold which have 
arisen from their interaction with the world. They are even more elemental than 
Minstrell's facets. When faced with having to explain a phenomenon, p-prims are 
`cued to an active state' depending on the context. Whether they remain active 
depends on the subsequent chain of mental events. 
Each person has many hundreds or thousands of p-prims that can be cued quite 
readily. They can be thought of as primitive `explanations' in that they are 
axiomatic and they are phenomenological in that they are based on our direct 
experience of the world. They probably arise from simple abstractions of a 
familiar event. Similar events are then `explained' by the p-prim. 
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abstracts to 
Event p-prim 
Figure 5 diSessa's p-prims 
DiSessadiSessa (1993,1996) has given a number of characteristics of p-prims and 
these are summarised below. 
P-prims are: 
" Small knowledge structures 
" Invoked as a whole (non-splittable) 
" Numerous 
" Difficult to systematize 
" Simply recognised/invoked in certain situations 
" Sometimes quite context specific 
" Plausible and feel natural 
" Fluid. A change in direction of attention shows the fluidity of p-prims. A 
slight alteration in perspective may change the p-prim cued, sometimes, 
seemingly with no problem to the observer who may see no conflict in the 
inconsistencies present. This is another indication that p-prims do not 
coalesce to form concepts, beliefs or theories since, if they did, surely the 
inconsistencies would be apparent and thus cause conflict. 
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" Data driven 
" Unable to resolve conflict even if it is noticed 
" Difficult to verbalise. P-prims are difficult to verbalise since they originate 
at a much more basic level than language. The level proposed is visual or 
kinaesthetic. This is perhaps why pupils learn much through experiment 
with the proviso that they are guided to observe relevant features and pick 
up the right clues; in other words, to cue the correct p-prims. Unguided 
experiments are likely to strengthen already strong and possibly incorrect 
p-prims. 
" Minimal abstractions in origin 
" Often superficial interpretations of experienced reality 
" Developed by reorganization 
" Not totally removed by learning 
" Strengthened or weakened in learning (sometimes new ones are produced) 
" `Explanations' in themselves for naive subjects 
" Small, contextually bound parts of concepts and theories for experts 
" Possibly able to serve as examples of scientific principles for experts 
" Instrumental, e. g. push harder for greater effect, for naive subjects 
" Able to cause surprise if violated and thus may promote learning for naive 
subjects 
" Usually diverse but may be loosely related and may generate new p-prims 
called p-syllogisms. Families of p-prims may produce meta-p-prims which 
can cover a wide range of situations. It is possible that sometimes p-prims 
do come together to form relatively stable arrangements that give so-called 
intuitive theories such as the `impetus' theory described by, for example, 
McCloskey (1983). 
In changing from novice to expert (terms used by diSessa to roughly indicate 
competence levels), diSessa suggested that some p-prims become used more and 
some used less. With novices, the p-prims have different priorities but there are 
none with comparatively very high priority. DiSessa proposed that, during the 
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novice to expert change, some p-prims are greatly reduced and some greatly 
increased resulting in more structure round central high priority p-prims. New p- 
prims may develop and old ones are probably never completely extinguished but 
some may take on new functions, e. g. they may come to cue some formal 
knowledge or procedure (diSessa, 1993, Sherin, 1999). This is represented in 
Figure 6 where the novice has several p-prims associated with a particular topic 
which could be cued. They are all reasonably likely to be cued as they all have a 
similar strength. Which is cued will depend on several factors including the 
context and any particular emphasis in the question asked. In contrast, the expert's 
p-prims are of different strengths and it is more likely that the correct one (high 
priority) will be cued. It will depend less on the context or emphasis in the 
question. Of course, the other p-prims still exist and could be cued in certain 
circumstances - experts are not infallible. 
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Figure 6 P-prims in novices and experts 
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Sherin (1999) stated the view that p-prims can come to cue actual equations, 
missing out the intermediate stage of formal argument. However, more generally, 
he suggested that `symbolic forms' develop. These are a new type of knowledge 
which bridge p-prims and equations and are made up of a `conceptual schema' - 
the idea to be expressed and a `symbolic template' - how to show the idea in 
symbols. Symbolic forms generally apply to a wider set of contexts than p-prims 
and have less concrete meaning. The idea of proportionality is one example. 
In conclusion, Sherin (1999) decided that, although intuitive ideas do need some 
changing, they do not need too much adjustment as physicists can use equations in 
problem solving. He seems to be suggesting that problem solving and 
modification of intuitive conceptions complement each other. 
Concepts can be regarded as a set of coherent statements about things. Beliefs 
select what you believe to be true about the interactions of concepts and theories 
can be considered to be a "complex but connected fabric of concepts and beliefs" 
(diSessa, 1996, p4 of manuscript). P-prims form a level beneath concepts and, 
until learning has taken place, it is unlikely that there will be enough strong p- 
prims in the same area to link together to form anything resembling a concept. 
Since p-prims are so diverse, it is difficult to provide exemplars of them. 
However, some are more central and important than others. One such is Ohm's p- 
prim which was discussed on page 17. P-prims pertinent to this research will 
be 
explained in section 6.2. 
diSessa points out that deep conceptual learning is unlikely to occur unless there 
is 
extended, cumulative and systematic experience with a concept (1994). 
A short 
lesson aimed at conceptual change of an idea is obviously not going to 
be 
sufficient. The lessons planned for this research are short and can no more than 
scratch the surface. However, if more relevant p-prims can 
be cued, then it can be 
counted as a success. 
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P-prims are not the only knowledge type, argues diSessa (2002). There are also 
co-ordination classes which are much bigger and more complex than p-prims. 
They probably include p-prims and, unlike p-prims, can be considered as a model 
of at least one type of concept. They may not be present in naive thought as such. 
Their function is to enable one to extract and use information about the world. 
diSessa identifies two main categories of co-ordination class comprising readout 
strategies (methods of extracting information) and the causal net (possible 
inferences from the information). As diSessa (2002) points out; "the development 
of a co-ordination class is an extended and complex affair" (p 18). The present 
research is concerned with the cueing of p-prims using analogy rather than with 
the development of full-blown concepts and so the discussion of co-ordination 
classes will be left at this point, being aware that they exist but also that they are 
beyond the requirements and scope of this study. 
P-prims and constructivism 
If p-prims are to be considered a valid constituent of knowledge and learning and 
if a constructivist approach is taken as a backdrop to learning theory, then it is 
necessary to be assured that p-prims and constructivism are complementary. Smith 
et al (1993) suggest that this is so in the following two ways: 
" Conceptions must be functional in order to fit in with constructivism. If 
misconceptions exist, then they must have been functional, that is, must 
have worked in some contexts. This is easy to see if `misconceptions' are 
produced by p-prims being cued. The p-prim has come into being at a very 
early stage as an abstraction of a familiar event. It is then used to 
describe 
other events, sometimes correctly and sometimes wrongly. 
" Constructivism maintains that new knowledge is continuous with and 
therefore dependent upon previous knowledge. Instead of the notion of 
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replacement of misconceptions there emerges the suggestion of knowledge 
refinement where pupils' ideas are gradually used in correct contexts. In 
this view, there are no such things as misconceptions but just misplaced 
conceptions. 
This latter point reinforces the efficacy of subscribing to the theory of p-prims in 
that it removes the `paradox of continuity' (Roschelle, 1991). This, as has 
previously been stated, describes the following paradox: constructivism depends 
on previous knowledge but if this previous knowledge is erroneous it is difficult to 
see how new correct knowledge can be constructed. In the theory of p-prims, the 
correct knowledge is usually present but as a low priority p-prim. It is up to 
teachers to change the priority of the p-prim so that it becomes a high priority p- 
prim in that particular context. 
Further assurance on the complementary nature of fine-grained theories such as p- 
prims and constructivism comes from Elby (2000). He points out that in this 
theory, pupils' small unit ideas never entirely die out; in other words they will 
contribute something to experts' reasoning. 
At this stage it should be noted that there are other ways of viewing conceptions 
such as using ontological categories (Chi, 1992; Chi and Slotta, 1993; Ferrari and 
Chi, 1998; and Slotta et al, 1995). There are three main ontological categories: 
matter, processes and mental states. Each of these has sub-categories. There is 
evidence that pupils miscategorise conceptions. For example, heat flow is taken 
by 
scientists to fit into the process category where energy is redistributed but pupils 
may take the `flow' to be more literal, describing something in the matter 
category. Another example, suggested by Vosniadou (2002) as being similar, 
is 
when children recategorise the Earth as an astronomical body rather than a 
physical body, similar to the shift from Ptolemy's view to that of 
Copernicus. 
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These theorists do not argue with most of diSessa's theory of p-prims, seeing them 
as examples reflecting ontological attributes (Nasr, Hall and Garik, 2003). They 
see ontological categories as adding more coherence and structure to p-prim 
theory. 
Johnston (2000) has suggested that the mind organizes concepts, in ontological 
categories, in a way which is more systematic than p-prims would imply but 
looser than theoretical frameworks. These ontological categories might also 
suggest a basic similarity in how many misconceptions arise. 
Misconceptions or p-prims? - practical research 
There appears not to have been much empirical research done in this area. One 
piece that has been carried out was by Elby (2000) who considered how the two 
theories would or would not predict results that pupils would give to physics 
questions involving velocity-time graphs. Human beings are hard-wired to pick up 
on visual clues like edges, corners and motion (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992) as 
they are useful to survival and these are known as compelling visual attributes. 
This reasoning can be applied to soft-wired perception mechanisms such as 
representational graphs. 
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The questions given were as follows (Elby, 2000, p. 11): 
V 
speed 
t 
11 
time 
Figure 7 Motion of cars A and B (speed/time graph) 
Cars A and B start at the same position and move according to the graph of 
speed versus time [Figure 7]. 
a. Is car A going forward or backward? What about car B? 
b. What happens at time Ti? Circle the correct response. 
i. Car B is ahead. 
ii. Car A is ahead. 
iii. Neither car is ahead; car B and car A cross each 
other. 
Elby argued that if the misconception theorists were correct then there could be no 
prediction made as to which question a pupil would answer wrongly if the other 
question was answered correctly. A misconceptions theory could predict only that 
the correct scientific conception would lead to two correct answers and the 
misconception to two wrong answers but that the `one right, one wrong' would be 
random. On the other hand, if the fine-structure theorists were correct, for the `one 
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right, one wrong' group more would answer the second question wrongly and the 
first question correctly than the other way round. This was because the most 
visually compelling attribute was the crossover (corner) and this would cue the 
wrong answer for the second question. His findings supported this latter view 
although his study was on, what he himself claims, a very small sample. Another, 
similarly small, sample gave comparable results. As another method of approach 
he used a transcript of an interview with two pupils looking at a slice graph of 
brightness on part of the Moon. Again the fine-structure theory would predict a 
definite pattern in pupils' responses to questions and the interview answers did 
point to this interpretation. 
It may seem that these two viewpoints (that of the misconception theorists and that 
of the fine-structure theorists) are contradictory but it may be that, with repeated 
usage, the explanations constructed from p-prims become stable cognitive 
structures. If the same p-prim is cued each time, it will strengthen to such an 
extent that, in effect, it becomes a stable cognitive structure (to become a 
misconception or correct conception). Perhaps it is when different p-prims have a 
similar strength and have a similar likelihood of being cued, depending on 
context, that no stable cognitive structures are formed and explanations are being 
constructed spontaneously. (See Figure 8) It may be that p-prims and 
misconceptions are just the extremes of a spectrum. 
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Context 
dependent 
Figure 8 Can p-prim explanations become stable cognitive structures? 
Implicit Learnin 
It is possible that cueing p-prims is linked with the `implicit learning' which 
Cummings (1998) describes. This implicit learning is automatic and requires no 
effort. An instant response to a stimulus can follow from this type of learning. 
Driver (1983) and others talked about beliefs or intuitions as if they were 
deliberately constructed as the child tries to make sense of the world. However, 
Cummings argued that intuitions might have arisen through implicit learning. An 
example that Cummings used is that of thinking that a force is always needed to 
keep an object moving at a constant velocity. She suggested that the implicit 
learning has come about as a result of many kinaesthetic experiences. 
Conclusions and framework for this research 
This section has reviewed the ideas of misconception theorists and 
fine-structure 
theorists and has pointed out that misconception theories are 
less compatible with 
constructivism than are fine structure theories. It has reported practical research 
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which supports the fine-structure theorists. It has also been tentatively suggested 
that p-prims which are repeatedly cued could become misconceptions. 
The framework taken for the present research is mainly that of the fine-structure 
theorists. However, it is accepted that there may be areas where some fairly stable 
naive theories exist especially in the topic of forces and, in fact, this may influence 
the results gained from investigating the different topics. 
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1.5 Analogies in general 
History of analogy 
There are many examples of famous scientists using analogy. Amongst those most 
often quoted are Kepler who used the analogy of clockwork in explaining 
planetary motion and Priestley who linked electrical forces to the well understood 
law of gravitational forces by analogical reasoning (Glynn, 1991). Einstein used 
the analogy of a person riding in a lift to explain relativity so it could be 
understood without recourse to difficult mathematics. 
Campbell argued that analogies are not merely aids to establishing theories but of 
absolute importance throughout the life of the theory (ibid). In addition, 
Oppenheimer viewed analogy as indispensable for coping with a new discovery 
since it is impossible to "deal with it except on the basis of the familiar and the 
old-fashioned" (Oppenheimer, 1956 (pp 129-130). He also recognised that 
mistakes would be revealed using analogy. 
What is an analogy 
Analogy is a way of linking different concepts by pointing out the similarities 
between them. These similarities could be surface similarities, e. g. colour or shape 
or deep structure similarities, e. g. the similarity of both the retina in the eye and 
the film in the camera being light-sensitive surfaces. Glynn(1991) suggests that 
analogy leads to meaningful learning, which has been defined by Wittrock 
(1985) 
as a "student generative process that entails construction of relations, either 
assimilative or accommodative, among experiences, concepts and 
higher-order 
principles and frameworks" (pp 261-262). 
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The familiar concept is known as the analogue and the unfamiliar one as the 
target. The characteristics of the analogue and target are viewed and the similar 
ones identified and linked. 
Both the analogue and target are subordinate to a superordinate concept which is 
sometimes easy to identify as in the water circuit / electrical circuit analogy where 
the superordinate concept would be `circuit'. However, it is sometimes more 
difficult to identify; an example being the analogy between the camera and the 
eye. Glynn (1991) maintains that naming the superordinate concept is important as 
it can suggest other analogies and also allow the student to generalise their ideas 
and to apply them to other contexts and domains. 
Advantages of using analogies (Boo and Toh, 1997) 
1. They are valuable tools in conceptual change learning. 
2. They provide visualisation and understanding of the abstract by comparison 
with the concrete, real world. 
3. They may motivate pupils. 
4. They make the teacher take into account pupils' prior knowledge. 
5. They may reveal misconceptions. 
Treagust et al (1990) give another advantage of analogies. They allow the target 
and analogue domain to be interchanged in order to further the teaching and 
understanding of both. They cite an example of a teacher who used the analogue 
of the gravitational field to introduce the electric field but then swapped the 
analogue and target roles quite a few times so the pupils could use characteristics 
of each type of field to work out characteristics of the other. Thus the 
learning of 
both types of field was facilitated by using them as analogues of each other. 
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What makes a good analog. 
Glynn (1991) gives three criteria for the success of an explanatory analogy: 
1. As the number of features compared increases, this often improves the analogy. 
2. As the similarity of the features compared increases, so does the analogy. 
3. The greater the conceptual significance, the better the analogy. 
Glynn (ibid) gave three requirements for pupils when using analogy: 
1. The pupil must understand the analogue. 
2. The pupil must agree with the plausibility of the analogy. 
3. The pupil must be able to apply the findings from the analogue to the target. 
English and Halford (1995) emphasise the need for clarity as to which features of 
the analogue and target can be mapped or even compared. Irrelevant features of 
the analogue can often lead to misconceptions. It is also important to make sure 
that the features which are compared are similar enough to be compared without 
confusion (Glynn et al, 1989). 
Halpern et al (1990) discussed whether it is better to have the analogue and target 
from within domains or from different ones. They thought that the different 
domains would be better mainly because there was too much literal similarity 
when the analogy was across similar domains but presumably enough differences 
to make it confusing. They did find that the participants in their study did better 
when the analogue and target came from different domains and they suggested 
that when the analogy crossed domains it needed more mental effort from the 
subjects with more restructuring of schemata which leads to a greater degree of 
recall. However, analogies within the same domain are extremely useful for pupils 
so that they can connect associated concepts and construct conceptual systems 
(Glynn, 1991). 
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In addition to an analogy being an aid to understanding, it should be able to 
predict, as did Einstein's lift analogy that predicted that light should bend under 
the influence of gravity; a prediction which proved to be correct. 
Difficulties and disadvantages of using analogies 
In order to know whether an analogy is going to be useful, it is important to 
examine disadvantages of analogies. Thiele and Treagust (1995) have discussed 
some of these potential problems. 
" Pupils may take the analogy too far and confuse the analogue and target. 
Teachers must be careful to point out where analogies collapse, as all do at 
some point. If this is not done, then pupils will start to infer similarities 
where none exist. 
" Pupils may remember only the analogue and not the target. 
" Pupils may concentrate on attributes of the analogue that are not pertinent 
and thus conclude wrongly about the target. 
Duit (1991) points out several more difficulties which may occur. These are. 
" Pupils may not understand the base domain well enough and may have 
misconceptions about it. These will leak over into the target domain. 
However Spiro et al (1989) point out that using multiple analogies may 
help in this respect in that they could avoid mistakes induced by a single 
analogy. Wong (1993) agrees with this. Multiple analogies are also useful 
as they may help with different parts of the target domain (Gentner and 
Gentner, 1983). 
9 If there is not enough teacher guidance, there may not be understanding of 
the analogy. 
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9 Analogies are accessed through surface similarities and through deep 
structure similarities but it is only the latter which provide the inferential 
power of the analogy. 
It is imperative that teachers think carefully about their use of analogy and how 
they present it to their pupils. 
Theories of analogies 
Structural theories 
This research is not concerned with classical analogies (of the type 
A: B:: C: D1, D2) as such. It is dealing with A: B type analogies. However, it is 
important to review the research on this type of analogy as it provides more 
assurance that using analogy is valid in this research. Aristotle defined this sort of 
analogy as "an equality of proportions ... 
involving at least four terms ... when 
the second is related to the first as the fourth is to the third" (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics as quoted in Goswami (1992), p 4). The relationship between the A 
and B terms is identical to that between the C and D terms. Until recently, it had 
been accepted that there are two levels of reasoning involved in the use of analogy 
of the type A: B:: C: D, e. g. pig : boar :: dog : wolf. The lower order is the relation 
between A and B and between C and D. The higher order is the link between the 
pairs in the analogy. The latter requires knowledge of relational similarity. 
One of the main proponents of structural theory was Piaget. He proposed that from 
the onset of concrete operational reasoning at about age seven, children could start 
reasoning about relations between objects in class inclusion problems. They would 
be able to reason in a successive way. This means that they would see the link 
between A and B but go on to find possibly a different link between C and D (the 
term they have to choose). It would not be until the onset of formal operational 
reasoning at about 11, that they would be able to start reasoning about the 
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similarity between the pairs of terms and be able to use the relational similarity 
constraint. 
If Piaget's claims that only those at the formal operational stage should be able to 
reason analogically were correct, then the basis for using analogy in this research 
would probably not be valid. Although the pupils in the research are 12-13 years 
old, it is now generally acknowledged that the formal reasoning stage is reached 
much later than this age by many pupils and some never attain it. However, 
Piaget's claims that analogical reasoning occurs only at this stage have been 
refuted by, for example, Goswami (1992) as indicated below. 
The structural theories depend on several assumptions: 
1. Higher and lower order relations can be easily distinguished. 
2. Children know about the relations involved. 
3. Children understand that they are supposed to use the idea of relational 
similarity. 
These assumptions will now be discussed in more detail. 
1. Goswami (1992) argues that it is not possible to distinguish higher and lower 
relations and that it can be said that all classical analogies have the same higher 
order relation in that it is the similarity of the lower order relations. 
2. It cannot always be assumed that a child will know about the relations in an 
analogy. It would not be fair to assume that a child does not have the ability to 
think analogically unless we are sure that he or she has the necessary relational 
knowledge. 
It has been found that even young children (three - four years-old) can understand 
physical causality such as cutting, wetting and melting (e. g. Bullock et al, 1982; 
Das Gupta and Bryant, 1989; and Schulz, 1982). This has been used as a basis to 
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test Piaget's claim that analogical reasoning is a formal operational skill. It was 
found that, as long as children have the necessary relational knowledge, they could 
solve analogies before reaching the formal operational level (Goswami and 
Brown, 1989). 
3. It cannot be taken for granted that pupils know that they have to use the 
relational similarity constraint. Again, it would seem wrong to conclude that 
children could not think analogically just because they did not realise that the 
relational similarity concept was an integral step. It would be like concluding that 
children cannot play chess. Of course they cannot unless they have had the rules 
explained to them. Only then could you begin to gauge their ability. 
Further arguments against Piaget include the idea that proportional reasoning is 
necessary for analogical solving. Levinson and Carpenter (1974) gave their 
subjects such analogies as `foot : inches :: minute : ? '. If the child could give the 
correct answer (seconds) and explain the links within and between each pair, they 
were deemed to understand proportional reasoning. However, this is only another 
way of testing whether the children can use the relational similarity constraint and 
is unlike Piaget's proportional understanding. This was the awareness of the 
equality of two ratios, xl/yl and x2/y2. Where researchers have tried to investigate 
the connection between Piaget's proportional understanding and the ability to use 
analogy, there was still the problem that the children may not have had the 
relational knowledge necessary (Lunzer, 1965). 
Research (Goswami, 1989) has found that, if perceptual understanding of 
proportion was involved, then there was a link with analogical reasoning and this 
could be shown at a young age (pre-formal operational). If it is a logical 
understanding of proportionality - definitely a formal operational skill, then there 
does not seem to be any close linkage in the development of these skills. 
91 
Young children will often accept counter-suggestions to their (correct) answer. 
Piaget thought that this meant that they do not understand the relational similarity 
constraint rule. However, it may be that children do not wish to contradict those 
whom they perceive as having superior knowledge (teachers, researchers or adults 
in general). The linked idea is that children solve analogies by associative rather 
than analogical reasoning. By including associative distracters in the set of 
possible answers, it was found that even young children tended to choose the 
analogous rather than the associative response (Goswami and Brown, 1990). 
Knowledge-based accounts of analogical reasoning 
The research mentioned above has refuted Piaget's claims that reasoning by 
analogy is a formal operational skill. Indeed, very young children can reason 
analogically if they understand the relations involved and that they should be 
using the relational similarity constraint. 
The knowledge-based theories of analogical reasoning put forward by such as 
Brown (1989); Gentner (1989); Goswami (1989); Goswami and Brown (1989); 
and Vosniadou (1989a) claim that it is the depth of a child's conceptual 
knowledge that indicates the potential for analogical success. Apparent shifts are 
due to increasing knowledge of the child and these theories do not predict sudden 
changes but rather a gradual improvement. Goswami (1992) argues that the ability 
to understand relational similarity may be present in children from early infancy. 
The difficulty of the relations and performance factors, e. g. distraction by other 
test factors will apply more profoundly to younger children and will be the only 
limit to the child's ability to apply the relational similarity constraint. 
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Information processing framework 
The arguments above have related to the question as to whether children still in 
the concrete operational stage can understand and use analogies. The next problem 
is to look at how analogical reasoning works. 
Sternberg (1977) is credited with the first Information Processing (IP) framework 
suggesting how analogical reasoning may work by postulating component 
processes. These components for A: B:: C: D1, D2 were encoding, inference, 
mapping (optional), application, justification and response. 
1. Encoding This involves perceiving each term and accessing their attributes or 
properties in semantic memory. This is the part of memory which refers to a 
structural set of facts, skills and concepts that each person has accumulated. 
A: B:: C: Dl, D2 
Perceive each term and access attributes 
2. Inference This involves discovering the relationships between A and B from 
their attributes and holding them in working memory. 
A: B 
Ll Discover relationships 
3. Mapping (according to Sternberg (ibid), this step is not absolutely necessary in 
analogical reasoning). If used, it represents discovering the link between the A 
and C terms. 
A: B:: C: DI, D2 
i_1 
Discover link 
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4. Application This involves applying an analogous relation from the inference 
step (2) to between C and the choices D1 and D2 to see which work. 
A: B:: C: D1, D2 
t- Atj AL 
Use relationships inferred .... to test similar relationships 
5. Justification The subject must justify any decision to his- or herself. 
6. Response Finally, the subject must respond to the question. 
Both inference and application are measures of relational knowledge and 
application is also a measure of the understanding of the relational similarity 
constraint. 
Sternberg and Rifkin (1979) discovered that all age groups used encoding, 
inference, application and response but that younger children (aged eight) did not 
use the mapping component, which, according to them, involves a higher order 
relation between two relations. Thus, they came to the same conclusion as the 
structural theorists but for different reasons. However, Goswami (1992) argues 
that, as mapping is not necessary for analogical reasoning, then we cannot say that 
not using mapping means that the child cannot use relational similarity. She also 
maintains that mapping does not measure higher-order similarity and that it is the 
application step that most nearly resembles the use of the relational similarity 
constraint. 
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Models for teachin analo ies 
The general model of analogy teaching 
Zeitoun (1984) developed a model for the use of analogy. This model involved 
several steps including the following: 
" Assessing the pupils' prior knowledge about the topic. 
" Analysing the learning material of the topic. 
" Judging the appropriateness of the analogy. 
" Determining the characteristics of the analogy. 
" Selecting the strategy and medium of the presentation. 
" Presenting the analogy. 
" Evaluating the outcomes. 
" Revising the steps. 
Duit (1991) regards this model as being somewhat pragmatic and not linking well 
with the theory which he developed. Also, it does not communicate the 
importance of knowledge about the base domain. As Duit points out, this is of 
vital significance since misconceptions in the base will probably transfer 
misconceptions to the target. Duit's final comment refers to a shortage of 
examples given. There are not enough to make it possible to test the model's 
usefulness. 
Gentner's structure mapping heorY 
Gentner (Gentner, 1989, Gentner and Markman, 1997) proposed a model for 
analogical reasoning that consisted of four steps. It is accepted that the person 
understands the relational structure of the base domain. This relational net is 
composed of various items. At the bottom, in the most basic level are the objects. 
If one were discussing the relational net for electric circuits, the objects would be 
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the physical parts of the circuit, e. g. the cell/battery, lamps and leads. At the next 
level are object properties, e. g. lamp brightness and first order relations, e. g. 
`consists of as in `the battery consists of a negative pole and a positive pole'. First 
order relations always connect objects. Further up in the hierarchy are the higher 
order relations, e. g. `causes' as in a description of Ohm's law. The higher order 
relations connect relations. (Paatz, Ryder, Schwedes and Scott, 2004) 
When an analogy is being made, the base and the target should have an identical 
relational net for the features being compared although the objects will not be the 
same. However, the objects will be mappable. The steps involved are as follows: 
1. Activating a potential base domain At this point the goals are explained 
which determine which parts of the target domain are to be looked at and 
therefore which base domain can be used. If the pupil is asked to consider 
the rules of electric circuit systems as the target domain, then the 
superordinate concept would be circuit and the base domain could be water 
circuits. 
2. Postulating local matches This step requires the mapping of objects, 
properties or relations between the domains. These are rather isolated 
mappings at this stage. 
3. Connecting to a global match Here further links are made, this time 
between the isolated objects or properties. The links between the objects or 
properties in the base domain are mapped onto the target domain. At the 
end of this stage the target net is similar to the base net but is less 
branched. 
4. Candidate inferences It is at this stage that the pupil hypothesises about the 
target domain using information about the base domain. In this way the 
domains become more structurally equal. 
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Gentner (1980) used structure mapping theory to explain the difference between 
analogy and similarity. She uses similarity if the objects and relational structure 
overlap and the example she uses is of the helium atom and the neon atom. Here, 
both the objects and the relations between the two are the same. However, 
likening a hydrogen atom to the solar system is an analogy since the relations are 
similar but the objects are different. 
Gentner and Markman (1994) carried out some research on differences between 
items using the structure mapping theory. Differences are either alignable or non- 
alignable. Alignable differences are those which are associated with the common 
structure and non-alignable ones are not. An example given by Iding (1997) is 
based on the camera-eye analogy. An alignable difference is the way each focuses 
when objects are at a different distance; the camera focuses by moving its lens and 
the eye by changing the shape of the lens. A non-alignable difference is that the 
eye has eye-lashes since this cannot be mapped on to anything in the camera. 
Gentner and Markman's research found that it was easier to find alignable 
differences than non-alignable differences. Participants in the study found it easier 
to find differences between similar items which had alignable differences than 
between items which were vastly different where there were many differences but 
most of them were non-alignable. This research is important when it comes to 
analogy. When comparing the analogue and target, differences as well as 
similarities must be made and it is important for pupils to differentiate between 
differences which are relevant (alignable differences) and differences which are 
irrelevant (non-alignable differences). In this way, there is less likelihood of 
misconceptions being produced or of pupils taking the analogy too far. 
Paatz et a! (2004) found that Gentner's structure mapping theory steps worked 
well in analysing an analogy teaching approach. An analogy was drawn between 
electric circuits as the target and water circuits as the base and the analysis was 
based on the learning development of a girl over several weeks. They point out 
that, although progress for the first three steps could be attributed to activities 
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provided during the teaching sequences, the student concerned made inferences 
unaided by teachers and activities. 
Among the several models available for teaching analogy is the Teaching-with 
Analogies (TWA) model (Glynn, 1991). 
In the production of the TWA model (Glynn, 1989 and Glynn et al, 1989) 
analogies in 43 science textbooks were reviewed to find which were most 
effective. Effectiveness includes analogies having multiple features to be mapped 
although it is sometimes adequate to have just a few principal features. The 
features in the analogue and target should be similar enough to avoid confusion 
when mapping and, in addition, it is important to consider the conceptual 
significance of the features to be compared. A model was then made for producing 
analogies (Glynn, 1991). It contained the following operations: 
1. Introduce the target 
2. Cue retrieval of analogue 
3. Identify relevant, similar features of target and analogue 
4. Map similarities. 
5. Draw conclusions about target. 
6. Indicate where analogy breaks down. 
Glynn et al (1989) point out that this is only a general structure and that the way 
the steps are carried out is important. For example, it is imperative that the pupil 
understands the analogy in the same way as the teacher does. 
Figure 9 shows analogical steps for the camera - eye analogy. The steps shown 
bring together ideas from such as Gentner et al (1993) and Glynn et al (1995). 
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Access Domains 
Target domain - 
eye 
Base domain - 
camera 
Map Similarities 
Lens and cornea Focuses light Lens 
Choroid Prevents reflection 10 
Dark inner lining 
Eyelid 01 Protects Lens cover 
Iris Admits light Aperture 
Retina 10 Receives image Film 
Assess differences 
Lens focuses by bending Lens is focused by being moved 
Cellular change in rods and cones Chemical change in film 
Address shortcomings 
The analogy does not address binocular and stereoscopic aspects of human 
vision 
Evaluate new representation 
How complete is the understanding of human vision? 
Are there remaining sources of confusion? 
Figure 9 Analogical steps for the camera - eye analogy (Iding, 1997, p 237) 
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Concretisation or abstraction? 
Many have seen analogies as being a way of helping to construct more abstract 
representations but Brown (1989) maintains that one of the most important roles 
for analogy is that of concretisation, especially in conceptual change. An example 
he uses is that of the target being the `book on the table' situation. The analogue is 
a hand pushing down on a spring. The idea of the analogy is to introduce the idea 
of springiness so that pupils can see that the table itself can have this property, a 
feature which is unobservable in the target but very observable in the analogue. 
The alternative view of the analogy would be that it helps the pupils to view the 
situation more abstractly by seeing the table and book having opposing forces in a 
similar way to the hand and spring having opposing forces (which can be felt in 
the latter case). While he argues that this is where the pupil should end up, he 
maintains that research has shown that this is not how this and similar analogies 
work. 
Pupils may realise that an analogy suggests a particular answer but may be 
reluctant to accept it if it does not make sense to them or where there is a deep- 
seated idea to the contrary. An example used by Brown and Clement (1989) was 
one of Newton's third law involving the forces a moving and a stationary billiard 
ball have on each other. The analogy used here was that of Mr. T (an action hero 
on television) being tied to the front of a train which was to have a collision with 
another train. The student was happy that Mr T would feel the same force whether 
his was the moving train colliding with a stationary train or whether the other train 
was the moving one (at the same speed) and his was the stationary one and was 
also sure that the analogy was appropriate. However, he could not accept equal 
forces in the target case. The authors suggest two reasons for this. The first is that 
students have an entrenched conviction that moving objects contain and can apply 
more force than a stationary one and the second is that, although the analogy let 
the student make the correct abstract relational correspondences, it did not provide 
an explanation of the situation. 
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As has been previously cited, Posner et al (1982) believe that several conditions 
must be met in order for a conception to be fully accepted and retained by a 
student. The first of these is that the student must feel dissatisfaction with the 
current idea being held. There appears to be little problem to pupils when they do 
not `believe in' Newton's third law. Even if the student is prompted into being 
concerned by his or her own ideas (possibly by a teacher), the new idea has to be 
intelligible. It is difficult to make it intelligible without giving an explanation as to 
its origin and some analogies do not attempt to do this. Any analogy used should 
concretise the target situation bringing out features that will alter the model the 
student has of the situation (Brown, 1994). 
If an analogy is given which can act as an explanation, then the results can be 
different. Clement et al (1987) used a different analogy for the same target as 
above. It was, in fact, a set of bridging analogies (see section 1.7). The anchor 
which was agreed by most of the pupils was that a spring compressed between 
both hands exerts an equal force on each. This is extended to a spring between 
colliding carts which, in turn, is extended to considering the microscopic 
springiness of the colliding carts. Again the concrete idea of springiness is 
introduced into the situation by use of an analogy where springiness is directly 
observable. An explanation of the origin of Newton's third law, at least in the case 
of collisions has been given. This research was carried out with 150 American 
high school students who were studying a first year physics course. The control 
group consisted of 55 students. The results from this part of the research show a 
pre-test to post-test gain which is much greater for the experimental group 
(44.3%) than for the control group (14.5%). On a two-tailed t-test, p<0.0001, 
showing a high degree of significance. 
101 
Analogy and unconscious contextual clues 
Part of the current research discusses whether analogies can be used at a low-key 
level as a way of cueing p-prims. With this in mind, it is time to turn to a piece of 
research carried out by Kokinov and Yoveva (1996). They carried out some 
experiments where problems were given to volunteers. In the experimental 
condition, a diagram belonging to another question was also on the same page. 
The students were told to ignore any second question on the sheets and to answer 
only the first question. The control condition had only the first question and no 
other diagram. From the answers given, it was found that the students seemed to 
be influenced by the apparently irrelevant diagrams. The researchers concluded 
that particular memory elements had been cued and subsequently played their part 
in the problem solving procedure. Many of the participants said that they had not 
consciously been swayed by the second question in their answer, not even 
appreciating any connection. Work done by Kokinov et al (1997) gave further 
support to this by comparing four groups of subjects who had to solve a target 
problem. The first group was a control group which was given just the problem. 
The other three were experimental groups, one of which was given another 
diagram and told that it might be helpful. Another group was given the diagram 
but without any comment and the final group again had the diagram but this time 
it was given as part of another question which was not to be answered (remote 
condition). The results showed that being given the hint to make use of the 
diagram actually reduced the number of correct solutions compared with the 
control group but in the remote condition the number of correct solutions was 
increased. There was also an increase for the group which was not told anything 
about the diagram showing that they might also have picked it up unconsciously. 
The authors suggest that the reason the remote condition was more successful than 
the explicit hint was that the reasoning mechanisms involved for this particular 
problem in understanding the analogy provided by the diagram were too difficult 
as the shared relations in the structure correspondence were not obvious. At the 
same time other, potentially useful, mechanisms were inhibited by the analogical 
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reasoning processes. Such processes seemed to be encouraged by the unconscious 
picking up of cues. 
The authors of the research mentioned above do not mention p-prims but there 
seems to be an obvious link. The correct solutions were being prompted by the use 
of an analogical diagram but without the structure mapping analysis that is 
necessary in an explicit use an analogy. This is similar to how p-prims are 
unconsciously cued by contextual clues. 
Schunn and Dunbar (1996) undertook research on priming. This is where there is 
another encounter with an already known idea. This idea is then considered as 
primed and is then more readily accessible for use in another context. It is an 
implicit process as the pupil is unaware of what it is that has made them use that 
particular idea in the new context. They do not explicitly make an analogy. Their 
research involved problem solving and was carried out on the subjects over two 
days. Participants in the study had previously been taught the concept of inhibition 
which was primed on the first day when they had to solve a source problem on 
viruses. On the second day the students had to solve another problem (about 
genetics) which was, for them, unrelated to the first problem. In fact, this also 
required the idea of inhibition to solve it. In order to test whether any analogical 
link had been explicitly made, the researchers asked the subjects to give a running 
commentary on how they were solving the problems. If they were making an 
explicit link, then this would show up. They were also given a questionnaire after 
the second problem. The results showed that there was an improvement for the 
groups who had been primed. They did not seem to have made any explicit 
analogical links according to the commentaries that they gave and the 
questionnaires. Schunn and Dunbar regard priming as a lower level cognitive 
process whereas explicit analogy use is higher level reasoning. At first sight, it 
does seem odd that none of the participants made an explicit analogous link 
between the two problems. However, the researchers point out that there were no 
similar surface features between the two problems nor was there a similar 
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relational structure. The only similarity was the idea of inhibition. This actually 
makes this a poor candidate for a good analogy according to Gentner's structure 
mapping theory and so it is less surprising that analogical links were not made. 
Another possible reason is that inhibition is a very general concept which had 
been learnt before the experiment. It is likely that the concept of inhibition is an 
idea that exists independently of its examples. It may be that less general concepts 
which are learnt with only one or two examples will only be accessed through 
more explicit analogy. 
Textbook analogies 
Textbooks are not always rigorous in their use of analogy (Parida and Goswami, 
2000). They use analogy frequently but Glynn et al (1989), who analysed 43 
science textbooks of various levels, point out that there was nothing in the 
introductions to help students work with the analogies given. 
Thiele and Treagust (1995) acknowledged several characteristics of textbook 
analogies as they were analysing high school chemistry textbook analogies. These 
were as follows: 
" Visualisation effect Analogy is an aid to prompting visualisation which 
is 
beneficial in cognition. It is usually considered better to have a pictorial 
form of analogy but most textbooks use a written form. Lin and Shiau 
(1996) found that low achievers gained more from being taught by 
pictorial analogy than did brighter pupils. This was possibly since the 
latter 
would be more likely to be at the formal operational stage and not need the 
concrete ideas as much (Gabel and Sherwood, 1980). 
Parida and Goswami (2000) add an activity type of analogy to this since 
activity helps cognition and visualisation. Activity could 
include the pupils 
comparing the analogue and target. 
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" The extent of mapping This can be of the following types: 
Simple - In this type there is no amplification or explanation. There is just 
the statement that the target resembles the analogue. 
Enriched - The enriched analogy indicates the shared characteristics 
between the target and analogue. 
Extended - This uses several attributes of the analogue to be mapped to 
the target and can involve multiple analogies. 
9 Analogue explanation As has already been mentioned, sometimes pupils 
do not fully understand the analogue domain. Good textbooks will include 
explanations about these so that the pupil can utilise the analogy better. 
" Analogy identification Students need to know when an analogy is being 
presented with word pointers such as like, similar and analogous. 
9 Analogy limitation Good textbook authors point out the limitations of an 
analogy so that pupils are sure about which attributes are shared and which 
are not. 
In their analysis of a science textbook used in India, Parida and Goswami (2000) 
found that many of the analogies used did not satisfy the above criteria. Some of 
these analogies were likely to cause misconceptions since there was not enough 
explanation of the analogue domain given nor were the limitations of the analogue 
discussed fully. This is in line with the findings of Thiele and Treagust (1994, 
1995) in their research of analogies in high school chemistry textbooks. 
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Glynn et al (1989) found very few elaborate analogies; mostly they were of a 
simple type. They also found that there was a large range in the number of 
analogies used in different textbooks, even within the physics and physical science 
textbooks. 
Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) carried out an analysis of 26 science textbooks and 
again found a large range in the number of analogies used in the different 
textbooks. They also point out that there was a lack of guidance in the use of 
analogies together with a lack of explanation of the analogue. They differentiated 
between analogies which were based on surface similarities (structural analogies) 
and those based on deep structure similarities (functional analogies) and 
concluded that the former were useful only for easy concrete topics but the more 
difficult, rather abstract topics required the latter. 
Newton (2003) carried out research on science text books for seven-11 year-old 
pupils using Curtis and Reigeluth's (1984) classification. She found that there was 
a preponderance of structural analogies and relatively few functional analogies. 
This was the reverse of the results Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) had found in their 
study of secondary school science textbooks. This fits in with their view that 
structural analogies are only useful for easier, concrete topics which might be 
expected at a more junior level. 
Newton's research found a higher proportion of simple analogies than extended 
analogies used in the elementary textbooks in contrast to Curtis and Reigeluth's 
(1984) research which found a higher proportion of enriched analogies in the 
secondary textbooks. Thiele and Treagust (1994) noted the use of many simple 
analogies in the high school chemistry books they were reviewing. 
This sort of analysis will be carried out on the analogies used in the present 
research (see section 4.2). 
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Analogies as advance organisers 
An advance organiser is information given to a person before the main 
teaching/learning session to make it easier for him or her to organise and make 
sense of the information to be introduced. Ausubel (1968) said that the function of 
an advance organiser is "to provide ideational scaffolding for the stable 
incorporation of more detailed and differentiated material that follows" (p 148). 
Advance organisers may give prerequisite knowledge or link the information to 
other prior concepts. Ausubel was in favour of using abstract advance organisers 
that are given at a "higher level of abstraction, generality and inclusiveness" 
(Ausubel, 1968, p 148) than the main block of information. Mayer (1979a) 
suggested that a successful advance organiser would be able to relate the new 
information to a person's existing schema and thus assimilate it. Derry (1984) 
added that the learning would then bring about accommodation of the schema. 
Mayer (1979b), differing from Ausubel, proposed that concrete advance 
organisers would be more successful than abstract ones. Research by, for example, 
Royer and Cable (1975,1976) and Mayer (1983) has shown that using concrete 
analogies as advance organisers is indeed better than abstract ones in the topic of 
electricity (conduction and Ohm's law). 
Analogies and models 
Most models are analogical in nature and can include actual physical models, 
pictorial representations, equations, graphs or simulations. They are termed 
analogical since they describe abstract concepts using familiar objects and ideas 
(Harrison, 2001). Even equations can be a familiar enough idea, especially if they 
can be likened to other, more familiar equations of a similar form. Coll (2005) 
puts analogies as a subset of models. 
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Models are potentially useful for several reasons. According to Harrison (2001), 
they: 
" are a way of pointing out the important characteristics of the target and 
they do this well when they remove unnecessary details and direct the 
attention towards the model's significant characteristics. 
" can exaggerate the important parts. 
" are usually familiar to pupils. 
According to Mayer (1989) a model is good if it meets the following conditions: 
0 They must be structurally complete - contain all the necessary parts of the 
target. 
" They must be coherent - be appropriate in detail level. 
" They must be considerate - contain the appropriate vocabulary and 
presentational form for their audience. 
" They must be concrete in representation and the relationship of all parts of 
the model must be obvious. Mayer (ibid) felt that this is more likely with a 
concrete model than with an abstract model which may obscure the inner 
details. 
" They must give a clear, conceptual account of the theory they are 
explaining. 
" They must underline the correct comparisons which should be made so 
that the pupils do not take the analogy too far and cause misconceptions to 
arise. 
Harrison and Treagust (2000) devised a classification of models used by teachers 
and textbooks. This was as follows. 
Pedagogical analogical models These are models which are used for teaching and 
learning and can include the following: 
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" Scale models These precisely follow proportions but rarely indicate 
internal structure, functions and use (Black, 1962). Also, their constituent 
materials are different. Since scale models are often toy-like, this may hide 
some of the model-target differences (Gosslight et al, 1991). 
" Iconic and symbolic models These include chemical formulae and 
equations. 
" Mathematical models Mathematical equations and graphs are used in 
physics to describe physical processes and relations (Black, 1962; 
Hodgson, 1995). However, they are not always easy to use in real 
situations. For example, when using F= ma, pupils must be made aware of 
the fact that friction must be taken into account. The meaning of equations 
should be made by the pupils themselves, using verbal or written 
explanations (Hewitt, 1987). 
" Theoretical models These include analogical models such as electro- 
magnetic lines of force and photons. 
" Maps, diagrams and tables These tend to be simplified and sometimes 
exaggerated and are designed so that the patterns and relationships that 
they represent are easily visualised by pupils. However, care must be taken 
that pupils do not take part of the model literally, e. g. carbon atoms are 
generally represented in diagrams by black balls and some pupils think that 
carbon atoms are black. The size of molecules in comparison with the size 
of the beaker when drawing a diagram showing the pattern of molecules in 
different states is an example of the exaggerated nature of some diagrams. 
It is necessary but potentially confusing for the pupil. Pupils must realise 
that no model is the same as reality. Examples of this type of model are the 
periodic table and circuit diagrams. 
" Concept-process models Much of science is concerned with processes, 
e. g. refraction and redox reactions. Concept-process models, sometimes 
multiple models, are used to try to represent and explain these processes. 
For example, refraction can be explained by vehicles or lines of soldiers 
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moving from a hard surface to a muddy, soft surfaces, slowing down and 
usually changing direction (Hewitt, 1987, Harrison, 1994). 
" Simulations These model complex processes. Some may be virtual reality 
as in computer games or learning to drive on a simulator and some depict 
situations such as potential nuclear accidents which require the participant 
to make decisions which dictate the next part of the simulation. Computer 
based simulations are becoming increasingly popular with the growth of 
the `computer generation' and sometimes their modelling is so 
sophisticated that their analogical property is masked. They become almost 
a reality in themselves. 
" Mental models It is difficult to define this term exactly as it is used in a 
variety of ways in the literature. Johnson-Laird (1983) portrays mental 
models as being cognitive representations of `states of affairs' where there 
is, amongst other things, a similar relational structure. Mental models 
comprise elements which correspond to objects, and operations on the 
elements for constructing, revising and evaluating. Vosniadou states that 
they "refer to a special kind of mental representation, an analogue 
representation, which individuals generate during cognitive functioning" 
(Vosniadou 1994, p 48). They are unique to each person and develop 
"through interaction with the target system" (Norman, 1983, p 7). In 
addition, they can be "incomplete ... unstable ... unscientific ... 
parsimonious" (ibid, p 8) and may be difficult to communicate to others 
(Harrison and Treagust, 2000). 
" Synthetic models These are models which are produced by pupils when 
they amalgamate their own models and those which they are taught. These 
synthetic models may be the source of many misconceptions. 
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Scientists and teachers thus find models useful, for example, to explain ideas and 
to plan experiments. According to Grosslight et al (1991) there are three levels in 
modelling ability: 
Level 1 Pupils believe that there is a 1: 1 correspondence between the model and 
reality; the model is a simple copy of what it is trying to model. 
Level 2 Pupils see models as not having to have a complete correspondence with 
reality but perceive the main use of a model to be explanatory rather than as a tool 
to explore ideas further. 
Level 3 At this level, models are seen in their multi-modal role as tools for 
thinking about and testing ideas and for developing ideas as well as explaining 
concepts. Also at this level multiple models are seen as useful. 
According to Grosslight et al (ibid), many pupils who are at the age of those in the 
present study would be at Level 1, showing that their ability to use and understand 
models is limited. The levels are based on how pupils describe and use models 
and could provide knowledge about conception status and level changes could 
mirror conceptual changes. 
Harrison and Treagust (1996) suggest that pupils be given the chance to develop 
their ability at modelling, using models to explain ideas and learning to understand 
the strong points and restrictions of each model used. Teachers should make sure 
the analogue is well known and that the pupils know which are the shared 
attributes and which are the unshared ones. 
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1.6 Analogies and constructivism 
The use of analogy fits in well with constructivism. As has been indicated, 
learning requires links to be made between what is being experienced and what is 
already known. In a similar way, analogies are links between a target and a base. 
Duit (1991) says that learning "fundamentally has to do with constructing 
similarities between the new and the already known. It is precisely this aspect that 
emphasizes the significance of analogies in a constructivist learning approach" (p 
652). 
He points out that more `traditional' views of learning also see the need for 
linking new ideas with more familiar ones. However, this seems to be in the 
context of conceptual growth; a continuous set of enlargements presumably along 
the lines of Piaget's assimilation idea. The constructivist view agrees that much 
learning is conceptual growth but the main difference is that it is a fully new 
construction of what is already known. This is more akin to Piaget's 
accommodation process. 
ýý 
Figure I Oa Traditional view of conceptual development as a continuous set of 
enlargements 
a <: D 
Figure 1 Ob Constructivist view of conceptual development as fully new 
constructions 
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Analogies are examples of plausible reasoning processes in that: 
" They allow the domain of applicability to increase. 
" They could prove more useful than logical proof processes. 
They are concerned with going from concrete ideas to abstract ideas, which is 
reminiscent of Piaget's concrete and formal operational thinking stages. 
Vygotsky might see analogies as scaffolding which is gradually removed as the 
child becomes more competent. In Gentner's structure mapping theory the 
scaffolding might include the first three steps but being removed before the fourth 
step where the pupil makes their own inferences. 
Summary 
Since analogy plays such an important role in learning and since analogies can be 
easily accessed by pupils, it was decided to make use of them in the present 
research. Their close link with the ideas of constructivism makes them a good 
candidate for overcoming misconceptions on condition that their limitations are 
realised and confronted. 
Although Piaget did not believe that children at the Concrete Operational Level 
are able to reason analogically, more recent research has led to the opposite view. 
One of the questions this research is attempting to answer concerns whether any 
success using analogies as a low-key intervention can be explained in terms of 
cueing p-prims (an unconscious process) or in terms of a process involving more 
explicit analogical reasoning. Previous research has shown that analogies can be 
used as unconscious contextual clues although no research seems to have linked 
this with cueing p-prims. 
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1.7 Bridging analogies 
It is easier to understand a close analogy than a distant one (Clement, 1998). 
Pupils may not be willing to accept straight away that A is analogous to C but, by 
introducing B. they may agree that A and B are analogues as are B and C. Thus, 
they may be more confident in the analogous relationship between A and C. 
In a distant analogy the analogue and target are too dissimilar for pupils to make 
easy comparisons. There are probably too many non-alignable differences between 
the analogue and target. As has already been mentioned, it is easier to compare the 
similarity of items by comparing alignable differences than non-alignable 
differences. The closer the analogy is, the more alignable any differences are 
going to be. It is better to reduce the total number of differences between analogue 
and target but there will always be some remaining. If it is possible to lessen the 
number of irrelevant, non-alignable differences, it should be easier for pupils to 
`see' the analogy. 
The anchor-bridge-target model aims to start where the student is and finish where 
the scientist is having crossed the chasm using conceptual bridges usually going 
from the very concrete to the rather abstract. In order to start where the student is 
it is necessary to make sure that one of their intuitive conceptions which is more 
or less correct from the scientific point of view is chosen and these, in general will 
involve the easily observable, concrete phenomena (Clement et al, 1989). It is not 
always easy to decide what to choose as an anchor. Clement et al (ibid) define an 
anchoring conception theoretically as "an intuitive knowledge structure that 
is in 
rough agreement with accepted physical theory" (p 555). If the student confidently 
makes a correct response to the problem then that is an anchor for that particular 
pupil. The confidence that the student has in the answer is important as this 
is a 
means of differentiating between what the pupil really believes and what they 
think is the correct answer even if it makes little sense to them. 
Of course, in a 
class situation it is more convenient to use an anchor that most students can relate 
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to; Clement et al, in this paper, suggested 70% as being a reasonable starting 
point. They considered this figure to be arbitrary but practical. 
Clement et al (ibid) carried out their study in three Western Massachusetts high 
schools on students who had not yet done any physics courses but who were doing 
chemistry, biology or general science. The respective average ages of the pupils in 
these groups were 17,15 and 14 years old. The researchers found that anchoring 
examples were not always the ones expected and added to the body of knowledge 
about the subject in revealing that some anchors are `brittle'. These are anchors 
that at first glance seem suitable candidates but it is found that they cannot be 
extended to even the first bridging analogy. They are especially prevalent where 
the anchor involves a symmetric situation but the bridge/target is asymmetric. The 
breaking of symmetry provides a barrier for the student, as he or she believes this 
small change to be more important than it actually is and to alter the whole 
situation. An example of this breaking of symmetry causing a brittle anchor is 
given by Clement et al (ibid). It involves two carts tied together by rope, there 
being a compressed spring between the two (Figure 11 a). Most pupils said, with a 
high degree of confidence that the carts would move apart with the same speed if 
the rope were cut. When the situation was changed to the spring being attached to 
one of the carts (Figure 11 b), the percentage of pupils answering correctly dropped 
considerably together with their confidence rating. The asymmetry introduced into 
the problem caused too large a change in the pupils' minds for them to consider 
the two situations analogous. 
Figure 11 a Spring not attached to carts 
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Figure 1lb Spring attached to one cart 
The research dealing with bridging analogies will be looked at in more detail in 
section 2.1. 
Clement (2004) has found that bridging analogies are useful in problem solving. 
His research involved experts in scientific fields who were asked questions about 
topics which were at the periphery of their knowledge. Analogies were generated 
by the participants to help to answer the questions. Earlier work by Clement 
(1989) had found that part of using analogies was in validating the analogies used. 
Bridging analogies can be used as a higher order strategy to make it easier to carry 
out validating methods. Although it adds more work since each pair of the 
bridging analogy sequence needs evaluating, presumably it makes each evaluation 
easier and promotes more confidence in the validity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Design of pilot research 
Introduction 
The objectives of the pilot research were: 
" To conduct similar research to previous work to establish whether 
equivalent results would be obtained. 
" To check on the logistics of the research, e. g. whether it would fit into the 
classroom routine without too much disruption. 
" To examine the potential for further research. 
It was decided to use bridging analogies as the main method of teaching for 
meaningful learning. This was for the following reasons: 
" Using bridging analogies is a constructivist approach, designed to instruct in a 
conceptual manner resulting in meaningful learning. 
" Research has shown that this strategy has been successful and there have been 
various research projects on the topic of balanced forces using this method. 
" Research has shown that it is a reasonably straightforward, self-contained 
method which can be implemented over a relatively short time-scale. 
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2.1 Previous research on bridging analogies 
Brown's (1994) research on bridging analogies points to their success. Rather than 
using any practical work, his study was conducted using a written explanation 
involving bridging analogies. The students taking part were 73 chemistry students 
in their junior year who would be taking physics the following year. The 
explanation was interspersed with questions which probed the pupil's 
understanding of the target situation - whether a table exerts an upwards force on a 
book resting on it - as well as those which asked how confident the pupil was 
about their answers and how much sense the idea of a balanced force made. Out of 
the 40 students who had said, at the start, that the table did not exert an upward 
force on the book, 37 had changed their minds by the end. Although Brown 
recognised that his results did not show that every student had gone through a 
permanent conceptual change, he argued that students were not merely being 
trained to answer correctly by the fact that their `sense' ratings increased during 
the session. However, being offered an explanation and then denying it makes 
sense would not be the usual behaviour of a pupil who would probably prefer to 
believe that they had understood. That the pupils could explain their answers by 
linking to their intuitive anchors does not seem surprising given that the 
explanation was already there. Brown did not, in this paper, report any follow-up 
testing to see how permanent these conceptual changes were. 
Thijs and Bosch (1995) used the success of bridging techniques in their work to 
compare the relative usefulness of demonstration and small group practicals 
in 
teaching about forces on objects at rest. The students involved in their study were 
approximately 15 years old. The bridging steps used in this research 
involved 
work on the normal force and the force of friction. They 
found that bridging 
analogies are very successful especially in dealing with the normal 
force and that 
demonstration practicals are, for girls, more successful than small group 
practicals. They also found that retention was high for those tested three months 
later although they do point out that only pupils opting 
for physics in the following 
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academic year took the retest. The three-week teaching sequence included pre- 
tests, anchor-bridge analogy practical sessions (small group and demonstration) 
and post-lab, final and, later, retention tests. Unfortunately their research related to 
only the top 40% - 50% of the ability range and it would be interesting to see if 
their conclusions apply to those of below average ability. As the research was 
designed primarily to compare the differences between teacher demonstrations and 
small group practicals there was no comparison between pupils using bridging 
analogies and those not doing so. 
More recently, Clement (1998) has studied the similarities in generating analogies 
between students and experts and the research again supports the use of bridging 
analogies in the topic of balanced forces. His work included comparing the 
improvement on identical tests before and after bridging analogy teaching for high 
school students taking a first year physics course (150 in the experimental group 
and 55 in the control group). The latter test was given approximately two months 
after the instruction thus testing retention. The control classes just used their 
normal curriculum. The results of the tests indicate that the experimental group 
gained more than the control group (of the order of one standard deviation in size). 
A two-tailed t-test gave a probability of < 0.0001 that these results were due to 
chance. 
One of his conclusions was that students need to be encouraged to spend time 
discussing the analogies in order to evaluate them as experts do. There are no 
short cuts to the answer. 
He suggested that bridging analogies might work because they gradually extend 
the domain where the student can apply a particular conception via a mental 
simulation. In contrast, many textbooks require pupils to see the connection 
between a set of unordered examples in order to understand the general principle 
(Brown and Clement, 1992). 
119 
Of course, one major difficulty of working with balanced forces is that of 
differentiating between balanced forces acting on an object and action-reaction 
pairs. This does not seem to be discussed in the literature even though the possible 
future confusion seems possible. 
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2.2 Implications for this study 
From these pieces of research various important points have emerged. These are 
summarised below together with implications for this research. 
" For girls demonstration work is more successful than small group 
practicals (Thijs and Bosch, 1995). This suggests that it would be 
advisable to include at least some demonstration work since it is only girls 
in the sample school. 
" Discussion to evaluate analogies appears to be important (Clement, 1998). 
Pupils must be given the opportunity and the time to discuss whether the 
analogies make sense to them with the teacher acting Socratically. 
" Written explanations are useful (Brown, 1994). If nothing else, they will 
allow pupils to follow through the reasoning as often as they need. 
9 If it is used in a whole class situation, it is more convenient if the anchor is 
applicable to the majority of the pupils (Clement et al, 1989). Also, one 
must be wary of `brittle' anchors (ibid). 
" Retention tests are essential since it is the permanent restructuring of 
schemata which is most important. 
0 The work of the control group is as important as that of the experimental 
group. Their curriculum should be of the usual textbook type - state 
principle (perhaps as the conclusion to an experiment), look at examples 
and work through similar examples as questions. 
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2.3 Pilot research methodology 
A comparison was made between the effect of teaching using bridging analogies 
and a more traditional approach to overcome certain physics misconceptions. In 
order to measure the effectiveness of the two approaches, two Year 8 classes (12- 
13 year olds) were used. One class acted as the control, learning by the traditional 
approach and the other was the experimental group, learning by using bridging 
analogies. 
Previous work on which this research was based 
There were several works on which this present research was most directly based. 
The results and conclusions to these have been articulated above. 
It was decided to style the bridging analogy sheets on the work of Brown (1994) 
who gave a written explanation including bridging analogies to 73 American high 
school students who had not already studied physics. The topic was Newton's 
third law and the question posed was as to whether a table exerts an upward force 
on a book resting on the table. At the beginning and after each part of the 
explanation, the students were asked to say what they believed about the problem. 
They were also asked, at intervals, about their `sense' ratings and also their 
`confidence' ratings. The `sense' ratings were designed to reveal what they 
intuitively believed and the `confidence' ratings, what they thought was the `right 
`answer, possibly based on what they may have been told in the past. 
Present research 
The bridging analogy sheets for the present research (see Appendix Ia) were 
printed with each part appearing on a separate sheet so that, as in Brown's 
research, the pupils did not accidentally glance at the next part of the explanation. 
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In this part of the research, the pupils were asked how much sense it made that the 
table is pushing up on the book (on a scale of one to five). 
It is easier to control and measure what is happening in demonstration conditions 
as the teacher is more experienced and there is more chance that the experiment 
will go according to plan. It also means that each pupil will have seen exactly the 
same experiment being performed although the sense they make of it may well 
differ. In addition, the teacher can limit the amount of discussion between pupils. 
Discussion is usually beneficial but it may lead pupils to give responses based on 
their peers' ideas rather than their own. Thus it was decided to carry out most of 
the research as demonstrations. This would not be seen as out of the ordinary by 
the pupils as they are accustomed to both small group and demonstration 
practicals. This method is supported by Thijs and Bosch (1995), who carried out 
the investigation, mentioned above, into the relative merits of demonstration and 
small group practical work. They found that girls tended to fare better under 
demonstration conditions and as the present sample is all girls, there is no 
complication of bias. 
Thijs and Bosch's research involved pre- and post-tests together with retention 
tests for some of the pupils. Clement (1998), conducting a study of bridging 
analogies, used pre- and retention tests. It was decided to incorporate pre-, post- 
and retention tests in the present research with the retention tests being eight 
weeks after the post-test. This period of time was chosen since it was not feasible 
to use a longer time, as each part of the research needs to be completed during a 
school year. Two months was used by Clement although he does not give his 
reasons for this. 
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2.4 Sample 
The school (fee-paying independent school in England) from which the sample 
was chosen is, in the senior (11-18) section, all girls. All the cohorts taking part in 
this research comprised two classes with approximately 24 in each class. 
For each Year 8 cohort, there was similarity between the classes in terms of ability 
which can be shown by the physics examination results at the end of year seven. 
For all the cohorts for whom research was carried out, there was a maximum of 4% 
difference in the means of the two classes (see Appendix If). 
The pupils have to pass an entrance examination and so are not representative of 
the population. How representative they are can be partly ascertained by comparing 
the Key Stage 2 results prior to entry to secondary school for this school and 
nationally. Pupils are tested in English, Mathematics and Science at the end of 
their primary school (10 -11 years-old). Not all the parents of pupils in the 
research classes volunteered information on their Key Stage 2 results and some 
pupils had not done the tests. Appendix Ig shows the national results and the 
results for those in the research school who had taken the tests and provided the 
information. It is clear that the pupils in the research school are generally of above 
average ability in the subjects tested. For example, in science, an average of 98% 
reached level four (target for the age group) or above for the research school 
compared with 86% nationally. Level five or above was reached by 36% nationally 
and 56% of the pupils in the research school. Pupils who reach level five are 
considered to have exceeded the targets for their age group. 
Although the sample is not entirely representative of the general Year 8 population 
of all schools in England, the conclusions reached may be capable of transfer to the 
wider population. Even if this is not possible, the information should be of value to 
schools of its genre as it will give an indication as to whether the type of approach 
would be of use in the teaching of more able pupils (especially girls). 
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2.5 Statistics used 
The t-test was used to show how likely it is that the results obtained are not due to 
chance alone. By using this test, we are testing the null hypothesis that there 
would be no difference between the test results for populations taught either way, 
i. e. Ho : µl = µ2 where µl and µ2 are the hypothetical population means. In order 
for the results to be statistically significant, the null hypothesis must be rejected so 
it can be stated that Xi - X2 (the difference between the sample means) is too 
high to have happened by chance at a certain level of significance. If the level of 
significance is 0.1 then there is a 10% probability that the results happened by 
chance. 0.05 would mean a 5% probability. Obviously, the lower the number, the 
more confidence can be placed in the results. As the t-value increases, the 
probability that the results are due to chance decreases. 
The basic t-test formula is as follows: 
t= 
Xi-x2 
s12/nl +s22/n2 
Xi and X2 are the sample. 
s12 and s22 are the sample variances. 
nl and n2 are the sample numbers and t is 
the t-value. 
There are three separate factors that the t-test takes into consideration in order to 
decide whether the results are significant (Popham and Sirotnik, 1967). 
Mean difference 
The greater the difference between the means, the less the probability that the 
difference is caused by chance. This mean difference is in the numerator of the 
formula so a larger difference gives a higher value for t and therefore a lower 
probability of chance results. 
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Group variability 
If the variance of the two groups is large (a great spread in the distributions), then 
even a fairly large difference in the means will result in a good deal of overlap. 
Could a valid assertion be made that both samples were not drawn from the same 
population? This idea is considered in the denominator. If the group variances are 
small, this will give a small denominator and therefore a large value oft. 
Means = 40 and 60 
Standard deviations =5 
Not much overlap 
Means = 40 and 60 
Standard deviations = 10 
More overlap 
Figure 12 Large and small variances (Lane, 2003) 
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Sample size 
Increased sample size produces a more stable indicator of group performance. The 
larger the sample, the smaller the difference in means can be to be statistically 
significant. This is taken into consideration twice. In the formula, the sample size 
appears in the denominator of the denominator so that a large t is produced from a 
large sample size. In the t-table, a given t value is more significant when the 
sample size (degrees of freedom) is large. The degrees of freedom are the number 
of independent pieces of information about the population. When the mean is 
calculated, one degree of freedom is removed. So, if there are 10 in each sample, 
then the number of degrees of freedom is 
(10-1) + (10-1) = 18. 
Different t-tests 
There are several formulae for the t-test, each differing slightly. Which one to use 
depends on three criteria. 
Correlation 
If matched pairs or two measures on each subject are involved, it is more likely 
that the scores for each subject will be more similar and the likelihood of the 
means of the groups being different is less. The t value is adjusted upwards 
accordingly. The formula used in this case is: 
XI-X2 
-i- 
S2 
- 
Zy, 
S'S2 
rn 
z 
n2 ýn, Vn 
12 
Xi and X2 are the sample. 
sie and s22 are the sample variances. 
nl and n2 are the sample numbers 
and t is the t-value. 
r is the correlation factor between the 
two sets of data 
Homogeneity of variances 
If there is no correlation or if correlation cannot be assumed since there are no 
matched pairs, or there are not two measures on each subject, then homogeneity of 
variances needs to be considered 
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The two sample groups are taken from two populations (real or hypothetical) and 
it is important to calculate statistically whether the variances of the populations 
are equal. This is done by calculating the F ratio. 
F= s2 
(larger) 
s2 (smaller) 
As F increases, the probability increases that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the two variances and that the variances are non- 
homogeneous. Tables show the cut-off point for homogeneity. 
If the variances are homogeneous, the formula is for pooled variances: 
t= 
X1 - X2 
r 
(nl 
- 
1)s12 + 
(n2 
- 
1)s2 z11 
+ 
\n1 
+ n2 -2) n1 n2 
If the variances are not homogeneous, the formula is for separate variances: 
X1 - X2 t= 
s12 /1)+ 
(s22/n2) 
Number of subjects in the sample 
Different formulae are used depending on whether there are equal numbers in each 
group or not (ni = n2 or nl #- n2). The correct formula to be used can be found by 
utilising the following flowchart. 
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t-test for correlated 
data - dependent samples 
t-test for non-correlated 
data - independent samples 
Is the variance homogeneous? 
yes no 
Is ni=n2? 1 Is ni=n2? 
Y 
Separate or pooled 
(equivalent formulae 
if nl = n2) 
df=nl+n2-2 
Pooled 
df=nl+n2-2 
Figure 13 Deciding on the t-test 
Separate or pooled 
(equivalent formulae 
ifnl = n2) 
df=n1-1 
(not nl+n2-1) 
Separate 
mean of 
t value for 
nj-1 and n2-1 
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Is there a correlation? 
Assumptions of the t-test (Popham and Sirotnik, 1973) 
1. The samples are randomly drawn from their respective populations. 
2. The scores are normally distributed. 
3. The scores have the same variance in the populations. 
Robustness of test 
If statistical assumptions are violated but the test remains valid, the test is said to 
be robust (ibid). The t-test is such a test in that the assumptions of normality and 
equal variance can be departed from quite noticeably without the validity of the 
test being compromised. According to Ferguson (1981), for large samples of 25- 
30, non-normality is not usually a serious problem and he claims that there is 
evidence to suggest that even small samples of 5-10 are not usually seriously 
affected. However, a one-tailed test is more prone to influence. Pure randomness 
is difficult to achieve but, if it can be shown that the samples are not biased with 
respect to their populations, then the t-test can still be utilised. 
Tails 
A two-tailed test is used if there is no direction to the research hypothesis, e. g. that 
scientific conceptions will be retained at different levels by the experimental and 
control groups. A one-tailed test is used when there is a direction to the research 
hypothesis, e. g. that scientific conceptions will be retained at a higher levels by the 
experimental than by the control group. 
Errors concerned with significance 
There are two main types of error as shown in Table 4. Ideally, both types of error 
should be made as small as possible. Total control of Type I error is given to the 
researcher. He or she can reduce this error merely by reducing the level of 
significance. However, in reducing the probability of a Type I error, it increases 
the probability of a Type II error since there is now less likelihood of rejecting the 
null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis is really false, then a Type II error will have 
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been committed. The Type II error thus depends to a certain extent on the Type I 
error but it is also dependent on other experimental considerations such as sample 
size. 
Nature of null Decision of researcher 
hypothesis Accepts null hypothesis Rejects null hypothesis 
Null hypothesis is really 
NO ERROR TYPE (I) ERROR 
true 
Null hypothesis is really 
TYPE (II) ERROR NO ERROR (1-0) 
false 
Table 4 Significance errors 
Choice of t-test for pilot research 
As the t-test is a robust test, it can be carried out on small sample sizes and it was 
assumed that the samples were not biased with respect to their populations. It was 
not feasible to use strict randomness in the choice of sample as the pupils were 
already in classes which were not being taught at the same time so random 
allocation of pupils to the control group or the experimental group was not 
possible. One class was the control group and the other was the experimental 
group. In the main part of the research, the classes alternated between being the 
control group and the experimental group for the different topics so that bias 
would be more easily noticed. In any case, an assumption of non-bias was made 
on the grounds of the year seven physics results of the examinations taken the 
summer prior to the research being carried out (see Section 2.4 and Appendix If). 
For the initial analysis, there was assumed to be no correlation as there were no 
matched pairs or two measures on the same subject. The F-test revealed that 
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statistically 61 ==U2 and nl # n2 so the pooled variance for non-correlated samples 
was chosen. A one-tailed test was used as the research hypothesis was directional. 
Statistics used in previous research 
Clement et al (1989) and Brown (1994) used percentages in their results without 
any further statistical analysis. 
Thijs and Bosch (1995) used percentage scores to indicate the number of pupils 
giving correct answers or the percentage scores of pupils at various stages of their 
study which looked at the relative merits of demonstration and small group 
practicals. They also used an analysis of covariance on the scores of the final and 
retention tests with the scores on the initial test as covariant. This analysis of 
covariance allows initial differences between experimental and control groups to 
be equalised. The factors distinguished in this study were type of strategy (small 
group practical or demonstration) and sex (boys or girls). The covariance analysis 
is designed to adjust observed scores in relation to differences in the covariant. 
Clement (1998) used the two-tailed t-test to report on the use of bridging analogies 
in a forces topic. The percentage gain during the experiment was stated together 
with the probability that the results were due just to chance rather than due to the 
experimental variable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Analysis of pilot research 
3.1 Results and analysis of pilot research 
Research hypothesis 
The experimental group will retain the scientific conceptions better than the 
control group and so their marks in the retention test will not have dropped as 
much (from their post-test results) as those from the control group. 
Null hypothesis 
Ho = "Pupils taught by the bridging analogy method will not retain scientific 
conceptions any better than pupils taught 'traditionally'. " 
Table 5 shows the results for how pupils differed between post and retention tests 
according to their groups. For the experimental group there was an average drop 
of 2.1 % between the post- and retention test. For the control group, it was 6.9%. 
The full results for the initial, post and retention tests can be found in Appendix 
Id 
and the questions themselves in Appendix Ic. 
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pupil no. (experimental) total post test(exp. ) total ret. test (exp. ) post-ret. (exp) 
1 18 18 0 
2 11 11 0 
3 17 17 0 
4 17 17 0 
5 13 13 0 
6 16 17 -1 
8 15 14 1 
9 15 18 -3 
10 16 18 -2 
11 18 10 8 
12 18 18 0 
13 15 12 3 
14 16 17 -1 
pupil no. (control) total post test (cont. ) total ret. test (cont. ) post-ret. (cont. ) 
15 12 8 4 
16 15 15 0 
18 17 16 1 
19 14 15 -1 
21 17 10 7 
22 8 13 -5 
23 7 4 3 
25 17 12 5 
26 18 12 6 
27 12 16 -4 
28 13 14 -1 
29 15 15 0 
Experimental group mean = 0.38 
standard deviation = 2.69 
Control group mean = 1.25 
standard deviation = 3.82 
p=0.26 
Table 5 Post- and retention test scores for the experimental and control groups 
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A one-tailed t-test for independent non-correlated data (equal variance) gave 
p>O. 1 (p=0.26) showing the results to be not statistically significant at the 0.1 
level of significance. There is a 26% probability that the results were produced by 
chance. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Because these results were not statistically significant it was decided to analyse 
each question and how well it was answered as a comparison between post-test 
and retention test. Now the difference in marks between post and retention tests 
for each question became the subject and each question was being tested twice; 
once by the control group and once by the experimental group. This became two 
measures on the same subject and so correlation was assumed. The t-test for 
correlated samples was thus used. 
Research hypothesis 
The drop in number of pupils answering each question correctly between the post- 
test and the retention test will be greater for the control group than the 
experimental group. 
Null hypothesis 
Ho = "If questions are used to test pupils in post and retention tests, there will not 
be any significant difference in the drop in number of correct answers between 
pupils taught by bridging analogy and those taught more traditionally. " 
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Table 6 shows the results for the fall in correct answers between post and retention 
tests for each question. Again, for the experimental group there was an average 
drop of 2.1 % between the post- and retention test. For the control group, it was 
6.9%. 
qu. no. post-retention (experimental) post-retention (control) 
1 0 5 
2 1 -1 
3 0 3 
4 0 0 
5 0 0 
6 0 2 
7 -3 4 
8 -1 -1 
9i 0 0 
9ii 2 3 
10i 0 0 
10ii -1 -1 
11i -1 -2 
11 ii 2 -3 
12c 0 2 
13b 1 1 
14i 2 -1 
1411 3 4 
Experimental group mean = 0.28 Control rý oup mean =0.83 
standard deviation = 1.41 
p=0.20 
standard deviation =2.28 
Table 6 Post - retention test scores for each question 
The one-tailed test for dependent (paired) samples gave p>O. 1 (p=0.20) showing 
the results to be not statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. There 
is a 20% probability that the results were produced by chance. Again the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Which test is more valid? 
The second test used concentrated on the individual questions and how well they 
were answered. The data points out the questions which are either too easy or too 
difficult to be influenced by the teaching method and clearly shows those 
questions which are influenced by the mode of instruction. The questions which 
are too easy are always going to be answered correctly whereas the most difficult 
questions may be approached with guesswork. This guesswork may cancel out 
when a question is answered by many children. However, if each pupil is the 
subject, as in the first test, the guesswork may follow a particular pattern 
depending on their answer to the first difficult question that they come across. 
This answer may be randomly different each time the test is attempted and this 
would lead to biased results. 
Example 
A pupil who does not understand about balanced forces on a stationary object may 
guess an answer as being `the down force is greater than the up force'. On 
subsequent questions, the pupil is more likely to give similar answers. When the 
test is repeated, the pupil might guess that the answer is `down force is equal to 
the up force', repeating with similar answers to the other questions. This would 
show a vast improvement in the pupil's score between the two tests. Conversely, if 
it were to happen the other way round, then there would be a large drop in the 
scores. This would produce a large variance, a smaller t-value and less statistically 
significant results. 
If each question is taken to be the subject, the difficult questions may be answered 
randomly, but by the argument above, the number of pupils answering wrongly is 
more likely to cancel with the number answering correctly. Thus, the variance 
should be less leading to a larger t-value and more statistically significant results. 
137 
Both methods of analysis will be used in the main research. The number of 
questions for each topic will be much less so the sample size for the second type 
of analysis will also be reduced. 
Analysis of each question (see Appendix Ic for questions 
Question I Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 15 46 46 
Control group 67 58 17 
Question 1 (apple hanging from tree) showed a substantial increase for the 
experimental group from initial to post whereas the control group performed 
worse after the teaching than before and even worse in the retention test eight 
weeks later. The success of the bridging analogy approach is indicated and could 
be explained by the pupils having a clearer idea of the forces being balanced in the 
vertical direction in a similar way to the forces being balanced for the book on the 
table. 
Question 2 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 23 100 92 
Control group 25 58 67 
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Question 2 concerned the `book on the table' problem and it is not surprising that 
there was again a substantial increase for the experimental group from the initial 
test to the post-test since this was the target question in the bridging analogy 
teaching approach. There was also not much of a drop to the retention test, 
showing that they had retained the concept well. The control group also increased 
their score from initial to post-test and this can be explained by the fact that they 
had had this as an example during their teaching. The control group went on to 
increase their score in the retention test. 
Question 3 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 85 100 100 
Control group 58 100 75 
Question 3 asked about the forces on a book on an outstretched hand. Both groups 
increased their scores from initial to post-test. This is a similar problem to the 
book on the table which both groups had seen the week before their post-test and 
this explains the increase. More importantly, the control group had a substantially 
reduced score in the retention test whereas the experimental group did not 
decrease their score. This suggests a better concept retention for the experimental 
group than the control group. 
Question 4 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 100 100 100 
Control group 92 100 100 
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Question 4 (a squashed spring exerting a force on a hand) was the anchor in the 
bridging analogy approach and it was expected that most pupils would get this 
right, even in the initial test as the anchor was chosen so that most pupils would 
`agree' with the correct answer. 
Question 5 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 100 100 100 
Control group 100 100 100 
Both experimental and control groups scored 100% in all tests on question 5 
which was about the forces on a rope during a tug-of-war, indicating that it might 
prove useful as an anchor question. 
Question 6 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 62 77 77 
Control group 17 67 50 
Question 6 concerned a boy pulling on a tree and, although all the pupils had 
responded correctly in the previous question where two people were pulling on a 
rope, this time there were far fewer correct responses from either group. This can 
be explained by the fact that many pupils do not think that inanimate objects such 
as trees can exert forces (Dykstra, 2000). Having been taught about balanced 
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forces, both groups increased their scores from initial to post-test, the control 
group considerably so. This may represent a case of a short-lived `teaching to the 
test' effect as the control group dropped their score in the retention test in 
comparison with the experimental group who had retained the concept well. 
Question 7 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 92 69 92 
Control group 50 75 42 
For question 7, about trying to push a large box on wheels which will not move, 
for the control group, there was an expected rise from initial to post-test together 
with a drop to the retention test. However, the results for the experimental group 
were unexpected. There was a drop from the initial to the post-test and then a rise 
to the retention test. Also, when asked the name of the forces acting on the crate, 
several, who had mentioned friction in the initial test, became confused in the 
post-test, having the idea that the crate itself was exerting a force. This is possibly 
explained by the `book on the table' problem where the table pushes on the book 
and no friction is involved. 
Question 8 Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 69 92 100 
Control group 17 58 67 
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Question 8 concerns a block being pushed against a wall where no motion is 
involved. Both groups showed increases throughout the tests. The experimental 
group had had this as a target in another set of bridging analogies (not discussed in 
this research) and the control group had it in one of the examples in their teaching 
sequence. 
Question 9i Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 100 100 100 
Control group 67 92 92 
Question 9ii Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 62 92 77 
Control group 42 92 67 
Question 9 asked about the forces on a lift which was not moving. The 
experimental group scored 100% in each test for drawing two opposing forces (9i) 
and increased their score from initial to post-test for indicating the forces were of 
equal size (9ii). There was then a drop to the retention test. The control group 
increased their score for drawing opposing forces from the initial to post-test, 
maintaining this score for the retention test. They also increased their score for 
indicating the forces were the same size between the first two tests but this 
dropped quite substantially for the third test showing a poor retention of the 
concept. 
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Question 1Oi Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 85 85 85 
Control group 50 67 67 
Question IOii Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 62 69 77 
Control group 17 58 67 
Question 10 concerned the forces acting on a swimmer floating in the water. The 
experimental group's results were similar to, if mostly lower, than their scores in 
question nine. The control group's results increased from initial to post-test for 
drawing two opposing forces (l 0i) and then stayed the same for the retention test. 
For the size of the forces (l Oii), there was an increase throughout the tests. 
Question 1Ii Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 92 85 92 
Control group 75 67 83 
Question 11 ii Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 69 85 69 
Control group 33 58 83 
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Question 11 was about a stationary floating boat. There was a decrease for both 
groups from initial to post-test for drawing two opposing forces (11 i) followed by 
a rise to the retention test. For indicating that the forces are the same size (11 ii), 
the control group there was an increase in their scores throughout the tests 
whereas the experimental group increased and then decreased their score. 
Question 12c Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 100 100 100 
Control group 100 100 83 
Similar results were obtained by both groups for question 12 about which way a 
chair spring pushed a woman on the chair except that the control group decreased 
their score in the retention test. This was similar to question four and could act as 
an anchor. 
Question 13b Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 62 85 77 
Control group 58 83 75 
There was not much difference between the groups for question 13 which asked 
about what would happen to the motion of a rocket on a launch pad if the upward 
force equalled the weight of the rocket. 
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Question 14i Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 62 100 85 
Control group 67 83 92 
Question 14ii Initial 
(% correct) 
Post 
(% correct) 
Retention 
(% correct) 
Experimental group 23 92 69 
Control group 42 58 25 
Question 14 asked about the forces on a stationary submarine on the seabed. This 
is very similar to the `book on the table' problem and for drawing the opposing 
forces (14i) the results followed a similar pattern. The experimental group 
increased more than the control group in going from initial to post-test which 
would support the bridging analogy approach but the control group then went on 
to further increase their score for the retention test whereas the experimental group 
decreased their score in this test. For drawing the forces the same size, the patterns 
of both groups were similar in that there was a rise and then a fall but the rise 
for 
the experimental group was larger than for the control group and the subsequent 
drop was smaller, again supporting the bridging analogy approach. 
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3.2 Conclusions and evaluation of pilot research 
The pilot research showed there was potential for further research. There was a 
trend in the results to indicate that using bridging analogies is a successful way of 
changing misconceptions. This is in agreement with the literature as shown at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
Most of the studies already carried out concentrate on the topic of forces and 
especially Newton's third law and it was decided to continue the research but 
covering more topics. One reason for this was to look more closely at the `sense' 
levels during the different bridging analogies (see Chart 1 below). An interesting 
feature of the bridging analogy used in the pilot study was that the average sense 
level actually dropped during the bridging analogies and only rose to more than its 
initial level after the final explanation. This could have been due to the fact that 
the analogous nature of the experiments was not explained to the pupils 
sufficiently. However, it could be due to a more fundamental reason in that there 
is a state of flux or confusion while basic concepts are changing towards a more 
scientific view. It was proposed that a similar analysis should be carried out on the 
bridging analogies used in the main body of research. 
4.4 
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Chart I Analysis of 'sense' ratings for bridging analogies for the 
'book on table' problem 
Although each topic, on its own, may not produce statistically significant results, 
it is possible that the accumulated results of all the topics may be statistically 
significant. 
Method of testing 
The pre-test, post-test and retention test became, for the pupils, very tedious since 
they were each so long. It was decided to shorten the tests from 14 to three 
questions in order for them to become a more positive experience for the pupils. 
This coincided with the decision to widen the area of research to cover several 
topics. 
There were problems with lack of feedback since it was not possible to discuss the 
questions until after the retention test. The pupils were used to being given 
feedback almost immediately. It was felt to be unlikely to be able to overcome this 
problem entirely although a fuller explanation of the rationale behind the tests 
could be given. 
The pupils were also not used to being given questions about a topic that they had 
not already covered and they needed a lot of reassurance with the pre-test. It was 
important not to raise levels of anxiety with the tests and to this aim they were not 
referred to as tests but merely some questions that were not going to be given a 
mark or used as assessment. 
Introducing video cameras was considered but it was felt that this could cause too 
much disruption as the pupils were not used to being videoed. It was felt that 
keeping the lessons as normal as possible would help to keep the research valid. It 
was envisaged that pupils would be even more likely to give answers that they 
thought the teacher would want rather than those based on their own ideas if they 
were being videoed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Main research (part 1) 
4.1 Methodology 
For each topic, one of the classes acted as the control group and the other was the 
experimental group. The classes alternated between being control and 
experimental to try to reduce bias or, at least, make it more noticeable. 
Both groups underwent a pre-test just before the topic, a post-test the week after 
the topic and a retention test eight weeks after the post-test. These tests were 
identical. The questions asked in the tests can be found in Appendix Ilc. Typically, 
they included a question which was closely aligned to and contextually similar to 
the target and other questions on a similar theme but set in a slightly different 
context. An example is shown below of the questions given for the Forces 2 
(stretching) topic. 
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SOME QUESTIONS ON STRETCHING 
1. Sarah found that a 5cm spring stretched to 7cm when she hung a weight on it. 
She took a 10cm spring (identical to the first one except for the length) and 
hung the same weight on it. What do you think the new length was? 
2. The graph shows the length (not the extension) of a spring with different 
weights on it. 
Graph of length of spring against weight 
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3. Alex has a box with a lid which she wants to hold secure with a rubber band. 
She finds that a 20cm rubber band is just the right tightness when stretched 
round the box. It has to stretch to 30cm. 
10cm 
5cm ist box ubber band 
rubber band 
1 
20cm 
)cm 2nd box 
She then takes another box and finds that the rubber band has to stretch to 60cm. 
She wants the same tightness of rubber band as for the first box. All the rubber 
bands she has are exactly the same except for their original length. Should she 
choose: 
a. a 50cm rubber band because to be the right tightness, the band will need to 
stretch 10cm so a 50cm band will stretch to 60cm. 
b. a 40cm band because to be the right tightness, the band will stretch by 10cm for 
each 20cm of band so a 40cm band will stretch to 60cm. 
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The first question is almost identical to the target concept of the same weight 
producing twice the extension for a double length but otherwise identical spring. 
The other two questions required use of the concept of original length and 
extension being directly proportional but these two questions are set in different 
contexts. 
The control group were taught the topic in a traditional style which usually 
comprised an experiment with conclusion and explanation, followed by more 
examples and questions. The control group work for each topic can be found in 
Appendix IIa. 
The experimental group were presented with a target question which included a 
known misconception in the topic. They were given two possible 
explanations/statements to the question and asked to score a mark out of five as to 
how much sense each explanation/statement made. They were also asked to say 
which they thought was the more likely to be correct. The sense scoring was to 
elicit their conception whereas their likely answer could have been based on the 
answer that they thought the teacher might require. Following this there was an 
analogous experiment/question (the anchor). This was designed so that most of 
the students would be able to answer it correctly. It was a concrete analogy to fit in 
with the concrete operational stage at which many of the pupils would be working. 
A class discussion was then held to decide how similar the anchor and target were. 
The target question was then repeated. A bridging analogy was then introduced, 
typically less concrete than the anchor but more concrete than the target. A 
discussion about the similarities and differences between the anchor and bridge 
and between the bridge and target followed. The target question was repeated and 
then an explanation given before the final time of asking the target question. 
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This can be summarised as follows. 
page 1 target question 
page 2 anchor -* discussion --* target question 
page 3 bridge -> discussion -3 target question 
1 
page 4 explanation -> target question 
The first target question, anchor, bridge and explanation were on separate pages to 
reduce the risk of reading ahead. The pupils worked by themselves apart from the 
class discussions and were encouraged to feel that it was acceptable to change 
their minds about the target question answers as they went through the work but 
that they must not go back and change what they had previously written. Details of 
the experimental group work can be found in Appendix IIa. 
In using the bridging analogies, the pupils were not specifically told that an 
analogy was being used. This was so that the pupils would not feel that they had to 
use the analogies in their answers. If they were told that the anchor was analogous 
to the target then that may have influenced their answers to the `sense' 
explanations/statements and `which explanation/statement they thought was 
correct' question. However, the anchor, bridging analogies and target situations 
were compared to elicit their similarities and differences. 
151 
4.2 Bridging analogies used and their analysis 
A brief explanation of the anchor and bridge analogies being used in this part of 
the research are given together with a short analysis partly based on Thiele and 
Treagust (1995) and Parida and Goswami (2000) - see pp 106-107. 
Heat 1 thermal equilibrium) 
Target 
Metal often feels colder than cork because it removes heat from your body and 
conducts it away quicker than cork. 
Anchor 
Bunsen 
Which pea drops off first? 
Bridge 
Bunsen 
flame 
hot wate 
V Vl lN. 
clamp 
Pea held on with 
vaseline 
Which cools quicker -a beaker of hot water on a cork mat or one on a metal mat 
(both beakers have lids). 
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Analysis 
Visualisation effect These analogies (anchor and bridge) contain pictorial forms 
to aid visualisation. The process also includes activity (comparison of analogues 
and target) to help cognition. 
The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation In this case, the anchor and bridge analogues are fully 
explained in terms of conducting ability. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. 
Target and analogue domains For this topic the target and analogue (anchor and 
bridge) come from the same domain of heat conduction. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of heat flow. 
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Heat 2 (radiation and absorption) 
Tar et 
Good absorbers are good radiators of heat. 
Anchor 
The pupils decide that, in general, people who are good at throwing balls are good 
at catching them. 
Bridge 
The pupils are asked to think of the balls as packets of energy that can be thrown 
and caught. 
Analysis 
Visualisation effect These analogies are not shown in a pictorial form but the 
anchor is easy to visualise. In the next part of the research, a diagram was included 
to further aid visualisation. The process also includes activity (comparison of 
analogues and target) to help cognition. 
The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation In this case, the anchor analogue is part of the pupils' 
direct experience. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. In fact, long discussions ensued as to whether the anchor statement was 
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valid but in the end it was decided that, if one were in a netball team, for example, 
then you would have to be good at both throwing and catching a ball. 
Target and analogue domains For this analogy the target and analogues come 
from different domains. The target comes from electromagnetic radiation and 
absorption and the anchor analogue comes from the domain of game playing. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of giving and receiving. 
Light 1 (reflection and scattering) 
Target 
We see objects, which do not produce their own light, by reflection. 
Anchor 
This involves rolling a ball towards a straight barrier at different angles and 
marking where the ball reflected. The position of the `image' is then found. 
Bridge 
The anchor is repeated but this time the ball is rolled towards two barriers, 
touching but at an angle to each other to simulate roughness of a surface. It is then 
shown that the `image' could not be found although there is reflection. 
Analysis 
Visualisation effect These analogies (anchor and bridge) contain pictorial forms 
to aid visualisation. The process also includes activity (comparison of analogues 
and target) to help cognition. 
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The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation In this case, the anchor analogue has been explained in a 
previous lesson and the pupils have had experience of image finding in mirrors. In 
retrospect, however, this was felt to be rather too difficult for the particular age 
group to fully comprehend and the anchor and bridge were changed in the 
following part of the research to ensure that the analogue was more 
comprehensible. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. 
Target and analogue domains For this analogy the target and analogue come 
from different domains. The target comes from reflection of light and the anchor 
and bridge analogues come from the domain of `reflection' of balls from hard 
surfaces. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of reflection. 
Light 2 (colour) 
Target 
Colour filters remove colours from white light. 
Anchor 
Filter paper is used to separate sand and water. 
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Bridge 
A colour filter is placed between a spectrum producer and a screen so that only the 
filter colour is seen on the screen. 
Anal 
Visualisation effect These analogies are experimental demonstrations to aid 
visualisation. The process also includes activity (comparison of analogue and 
target) to help cognition. 
The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation In this case, the anchor analogue has been fully explained 
in a previous (chemistry) lesson. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. 
Target and analogue domains For this analogy the target and analogues come 
from different domains. The target and bridge come from absorption of light and 
the anchor analogue comes from the domain of separating mixtures. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of separation by filtering. 
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Forces 1 (balanced forces) 
Target 
There are balanced forces acting on the book - gravity causing the weight of the 
book and the force of the table pushing up on the book. 
Anchor 
This involves the pupils feeling the force of a squashed spring on their hands. 
Bridge 
This involves the pupils seeing a book squashing a spring and thus inferring that 
the book is pushing on the spring. 
Analysis 
Visualisation effect The anchor analogy is a kinaesthetic experiment and the 
bridge is an experimental demonstration. Both of these aid visualisation. The 
process also includes activity (comparison of analogue and target) to help 
cognition. 
The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation In this case, the anchor analogue is experienced and does 
not need an explanation as such. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. 
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Target and analogue domains For this analogy the target and analogues (anchor 
and bridge) come from the same domain of the action of forces. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of objects exerting forces. 
Forces 2 (stretching) 
Target 
Doubling the length of a spring doubles the extension for the same stretching 
force. 
Anchor 
For this, the pupils pull a short piece of elastic as hard as they can. Then they have 
to imagine pulling a longer piece of elastic using the same force and decide 
whether the stretch would be more than or the same as for the short piece of 
elastic. 
Bridge 
The pupils watch a piece of elastic being pulled by a force of 4N using a 
newtonmeter. This is repeated using a piece of elastic of twice the length to give 
twice the extension. Some may argue that this is not a true analogy but merely a 
demonstration of the experiment. This may be partly valid but the bridge follows 
on from the anchor which was an analogy in that the anchor used is merely a 
reminder of everyday situations such as a short elastic band not stretching as much 
as a long elastic band. The target is specifically referring to springs but the anchor 
and bridge are about elastic. 
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Analysis 
Visualisation effect The anchor includes an experiment and the bridge is a 
demonstration experiment, both being designed to enhance visualisation. The 
process also includes activity (comparison of analogues and target) to help 
cognition. 
The extent of mapping These are enriched analogies since they contain several 
features common to both the analogue and target. 
Analogue explanation The anchor refers to everyday experiences and does not 
need an explanation as such and the bridge is a more mathematical demonstration, 
again not really needing an explanation at this stage. 
Analogy identification The analogue and target features are compared. 
Analogy limitation The limitations of the analogies used are discussed as part of 
the exercise of examining the similarities and differences between the analogues 
and target. 
Target and analogue domains For this analogy the target and analogues (anchor 
and bridge) come from the same domain of stretching forces. 
Superordinate concept The target and analogues (anchor and bridge) belong to 
the superordinate concept of the idea that each part of the length of an object 
`feels' and is affected by a stretching force. 
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4.3 Results of pre-, post- and retention tests (2000-20001) 
The full test results are shown in Appendix IId. The results shown below are: 
a. The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for each 
question. The total here refers to the correct answers given by the whole group, 
either the experimental or the control group. The probability of the test results 
happening by chance is given. This was calculated by doing a one-tailed t-test 
on correlated data. 
b. The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for each 
pupil. The total here refers to the correct answers given for all the questions in 
the topic. The probability of the test results happening by chance is given. This 
was calculated by doing a one-tailed t-test on non-correlated data. The t-test for 
equal and unequal variance gave the same result to two decimal places for each 
topic except Light 1. The variance for these sets of results was calculated using 
the F ratio and they were found to be of equal variance. 
c. A graph showing the average test mark for the two groups for the three tests is 
given. 
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Heat I f thermal equilibriums test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 -2 3.5 
2 -1 0 
3 3 2 
Note that a negative 
number indicates 
an improvement 
from post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.22 
Table 7 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Heat 1) 
b. 
Experimental 0 1 0 0 0 -0.5 0 0 0 1 0.5 -0.5 
Control 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 -1 0 0.5 
Experimental -0.5 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Control 0.5 -1 -0.5 0 1.5 1 1 0.5 -1.5 1 0 
p=0.10 
Table 8 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Heat 1) 
Chart 2 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (heat 1) 
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post-test retention test 
Heat 2 (radiation and absorption) test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 -2 2 
2 0 -2.5 
3 0 2 
4 0.5 0.5 
Note that a negative 
number indicates 
an improvement 
from post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.29 
Table 9 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Heat 2) 
b. 
Experimental -1 -0.5 0.5 0 -1.5 -2 2 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 
Control 0 0 0.5 -1 0 2 1 -1 0.5 0 -2 -1.5 
Experimental 0 -0.5 -0.5 1.5 1 0 -2 
Control 0 0.5 2 0 -1 1 1 
p=0.30 
Table 10 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Heat 2) 
Chart 3 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (heat 2) 
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Li hý t1 (reflection/scattering) test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 1 1.5 
2 0 0 
3 -1.5 -0.5 
Note that a negative 
number indicates 
an improvement 
from post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.11 
Table 11 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Light 1) 
b. 
Experimental 0 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 0.5 -0.5 0 0 0.5 0 
Control 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 
Experimental 0 0 0 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.5 0 
p=0.28 
Table 12 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Light 1) 
Chart 4 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (light 1) 
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Light 2 (colour) test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 1 -1 
2 0.5 2.5 
3 1 0 
Note that a negative 
number indicates 
an improvement 
from post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.40 but in the wrong direction (the control group's marks did not reduce as 
much as the experimental group's marks from post-test to retention test). 
Table 13 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Light 2) 
b 
Experimental 1.5 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 
Control 0 0 0.5 0 1 2 0.5 0 1.5 0 0 -0.5 
Experimental 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
Control -1 0 -0.5 0 -0.5 -1 1 0 -1.5 1 -1 
p=0.41 (again in the wrong direction) 
Table 14 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Light 2) 
Chart 5 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (light 2) 
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Forces 1 (balanced forces) test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 -2 0 
2 0 -1 
3 -2 -3 
Note that a negative 
number indicates 
an improvement 
from post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.50 
Table 15 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Forces 1) 
b. 
Experimental -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1 
Experimental 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Control 1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 -2 0 
p=0.50 
Table 16 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Forces 1) 
Chart 6 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (forces 1) 
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Forces 2 (stretching) test results 
a. 
question 
number 
post - retention 
(experimental group) 
post - retention 
(control group) 
1 1 -2 
2 0 1 
3 -3 0 
Note that a negative 
number indicates an 
improvement from 
post-test to 
retention test. 
p=0.43 
Table 17 The total post-test score for each question - the total retention score for 
each question (Forces 2) 
b. 
Experimental 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 
Control 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Experimental -1 02 -1 100 
p=0.47 
Table 18 The total post-test score for each pupil - the total retention test score for 
each pupil (Forces 2) 
Chart 7 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (forces 2) 
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4.4 Analysis of pre-, post- and retention tests 
There was in increase from pre-test to post-test for all the topics for both groups. 
There was greater improvement for the control classes than the experimental 
classes. This was not unexpected as the control classes had seen more examples 
and practised more and a greater variety of questions than the experimental group. 
The post-test was only one week after the topic so this may have been similar to a 
`teaching to the test' situation. The experimental group had spent most of their 
time working through the anchor, bridge and target questions. 
The relative success of the bridging analogy approach for the different topics can 
be quantified in the following way. The average retention test result (%) is 
subtracted from the average post-test result (%) for both the experimental and 
control groups. This shows how much their test results have dropped and a 
negative number indicates an improvement. The difference in this number 
between the experimental and control group is then calculated. The higher the 
number, the more successful was the experimental approach compared with the 
control approach. 
As far as this research is concerned, the most interesting feature was the difference 
between the post-test and retention test (see Table 19). For the control groups, the 
retention test score, for each topic, was lower than the post-test score for four out 
of the six topics. Again, this was expected since it is likely that pupils may revert 
to their original conceptions after a gap of two months. The experimental group, 
however, maintained their post-test score in one topic 
(Heat 1) and in four cases, even increased their marks (Heat 2, Light 1, Forces 1 
and Forces 2). In Light 2 they did decrease their score. 
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Topic Post-retention test 
Experimental (E) 
Post-retention test 
control (C) 
C-E 
Heat 1 0.0 8.0 8.0 
Heat 2 -2.0 2.6 4.6 
Light 1 -1.1 1.5 2.6 
Light 2 3.8 2.2 -1.6 
Forces 1 -6.7 -6.7 0.0 
Forces2 -3.5 -2.8 0.7 
Table 19 To show relative success of the bridging analogy approach for the 
different topics 
A one-tailed t-test (correlated data) carried out on the results shown in Table 19 
returned a probability of 0.08 that these results are due to chance alone so, 
although the results are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level they are 
sufficiently meaningful as to warrant further research. 
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4.5 Results and analysis of bridging analogies 
In order to analyse this approach, it was decided to make use of the `sense ratings' 
the pupils had given to each possible answer to the target question. The target 
question appeared four times; initially, after the anchor, after the bridge and after 
the explanation. The sense rating that the pupil gave the `misconception answer' 
was subtracted from the sense rating of the `scientific answer' to give numbers 
which were averaged (maximum 4, minimum -4). These numbers represent the 
relative strength of two conceptions during the course of the approach. The higher 
the number, the stronger the `scientific conception'. The results are shown in 
Table 20 and in Chart 8a. Chart 8b shows how the percentage of correct answers 
given differed through the stages. 
topic initial after anchor after bridge after explanation 
heat 1 -1.7 -1.46 -1.46 0.23 
heat 2 -0.67 0.33 1.1 2.86 
light 1 -0.75 -0.5 0.64 2.08 
light 2 -0.39 0.68 1.66 2.21 
forces 1 -0.62 -0.32 0.45 1.82 
forces 2 -0.9 -1.14 -0.81 -0.52 
Table 20 To show the average `sense of `scientific conception' answer - `sense of 
`misconception' answer' 
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The probability of these results happening by chance and not because of the 
bridging analogies used was calculated in two ways. 
"A one-tailed test (correlated data) was carried out using the topics as the 
subjects with the two measures being the `initial sense rating the pupil 
gave to the scientific answer' - the `initial sense rating the pupil gave to the 
misconception answer' and the sense rating the pupil gave to the scientific 
answer' - the `sense rating the pupil gave to the misconception answer' for 
after the bridge. This returned a probability of 0.01 and therefore 
significant at the I% level. 
"A one-tailed test (correlated data) was carried out for each topic using the 
pupils as subjects with the two measures being as above. The results were 
as follows: 
Heat 1pý0.202 
Heat 2p=0.003 
Light 1p=0.025 
Light 2p=0.003 
Forces 1p=0.019 
Forces 2p=0.431 
The only two of these which failed to be significant at the 0.05 level were Heat I 
and Forces 2. 
It can be seen from the table and graphs that there was a general increase (or, at 
least, no decrease) throughout the stages in all topics except Forces 2. Even when 
there was no increase or decrease in the sense ratings, the percentage giving the 
correct answer rose and similarly, when there was no increase or decrease for the 
percentage giving the correct answer, the sense ratings rose. The increases show 
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that all the parts (anchor, bridge and explanation) are useful in this approach. The 
method seems to be quite successful in changing their ideas, although these results 
do not attempt to reveal any long-term effects since each topic took no longer than 
30 minutes to work through. 
The dip in the Forces 2 topic on stretching, between the initial response and after 
the anchor, could indicate that the anchor has no relevance to the target question 
for the pupils and has, in fact, caused some of them to cast doubt on what they 
first thought. The lack of relevance could be due to the emphasis in the target on 
the weight required and the emphasis in the anchor on the extensions when the 
same force is used. The bridging analogy also uses the same force but here the 
pupils can see mathematically the relationship between initial length and 
extension and it may be this which increases the sense ratings and percentage of 
correct answers given. 
It is difficult to compare the relative success of the bridging analogy approach 
between topics as much must depend on the starting point of each. If the initial 
sense of the scientific conception is low then this can mean one of two things: 
" The misconception is entrenched and therefore difficult to change. 
0 The misconception makes more sense than the scientific conception but it is quite 
easy to change a pupil's mind by a small change in how the problem is viewed 
perhaps by giving even a low-key clue, e. g. Kokinov and Yoveva (1996); Kokinov 
et al (1997). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Main research (part 2) 
Introduction 
It was thought that the bridging analogies used within a topic were not close 
enough to each other and it was decided to introduce another bridging analogy into 
each topic. Reducing the number of differences between the steps should make it 
easier for the pupils to understand the target. In Piagetian terms, there will be more 
assimilation involved and less accommodation than going straight from anchor to 
target. In Vygotskian terms, the bridging analogies act as the scaffolding necessary 
in the Zone of Proximal Development. An analysis of the bridging analogies is 
shown below. 
The first four topics were used in this part of the research. The Forces 1 (balanced 
forces) had been looked at using more than one bridging analogy in the pilot 
research and the results are discussed in this section together with those 
from the 
other four topics. The sixth topic on stretching forces (Forces 2) does not 
lend 
itself to having any extra bridging analogies since the anchor and target are already 
quite close. 
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5.1 Analysis of bridging analogies 
The following analysis looks at the similarities and differences between the 
anchor, bridging and target parts of the analogy. The first comparison is between 
the anchor and target, the second is between the anchor, bridge and target using 
just one bridge and the final comparison is between the anchor, bridges and target 
when two bridging analogies are used. 
Heat 1 
Target 
Objects in thermal equilibrium are at the same temperature or, in pupils' terms, a 
piece of metal and a piece of cork are at the same temperature if they have been in 
the same place for a while. The common misconception is that the metal feels 
colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature. The scientific conception is 
that the metal feels colder since metal conducts heat away from our hand more 
quickly than cork does. 
Anchor 
Most pupils are happy about the fact that metals are good conductors of heat. If 
the following apparatus is set up, most will, quite correctly, predict that the pea on 
the metal rod will drop off first. 
metal rod 
HEAT 
Figure 14 Anchor analogy for Heat 1 
glass rod 
ried pea 
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For pupils, this analogy may be too distant from the target and a bridging analogy 
is required. In order to see why the analogy could be too remote, it is necessary to 
look at the relevant features for both the target and analogue. 
Anchor analogy features Target features 
Heat flow involved Heat f ow involved 
Temperature of Bunsen is greater Temperature of hand is greater than 
than that of rods* that of plates 
Metal / glass Metal / cork 
Mode of heating is the Bunsen Mode of heating is the hand 
Inanimate (Bunsen) Animate (hand) 
Emphasis on heating Emphasis on cooling 
Focus is on temperature of Focus should be on temperature of 
metal/glass near peas** hand but probably is on temperature 
of metal/cork* 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 21 Comparison of features of anchor and target (Heat 1) 
*Although this is a similarity, it may not be perceived as such by pupils. They may 
not think of themselves as being warmer than their surroundings (although they 
know it as a scientific fact). Normal conversation is that we feel hot or cold and 
when pupils feel cold, do they perceive themselves as being at a lower temperature 
than their surroundings? 
"When When pupils touch a piece of metal, the focus is on the apparent temperature of 
the metal - the metal feels cold. However, the focus should 
be on the temperature 
of the hand at the point of contact - the hand feels cold. This analogy does not 
help in this case. In fact, it positively hinders since the focus in the anchor analogy 
is also on the temperature of the conductor (metal or glass). 
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What is needed is a bridging analogy (or possibly two) in order to turn the 
differences into similarities and to overcome the problem identified above. The 
bridging analogy used is that of two beakers of hot water cooling, identical in 
every respect except that one beaker is on a metal plate and the other is on a cork 
plate. The temperatures of the two lots of water are taken as they cool to identify 
which cools quicker. 
me 
Figure 15 Bridging analogy (Heat 1) 
temperature 
nrobe 
of water 
beaker- 
I 
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Anchor analogy features ging analogy features Target features 
Heat flow involved Heat flow involved Heat flow involved 
Temperature of Bunsen Temperature of water is Temperature of hand is 
is greater than that of greater than that of greater than that of 
rods * plates * plates * 
Metal / glass Metal / cork Metal / cork 
Mode of heating is the Mode of heating is the Mode of heating is the 
Bunsen hot water hand 
Inanimate (Bunsen) Inanimate (hot water) Animate (hand) 
Emphasis on heating Emphasis on cooling Emphasis on cooling 
Focus is on temperature Focus is on temperature Focus should be on 
of metal/glass near of the water** temperature of hand but 
peas** probably is on 
temperature of 
metal/cork* * 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 22 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogy and target (Heat 1) 
*The introduction of the bridging analogy has not removed this difficulty but has 
possibly lessened it since the temperature of hot water is much less than that of the 
Bunsen and nearer to body temperature. 
**`fhe introduction of the bridging analogy has possibly helped the pupils to focus 
less on the apparent temperature of the metal/cork and more on the temperature of 
the hand at the point of contact. 
Leaving aside the last feature compared, between the anchor analogy and the 
target there are four differences and two similarities. After introducing the 
bridging analogy, there are three differences between the anchor analogy and the 
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bridge and three similarities. There are two differences between the bridge and 
target and four similarities. As we can see, we are reducing the number of 
differences between the steps in the process. It would improve the process further 
if we introduce another bridge to reduce the number of differences between the 
steps as much as possible. This extra bridge could be similar to but precede the 
present one and consist of taking the temperatures of the metal and cork plates as 
the hot water cools. This would wipe out one of the differences between anchor 
and bridge - the emphasis on cooling would be changed to an emphasis on heating 
as in the anchor. 
me 
temperature 
o robe 
of water 
beaker- 
t 
Figure 16 Extra bridging analogy (Heat 1) 
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Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Bridging analogy Target features 
features 1 features 2 features 
Heat flow Heat f ow involved Heat flow involved Heat f ow 
involved involved 
Temperature of Temperature of Temperature of Temperature of 
Bunsen is water is greater water is greater hand is greater 
greater than than that of plates than that of plates than that of plates 
that of rods 
Metal / glass Metal / cork Metal / cork Metal / cork 
Mode of heating Mode of heating is Mode of heating is Mode of heating 
is the Bunsen the hot water the hot water is the hand 
Inanimate Inanimate (hot Inanimate (hot Animate (hand) 
(Bunsen) water) water) 
Emphasis on Emphasis on Emphasis on Emphasis on 
heating heating cooling cooling 
Focus is on Focus is on Focus is on Focus should be 
temperature of temperature of the temperature of the on temperature of 
metal/glass near metal/cork* * water* * hand but probably 
peas** is on temperature 
of metal/cork* * 
Features in italics are similar features. Where brackets are used, the similarities 
are within rather than between the brackets. 
Table 23 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogies and target (Heat 1) 
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To summarise: 
2 similarities 
Anchor Target 
lp- 
4 differences 
3 similarities 
Anchor 
3 differences 
4 similarities 
4 similarities 
Bridge 1 10 Target 
2 differences 
5 similarities 
Anchor No- Bridge 1 Bridge 2 
2 differences 1 difference 
4 similarities 
Target 
2 differences 
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Heat 2 
Target 
Objects that are good at absorbing heat radiation are good at radiating it. This is 
the scientific conception. The common misconception is that good absorbers must 
be poor radiators and vice versa. 
Anchor 
Most pupils will agree that, generally, people who are good at throwing a ball will 
be good at catching it and those who are poor at throwing will usually be poor at 
catching. This analogy may be too distant from the target and a bridging analogy is 
required. In order to see why the analogy could be too remote, it is necessary to 
look at the relevant features for both the target and analogue. 
Anchor analogy features Target features 
Idea of good/poor Idea of good/poor 
Idea of something traveling from/to Idea of something traveling from/to 
something something 
Object being thrown/caught Waves being radiated/absorbed 
Visible action Invisible action 
Person Non-living object 
Throwing/catching Radiating/absorbing. 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 24 Comparison of features of anchor and target (Heat 2) 
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What is needed is a bridging analogy (or possibly two) in order to turn the 
differences into similarities and to overcome the problem identified above. The 
bridging analogy used is to imagine an object throwing/catching very small 
balls/particles in a similar way to a person throwing/catching balls. 
Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Target features 
features features 
Idea of something Idea of something Idea of something 
travelling from/to travelling from/to travelling from/to 
something something something 
Idea of good/poor Idea of good/poor Idea of good/poor 
Object being Object being Waves being 
thrown/caught thrown/caught radiated/absorbed 
Visible action Invisible action Invisible action 
Person Non-living object Non-living object 
Throwing/catching Throwing/catching Radiating/absorbing 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 25 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogy and target (Heat 2) 
Between the anchor analogy and the target there are four differences and two 
similarities. After introducing the bridging analogy, there are two differences and 
four similarities between the anchor analogy and the bridge. There are two 
differences and four similarities between the bridge and target. As we can see, we 
are reducing the number of differences between the steps in the process. It would 
improve the process further if we introduce another bridge to reduce the number 
of differences between the steps as much as possible. This extra bridge could be to 
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imagine an object throwing out little packets of energy (waves) instead of 
particles. 
Anchor analogy Bridging analogy nalogy Bridging analogy Target features 
features 1 features 2 features 
Idea of something Idea of something Idea of something Idea of something 
travelling from/to travelling from/to travelling from/to travelling from/to 
something something something something 
Idea of Idea of Idea of Idea of good/poor 
good/poor good/poor good/poor 
Object being Object being Waves being Waves being 
thrown/caught thrown/caught radiated/ radiated 
absorbed /absorbed 
Visible action Invisible action Invisible action Invisible action 
Person Non-living object Non-living object Non-living object 
Throwing Throwing Throwing Radiating 
/catching /catching /catching /absorbing 
Features in italics are similar features. Where brackets are used, the similarities 
are within rather than between the brackets. 
Table 26 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogies and target (Heat 2) 
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To summarise: 
2 similarities 
Anchor Target 
4 differences 
4 similarities 
Anchor 
2 differences 
4 similarities 
4 similarities 
Bridge 1 Target 
2 differences 
5 similarities 5 similarities 
Anchor Op- Bridge 1 Bridge 2 Target 
2 differences 1 difference 1 difference 
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Light 1 
Target 
Objects that do not produce their own light can be seen because they reflect light 
hitting them. However, the light is scattered since their surfaces are usually rough 
(on the microscopic scale). This is why we cannot see our reflection in these 
objects. A common misconception is that light falls on the objects and stays there 
even though many pupils accept the idea that mirrors reflect light. 
Anchor 
The anchor had to be changed from the one used in the previous part of the 
research since it was felt to be too difficult as it involved finding the position of 
the images using reflection. This is not usually done until year 11 (15-16 year 
olds). The replacement anchor did not involve finding the position of the images. 
Two mirrors at an angle produce more than one image and the pupils will readily 
agree. However, this is a very distant analogy and in order to see why the analogy 
is too remote, it is necessary to look at the relevant features for both the target and 
analogue. 
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Anchor analogy features Target features 
Can see mirrors Can see paper 
One bend Many `bends' 
Bend obvious `Bends' not obvious 
Reflection of lamp seen Reflection of lamp not seen 
Reflection of self seen Reflection of self not seen 
Two mirrors One piece of paper 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 27 Comparison of features of anchor and target (Light 1) 
There is one similarity and five differences. What is needed is a bridging analogy 
(or possibly two) in order to turn the differences into similarities. The bridging 
analogy used is of crumpled foil. 
187 
Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Target features 
features features 
Can see mirrors Can see foil Can see paper 
One bend Many bends Many 'bends' 
Bend obvious Bends not obvious `Bends' not obvious 
Reflection of lamp Reflection of lamp Reflection of lamp not 
seen seen seen 
Reflection of self seen Reflection of self not Reflection of self not 
seen seen 
Two mirrors One piece of foil One piece of paper 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 28 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogy and target (Light 1) 
There are now two similarities and four differences between the anchor and bridge 
and five similarities between the bridge and target with only one difference. The 
number of differences between the anchor and bridge is still high so another 
bridge is introduced. This is of a smooth piece of foil with just one bend in it. This 
is inserted between the anchor and the original bridge and becomes bridging 
analogy 1. 
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Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Bridging analogy 2 Target features 
features 1 features features 
Can see mirrors Can see foil Can see foil Can see paper 
One bend One bend any bends Many `bends' 
Bend obvious Bend obvious Bends not obvious `Bends' not 
obvious 
Reflection of Reflection of lamp Reflection of lamp Reflection of 
lamp seen seen seen lamp not seen 
eflection of Reflection of self Reflection of self Reflection of self 
self seen seen not seen not seen 
Two mirrors One piece of foil One piece of foil One piece of 
paper 
Features in italics are similar features. Where brackets are used, the similarities 
are within rather than between the brackets. 
Table 29 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogies and target 
(Light 1) 
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To summarise: 
1 similarity 
Anchor Target 
5 differences 
2 similarities 
Anchor 
4 differences 
5 similarities 
Bridge 1 Target 
I difference 
5 similarities 3 similarities 5 similarities 
Anchor Bridge 1 Bridge 2 ý--º Target 
1 difference 3 differences 1 difference 
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Light 
Target 
Colour filters absorb some colours of light and allow only some through. They do 
not, as some pupils think, add colour to white light. 
Anchor 
When a mixture of sand and water are filtered, the sand is held by the filter paper 
and the water goes through. 
Anchor analogy features Target features 
Separation Separation 
Something left behind Something left behind 
Can see what is left behind Cannot see what is left behind 
Sand and water are never seen as fully White light is fully mixed colours 
mixed as the sand sinks too quickly 
Not to do with light and colour To do with light and colour 
Features in italics are similar features 
Table 30 Comparison of features of anchor and target (Light 2) 
There are two similarities and three differences. What is needed is a bridging 
analogy (or possibly two) in order to turn the differences into similarities. The 
bridging analogy used is of a suspension being filtered. 
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Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Target features 
features features 
Separation Separation Separation 
Something left behind Something left behind Something left behind 
Can see what is left Can see what is left Cannot see what is 
behind behind left behind 
Sand and water are Solid and liquid can be White light is fully 
never seen as fully seen as an intimate mixed colours 
mixed as the sand mixture or separate 
sinks too quickly components 
Not to do with light Not to do with light and To do with light and 
and colour colour colour 
Features in italics are similar features 
-------------- = partial similarity/partial 
difference of feature 
(counted as a half difference/half similarity). This is because the bridging analogy 
used calcium carbonate powder in water. When shaken, the separate components 
cannot be individually identified but the calcium carbonate settles when 
undisturbed so the two components are seen as being separate. This means that it 
can be seen as either different from or similar to both the anchor and target 
depending on when it is viewed. The pupils saw it at both stages. 
Table 31 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogy and target (Light 2) 
There are now four and a half similarities and half a difference between the anchor 
and bridge and two and a half similarities between the bridge and target with two 
and a half differences. The number of differences between the bridge and target 
can be reduced further if another bridge is introduced. This is showing how a filter 
affects a spectrum of colours. 
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can be reduced further if another bridge is introduced. This is showing how a filter 
affects a spectrum of colours. 
Anchor analogy Bridging analogy Bridging analogy 2 Tar et features g 
features 1 features features 
Separation Separation Separation Separation 
Something left Something left Something left Something left 
behind behind behind behind 
Can see what is Can see what is Cannot see what is Cannot see what 
left behind left behind left behind is left behind 
Sand and water Solid and liquid Colours of light White light is 
are never seen as 
fully mixed as 
can be seen as an 
intimate mixture or 
can be seen as an 
intimate mixture 
fully mixed 
colours 
the sand sinks separate (white light before 
too quickly components the prism) or 
separate 
components (after 
the prism) 
Not to do with Not to do with ligh To do with light To do with light 
light and colour and colour and colour and colour 
Features in italics are similar features. Where brackets are used, the similarities 
are within rather than between the brackets. 
--------------= partial similarity/partial difference of feature (counted as a 
half difference/half similarity see previous page for explanation). 
Table 32 Comparison of features of anchor, bridging analogies and target 
(Light 2) 
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To summarise: 
2 similarities 
Anchor Target 
3 differences 
4 '/2 
Anchor 
'/2 difference 
2'/2 
Bridge 1 Target 
2'/2 differences 
4V2 3 similarities 
Anchor 10, Bridge 1 
1/2 difference 2 differences 
4V2 
Bridge 2 Target 
'/2 difference 
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5.2 Methodology 
For this part of the research both classes used the bridging analogy method so that 
more data could be taken on the pattern of results during the bridging analogy 
process. In using the bridging analogies, the pupils were not specifically told that 
an analogy was being used. This was so that the pupils would not feel that they 
had to use the analogies in their answers. If they were told that the anchor was 
analogous to the target then that may have influenced their ratings for the 
explanations/statements and `which explanation/statement they thought was 
correct' question. However, the anchor, bridging analogies and target situations 
were compared to elicit their similarities and differences. 
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5.3 Results 
Average scientific explanation `sense' rating - 
misconception explanation `sense' rating 
Topic 
After After After After 
Start 
anchor bridge 1 bridge 2 explanation 
Heat 1 0.09 0.60 1.55 1.64 2.17 
Heat 2 0.59 1.68 2.14 2.18 2.77 
Light 1 0.87 1.09 1.00 1.67 1.61 
Light 2 -1.37 -0.88 -0.35 0.13 0.79 
Table 33 To show average scientific explanation `sense' rating - misconception 
explanation `sense' rating for different topics 
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5.4 Discussion of results 
The important results are the difference between the `start' and `after bridge 2'. 
On average, this has risen from 0.05 to 1.41 for the sense ratings (scientific 
explanation `sense' rating - misconception explanation `sense' rating) and from 
51.8% to 76.8% for the percentage giving the correct answer. The probability of 
these results happening by chance and not because of the bridging analogies used 
was calculated in two ways. 
"A one-tailed test (correlated data) was carried out using the topics as the 
subjects with the two measures being the `initial sense rating the pupil 
gave to the scientific explanation' - the `initial sense rating the pupil gave 
to the misconception explanation' and the sense rating the pupil gave to 
the scientific explanation' - the `sense rating the pupil gave to the 
misconception explanation' for after the second bridge. This returned a 
probability of 0.03 and therefore significant at the 5% level. 
"A one-tailed test (correlated data) was carried out for each topic using the 
pupils as subjects with the two measures being as above. The results were 
as follows: 
Heat 1p=9.92 x 10-7 
Heat 2p=0.0008 
Light 1p=0.0112 
Light 2p=0.0001 
The only one of these which failed to be significant at the 0.01 level was 
Light 1 and that was significant at the 0.05 level. 
It is thought likely that, for at least some pupils, p-prims were being cued as this 
happens at an unconscious level and many pupils seemed not to 
know why they 
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had changed their minds about the target question as they went through the 
bridging analogy process. As was pointed out on page 151, the pupils were not 
specifically told that analogies were being used so as not to influence their 
answers to the `sense' explanations/statements and `which explanation/statement 
they think is correct' question. 
The following is a brief analysis for each topic of the comments given by the 
pupils as to why they had or had not changed their minds during the bridging 
analogy process (excluding the final explanation). 
Heat 1 
Of the 11 pupils who changed their minds from the misconception to the scientific 
explanation of the more likely explanation/statement, six either wrote that they did 
not know why they had changed their minds or left the answer blank indicating the 
same thing. One pupil claimed that "the experiments have sort of explained it" 
without any further elaboration and only four pupils picked up on the idea of metal 
being a good conductor of heat. 
Out of the 19 whose sense rating of the scientific explanation/statement - sense 
rating of the misconception increased at some point during the bridging analogy 
from what it had been at the start but who did not change their minds on the likely 
explanation/statement, 12 wrote nothing or nothing relevant at the point when they 
changed the difference in their sense ratings. The other seven did mention the 
experiment/analogy. 
Heat 2 
Of the five pupils who changed their minds from the misconception to the 
scientific explanation of the more likely explanation/statement, two wrote nothing 
or nothing relevant, indicating that they did not know why they had changed their 
minds. One pupil just stated that "this page made me change my mind" and the 
other two commented on the catching and throwing of the ball. 
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Out of the 11 whose sense rating of the scientific explanation/statement - sense 
rating of the misconception increased at some point during the bridging analogy 
from what it had been at the start but who did not change their minds on the likely 
explanation/statement, eight wrote nothing or nothing relevant. Of the other three, 
only one directly referred to the analogy although two possibly indirectly referred 
to it. For example, one wrote, "Because if it's good at letting in heat it should be 
good at letting it out". 
Light1 
Of the 11 pupils who changed their minds from the misconception to the scientific 
explanation of the more likely explanation/statement, two wrote nothing and one 
claimed not to have changed her mind even though she had. One pupil made no 
reference to the experiments done (analogies) but concentrated on the actual 
statements and one referred to "this showed me that what I thought was wrong". 
One made a reference to smooth and shiny objects being able to reflect. The other 
five did make specific reference to the experiments. 
Out of the 12 whose sense rating of the scientific explanation/statement - sense 
rating of the misconception increased at some point during the bridging analogy 
from what it had been at the start but who did not change their minds on the likely 
answer/statement, nine wrote nothing or nothing relevant. One made an 
ambiguous remark that could have referred to the experiment/ analogy and the 
other two made a specific reference to the experiment/analogy. 
Light 2 
Of the 15 who changed their minds from the misconception to the scientific 
explanation of the more likely explanation/statement, five wrote nothing or 
nothing relevant. One pupil said that "the experiment explained in a clearer way" 
and one said, "The experiment showed this". One did not change 
her mind until 
200 
the second bridge when she saw some of the colours had been taken away. The 
other seven specifically mentioned the experiments (analogies). 
Out of the 12 whose sense rating of the scientific explanation/statement - sense 
rating of the misconception increased at some point during the bridging analogy 
from what it had been at the start but who did not change their minds on the likely 
explanation statement, only one made a definite reference to the experiments 
(analogies) carried out. 
In total for all the topics, there were 42 instances of pupils who changed their 
minds from the misconception to the scientific explanation of the more likely 
explanation/statement. In less than half (43%) of these cases was there a specific 
mention of the experiment/analogy. There were 54 whose sense rating of the 
scientific explanation/statement - sense rating of the misconception increased at 
some point during the bridging analogy from what it had been at the start but who 
did not change their minds on the likely explanation/statement. Only 11 (20%) 
made a specific reference to the experiment/analogy. This shows that most of the 
changes in the pupils' answers had come about without them really knowing why 
they had changed their minds. This suggests unconscious thought processes and is 
indicative of the cueing of p-prims. 
It is important to look at the intermediate results as these indicate the contribution 
of the individual bridging analogies. It can be seen that, in the Light 1 topic there 
is a dip in the sense ratings at some point of the bridging analogies (see Chart 9a). 
This is similar to the results gained in the pilot research in the Forces 1 topic (see 
Chart1 reproduced below). 
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Chart 1 Analysis of 'sense' ratings for bridging analogies for the 
'book on table' problem 
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A discussion of the position of the main dips within the bridging analogy process 
and their possible reasons follows for each of the topics where they occurred. 
Light 
There is a slight dip between after the anchor and after the first bridging analogy. 
The only differences between the anchor and first bridge were that the anchor 
referred to images of an object in two mirrors and the first bridge referred to their 
own images in a folded piece of foil. Perhaps the anchor cued the reflection p- 
prim since it involved a mirror but the first bridge did not since, although it did 
involve reflections, it did not involve mirrors as such which are the usual 
reflectors as far as pupils are concerned. It may be that, by the time the second 
bridge was reached, the fact that light from the lamps could be seen reflected but 
not as whole reflections cued the idea of paper reflecting in a better way than 
linking the idea of paper reflection to a situation where whole reflections could be 
seen such as in the first bridge. There was also an unexplained slight drop between 
after the second bridging analogy and after the explanation. This would need 
further exploration. 
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Forces 1 
In the pilot research, there was not a comparison between the sense that the 
scientific statement made and the sense the misconception made; it was just the 
former. There was a drop after the initial question and, in fact, the recovery took 
until the explanation of the third experiment. This could be because the spring 
pushing back on the hand was not seen to be similar to a table pushing back on a 
book and the book on the spring and the book on the ruler were not analogous 
enough to the book on the table to cue p-prims. This particular problem is 
probably not open to treatment by cueing p-prims as discussed on page 266. If it is 
a model being built up, it may be that all parts of the bridging analogies and the 
explanation are needed before the new model is complete and understood. 
C 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Main research (part 3) 
Introduction 
It has been discussed how the bridging analogy approach was used in parts 1 and 2 
of the main research. The pupils were not told overtly that analogies are being 
used. They were just looking at different situations and comparing their 
similarities and differences to see if this made any difference to their thoughts 
about the target question. For some pupils it did and for some it did not. 
It was thought likely that p-prims were being cued as this happens at an 
unconscious level and many pupils seemed not to know why they had changed 
their minds about the target question as they went through the bridging analogy 
process. The next step was to investigate the p-prim idea in more detail. 
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6.1 Methodology 
In order to gauge whether p-prims can be cued using analogies, it was necessary to 
make the analogies as low-key as possible so the pupils were not told and could 
not guess that an analogy was being used. It was decided to ask the target question 
only twice, before the bridging analogy process and after. The target questions 
were first asked at the beginning of the academic year for all the topics together. 
This was because if the target question for each topic had been asked just prior to 
the bridging analogies, this may have made the analogies less low-key as it may 
have alerted the pupils to the process. It was felt that the benefits of separating the 
times of asking the target questions as far as possible outweighed the 
disadvantages which were as follows: 
" The pupils had time to change their minds due to other experiences, 
teaching or otherwise in the time interval. This could have happened but it 
is likely that the control class would have changed their minds by the same 
amount and it is the two classes which are being compared. 
" It is possible that one class may have had different experiences to sway 
their ideas. However, it is unlikely that this would have come from 
anything other than physics lessons except possibly for one or two 
individuals. Great care was taken to keep the teaching of both classes as 
similar as possible. This was done by having the same teacher (the 
researcher) and the same order of topics, etc. 
Since the analogies were going to be very low-key, this meant changing the 
analogies used somewhat. There was more of a gap between the second 
bridging 
analogy and the target. This was inevitable as in the previous research the second 
bridging analogy was too similar to the target to be low-key enough. 
If using analogy in this way was successful and the pupils did not 
know why they 
have decided on the correct idea, it may be safe to assume that the analogy 
had 
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unconsciously cued the right p-prim. If the pupils were aware that it was the 
analogy which had made them decide on the correct idea, then it is probably due 
to more conscious thought rather than cueing of p-prims. However, if the wrong 
idea was chosen, then the analogy had not worked, either as a p-prim cue or as a 
conscious thought promoter. 
A comparison was made between pupils that had been taught using a short 
bridging analogy approach to the target problem (without being told that they are 
analogies) and those who had gone straight to the problem. The bridging analogies 
were based on known or postulated p-prims. For the problem, the pupils were 
asked to read two alternative explanations of, or statements about, a phenomenon. 
They gave each a `sense' rating (1-5) and also decided which statement or 
explanation was the more likely to be correct. 
The results were analysed using t-tests to see if the findings were statistically 
significant. The sample size for each group was only small (a maximum of 24) 
but, by aggregating the results for the different topics, it was effectively increased. 
The experimental and control groups were swapped for each topic to reduce the 
effect of any intrinsic differences between the classes. 
There was a question for both groups to ask about their thinking for the answers 
they have given, designed to try to identify any thought processes the pupils had 
during the lesson and thus to reveal whether using analogy in this low-key way 
causes conscious or unconscious thought processes. This was given either as a 
question at the end of the target questions or as a separate questionnaire (What did 
you learn today? - see Appendix IVd). 
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6.2 Misconceptions, scientific conceptions, p-prims, analogies and mode of 
teaching 
This section outlines the misconception considered for each topic, together with a 
possible p-prim for the misconception. The correct scientific conception is then 
given together with the probable p-prim. Finally for each topic the analogies to be 
used and the target questions are given. 
Heat 1 (thermal equilibrium 
Misconception 
Metals feel colder than many other items because they are naturally at a lower 
temperature. 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
There may be a context-dependent meta p-prim; `objects have their own 
temperature dependent on the material they are made from (so long as they are not 
near any perceived heat source)' This would be got from sensory data when very 
young - it feels cold so it is cold. 
diSessa calls this a meta p-prim (personal correspondence, 2003-2004) but he 
points out that this is probably contextual in that many people also believe that 
metal that has been in the oven (for a long time) is hotter than wood that has had 
similar treatment, for example. 
Scientific conception 
Metals feel colder than many other materials because they are good conductors 
and take away heat from your body rapidly leaving your hand feeling cold. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
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This may be a type of `equilibration' p-prim (diSessa, 1993). He states, "An 
absence or sparseness of material next to an abundance leads, primitively, to flow 
and re-equilibration" (p. 141). However, he feels that, in order to appreciate what 
is happening in this situation, the pupils need a new model of sense experience. 
"Objects have to heat your hand in order to heat the nerves, in order to feel hot. 
So, the conductivity is part of sensing. THEN you can see that it is plausible that 
wood is actually the same temperature as metal, but does not conduct enough heat, 
quickly enough (some subtleties here) to `feel' the temperature that it is. Not 
everything is a p-prim. Sometimes when you change people's models of what is 
going on, p-prims automatically shift in salience" (personal correspondence, 2003- 
2004). 
Using the proposed p-prim, objects (including metal ones) that start off at different 
temperatures will come to be the same temperature (before a person becomes 
involved) due to equilibration. When a person is introduced into the situation, the 
pupils will need to know that: 
"A person is a heat'source. 
" Hotter things warm up cooler things 
" Metals are good conductors of heat 
These pieces of knowledge will 
have been covered in previous 
lessons. 
They will then be able to understand that metals feel cold because the heat 
from a 
person's hand is conducted away quickly. This means that the basic problem 
is 
that the `same temperature' idea needs to be cued rather than the `feels cold so it 
is' idea. 
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Analogies to be used 
A 
Figure 17 See-saw analogy 
B 
1. If I push down on side A of this see-saw and then let go, what happens? Discuss 
and agree on the answer that side A goes down and then goes back up to reach 
equilibrium again. The idea of this question is to get across the idea of things 
tending to reach equilibrium. With the experimental group, this acts as the anchor 
analogy and sets the scene for the rest of the work. This works as the anchor as it 
automatically makes the pupil think about re-equilibration. 
2. Discuss and show what happens to water when poured - it flows downhill. 
Treacle also does this but more slowly. This would not be used as an overt 
analogy as it may strengthen an idea that heat is a kind of matter that can flow like 
water. This acts as the bridging analogy for the experimental group. It is closer to 
the target than the anchor analogy is in that it introduces the idea that re- 
equilibration can be reached quickly or more slowly. The water is lifted up and 
poured and it `goes back' to its original level quickly but the treacle does it more 
slowly. 
3. Remind class that hot water cools down until it reaches room temperature (they 
will already have seen this). This is possibly acting as a further bridging analogy 
for the experimental group and as an introduction for the control group. It would 
be unfair not to remind pupils in this group of the `cooling water' situation as both 
groups should be treated as equally as possible except for the independent variable 
which, in this case, is the use of bridging analogies. Although the `cooling water' 
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situation is one of the bridging analogy steps for the experimental group, by itself 
it does not constitute the bridging analogy approach nor is it a p-prim cue. The p- 
prim cue for the scientific concept is the see-saw returning to equilibrium as this is 
a more basic idea. 
The two groups are then given the target questions as follows: 
Sense: How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
When I touch a piece of metal, it often feels colder than, say, a piece of cork. Do 
you think that this is because: 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it 
away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than 
the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
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Heat 2 Radiation/Absorption 
Misconception 
Black surfaces are good absorbers of heat so they must be poor radiators of heat 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
This could be the idea that, if something is good at doing one thing then it must be 
bad at doing the opposite. This may be emphasised by `good conductors are bad 
insulators'. diSessa (personal correspondence) sees it as something similar but 
more reliant on agency. He argues that people see things as "somehow actively 
achieving the things they achieve". So, if something achieves good absorption, 
then, in order to gain good radiation, it would have to change and want the 
opposite. 
Scientific conception 
Black surfaces are good absorbers of heat and good radiators of heat. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
If something is good at one thing, it can be good at the opposite. 
Analogies to be used 
1. `People who do well in a subject are good at taking in information and good at 
giving it out again'. This is the anchor for the experimental group. 
2. `In a netball team, players are good at throwing a ball and good at catching it'. 
This is the bridging analogy for the experimental group and is closer to the target 
than the anchor is in that there is the idea of something moving between two 
things as heat electromagnetic radiation moves between objects. 
The work will carry on from a lesson on absorption of heat so the pupils will be 
familiar with the terminology being used. The control group will also have had the 
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lesson on heat absorption but will go straight to the target questions without the 
analogy sequence. 
The two groups are then given the target questions as follows: 
Objects can radiate and absorb heat. Think about sitting in front of a warm fire; 
the fire is radiating heat and you are absorbing it. However, you are radiating heat 
all the time as well as absorbing it. Thermal cameras sense the amount of heat 
given off by different objects and human bodies give off quite a lot. 
Sense: How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
An object that is better at absorbing heat than another object is: 
a. Better at radiating heat 
b. Worse at radiating heat 
than the other object (both at the same temperature). 
Which do you think is the more likely statement to be true (a or b)? 
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Light 1 Reflection 
Misconception 
Light goes onto a surface of an object and stays there to light it up. 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
Seeing needs illumination to `light up' objects'. We cannot see in the dark but we 
can see in the light so the important factor must be the light. diSessa (personal 
correspondence) agrees with this interpretation but thinks that something more 
like a model is at issue. "Things are seen because they need light on them. Once 
light is on them, then they are seen (by direct perception). " 
Scientific conception 
Light goes to a surface and is reflected (more accurately described as scattered) 
and some enters into our eyes. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
Reflection is probably not a central, strong p-prim but could it have been 
encompassed into the p-prim system by the age of 12? Bouncing is a p-prim which 
diSessa describes (1993, p. 220) as follows. "An object comes into impingement 
with a big or otherwise immobile other object, and the impinger recoils. " 
Analogies to be used 
1. `What happens when we drop a bouncy ball? ' This is the anchor analogy for 
the experimental group. Children are familiar with this phenomenon from an early 
age - they drop something and it falls and then sometimes 
bounces (depending on 
the object). 
2. `What happens when we hit a snooker ball against the cushion (side of the 
snooker table)? ' This is the bridging analogy for the experimental group. It is 
closer to the target than the anchor is since it encompasses the idea that bouncing 
or reflection does not always take place in a vertical direction with something 
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being dropped. The control group will go straight to the target question without 
the analogy sequence. 
The two groups are then given the target questions as follows: 
When it is absolutely dark, we cannot see anything but when it is light, we can see 
objects. 
Sense: How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
We can see objects because light from a light source: 
a. Hits the object and stays there, lighting the object up. 
b. Hits the object and is reflected. 
Which do you think is the more likely statement to be true (a or b)? 
214 
Light 
.2 
Colour 
Misconception 
Colour filters add colour to white light. 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
Change implies doing something positive, adding something. Adding something, 
i. e. the coloured plastic, suggests adding colour or, in other words, you cannot take 
away something by adding something. diSessa (personal correspondence, 2003- 
2004) maintains that white (and black) are perceived as colourless; as an absence 
of something. He suggests that this might come from language and culture or 
neural mechanisms. It could come from the idea of bleaching to remove colour or 
dyeing to add colour. 
Scientific conception 
Colour filters absorb colours and let only certain ones through. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
This could be a `separation (in this case, filtering)' p-prim. Early on, children have 
the idea of being able to separate and sort items into sets (Vygotsky, 1962 and 
Inhelder and Piaget, 1964). So if this idea could be cued, it may be possible to 
implant the correct concept for the action of colour filters. 
Analogies to be used 
1. `Do you remember doing a filtration experiment in chemistry. Watch the 
mixture being filtered. The solid is caught in the filter paper and not allowed to go 
through but the water can. ' This acts as the anchor for the experimental group. It is 
obvious that there are two things in the mixture as each can be seen (sand and 
water). This gives a clue as to how they should be separated. 
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2. `This time the solid is not at the bottom of the beaker but spread about in the 
water. However, when filtered, the solid is again caught in the filter paper and not 
allowed to go through but the water can. ' This acts as the bridge for the 
experimental group. It is closer to the target than the anchor is since it is not 
possible to see the separate solid and liquid in this case when they are too well 
mixed together. This is similar to the mixing of the colours to make white light in 
that they cannot be seen separately. 
The pupils will already have been introduced to the idea that white light is made 
up of different colours where they had seen a prism splitting white light into its 
constituent colours and they are reminded of this as they are asked to observe what 
happens to the spectrum when a piece of green plastic is put between the prism 
and screen. This can act as another bridge for the experimental group and as an 
introduction for the control group. 
The two groups are then given the target questions as follows: 
Sense: How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
When white light is shone through a piece of green see-through plastic, green 
light 
is seen on the screen. This is because: 
a. The green colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic 
leaving 
only green. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or 
b)? 
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orces 1 Balanced Forces 
Misconception 
If objects are stationary, then no forces or only one force (gravity) acts on them. A 
book on a table has either no forces acting on it or just the force of gravity acting 
on it. The table simply stops the book falling further. 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
This may be the `supporting' p-prim (diSessa, 1993). Since inanimate objects are 
not seen as being able to provide force, the table is merely seen as being in the 
way (Dykstra, 2000). In this p-prim, there is no idea of a force being involved. The 
strong object underneath merely keeps the upper object in place. 
Scientific conception 
Stationary objects have balanced forces acting on them. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
Perhaps this is a type of `springiness' p-prim. A spring can push back on you so 
the table is acting like the spring and pushing back on the book. 
Analogies to be used 
1. `Push down on a spring. What do you notice (e. g. does the spring squash and 
does the spring push back on you? )' This is the anchor analogy for the 
experimental group. It is expected that the pupils will feel the spring pushing back 
as they squash it. 
2. `Balance a book on the spring. What do you notice? ' This is the first bridging 
analogy for the experimental group. It is somewhat closer to the target than the 
anchor is in that it involves a book resting on top of the spring as the book rests on 
top of the table in the target. 
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3. `Look at the book on ruler. What do you notice? ' This is the second bridging 
analogy for the experimental group and it is even closer to the target in that the 
book is now resting on something which the pupils see to be similar to a table and 
the only difference is that the ruler visibly bends and the table does not. 
The two groups are then given the target questions as follows: 
Gravity is a force that causes objects to fall down. If a book is on a table, then 
gravity is pulling on it so why does it stay where it is and not fall down? 
Sense: How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the 
way to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes 
upwards on the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
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Forces 2 Stretching Springs 
Misconception 
Springs that are identical, except for length, will stretch by the same amount when 
loaded equally. 
Possible p-prim for misconception 
This may be the `Ohm's' p-prim (diSessa, 1993). The factors involved in 
stretching would be weight, stiffness of spring and extension. The pupils know that 
pulling harder or a bigger weight extends a spring more and also that extension 
depends on the stiffness of the spring. Perhaps, if this idea is cued then pupils do 
not see that the extension could also depend on original length. This view is 
supported by diSessa (personal correspondence, 2003-2004) who agrees that it is 
Ohm's p-prim that is involved and the pupils do not see the effect that length has. 
As he says, "strength is more `obvious' in thickness. " 
OR 
It could be the `force as mover' p-prim (diSessa, 1993). Greater force is needed to 
move more massive objects and in this case, the longer spring is more massive so 
it will need more force to extend it by the same length or the same force certainly 
will not double the extension. 
Scientific conception 
Extension is proportional to original length. 
P-prim needed to be cued for scientific conception 
Perhaps a sort of `more things present, more things affected' p-prim is required 
here. 
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Analogies to be used 
1. `A teacher tells a line of five children, who are queuing up in the playground to 
be quiet. They all `feel' the same effect of her voice. 
Figure 18a Teacher/children analogy (short line) 
If there were ten children in the line they would still all `feel' the same effect of 
her voice (so long as they can all hear her). 
Be quiet 
Figure l8b Teacher/children analogy (long line) 
Discuss limitations of this and come to the conclusion that some things can have 
the same effect if there are only a few people or if there were lots of people. This 
acts as the anchor for the experimental group. It is visual and easily understood. 
Be aware of, but do not discuss with the pupils at this time, the possible 
complications caused if springs in parallel were being considered where a 
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different p-prim would have to be cued such as a `sharing a job reduces the 
amount of work each person needs to do'. 
2. `Hang a weight on a spring. Are the coils at the top and at the bottom stretched 
apart or just those at the bottom? Point out that the weight is having an effect on 
all the coils rather than just the bottom coils but do not discuss how much effect as 
this is giving the answer to the target question. ' This is the first bridge for the 
experimental group. It is closer to the target than the anchor is in that it is referring 
to something stretching as the elastic does in the target. 
3. `Hang two springs end to end and then hang the same weight on the end of the 
bottom spring. Do the coils on both springs stretch or just the coils of the bottom 
spring? These springs should be identical with each other but different from the 
first spring used so the pupils do not see that two springs extend twice as much as 
one spring. ' This is the second bridge and is even closer to the target as the there 
are two identical length springs in a similar way to there being a double length 
elastic in the target. 
The control group are given the two bridges. However, these bridges are not acting 
as bridging analogies for the control group since the anchor is not present. They 
could be seen as being analogies in their own right for the control group but it was 
felt to be necessary for this group to see these experiments, as some pupils in the 
experimental group may be able to find the correct answer to the target by viewing 
these rather than by having p-prims cued. Both the experimental and control 
groups need to be treated as equally as possible except for the bridging analogies. 
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The two groups are then given the target question as follows: 
1. Hang a weight on a spring. Are the coils at the top and at the bottom stretched 
apart or just those at the bottom? 
All the coils are stretched apart 
2. Hang two springs end to end and then hang the same weight on the end of the 
bottom spring. Do the coils on both springs stretch or just the coils of the bottom 
spring. 
The coils on both springs are stretched apart 
A 2N weight is hung on a piece of elastic that extends by 5cm. The 2N weight is 
then hung on a similar piece of elastic that is twice as long to begin with. How 
much will this piece extend? Circle the correct answer. 
a. 5cm b. 10cm 
5cm ýj 
I 
--f 
i 
iý 
ii 
i 
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6.3 Results and analysis for each topic 
Heat 1 (thermal equilibrium) 
Heat 1 
experimental control 
ave. sense S ave. sense M %S ave. sense S ave. sense M %S 
pre-test 2.78 3.67 38.1 2.15 3.96 13.6 
post-test 3.27 3.62 36.4 2.30 4.04 9.1 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation M is the misconception 
Table 34 To show the `sense' ratings and the percentage of pupils giving the 
correct answer for the experimental and control groups pre- and post-test 
(Heat 1) 
Chart 10 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
HEAT 1 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
ID 3.50 
c 
U, 3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
Experimental 
M 
Experimental S 
1.501 
pre-test post-test 
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There was an increase in the average `sense' score of the scientific answer for the 
experimental group together with a small decrease for the misconception answer. 
For the control group there was also an increase for the scientific answer but only 
a small one. There was a very slight increase for the control group's 
misconception answer. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated by 
carrying out a one-tailed t-test (correlated data) where the subjects were the pupils. 
The measures carried out for the experimental group were the sense ratings at the 
beginning of the academic year and after the low-key bridging. The measures for 
the control group were the sense ratings at similar timings to the experimental 
group although the control group did not have the bridging analogy intervention. 
This test was done for both the scientific statement and the misconception 
statement. A similar t-test was carried out for both groups for the answer they 
thought was correct. The t-tests returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - scientific statement p=0.047 
" Experimental group - misconception statement p=0.431 
" Experimental group - `correct answer' p=0.500 
" Control group - scientific statement p=0.465 
" Control group - misconception statement p=0.340 
" Control group - `correct answer' p=0.288 
The only results of significance at the 0.05 level were those relating to the 
experimental group's sense ratings of the scientific statement. 
In this topic, the pupils could have worked out the correct answer 
if they had put 
together the previous work that they had done. This probably explains the slight 
increase for the control group's `sense' rating for the scientific answer. 
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There was not much change in the answer that the pupils thought was correct 
between pre-test and post-test for either group. 
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Heat 2 Radiation/Absorption 
Heat 2 
experimental control 
ave. sense S ave. sense M %S ave. sense S ave. sense M %S 
pre-test 3.13 2.67 58.3 3.32 2.82 59.1 
post-test 3.42 2.77 66.7 2.79 2.88 47.8 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation M is the misconception 
Table 35 To show the `sense' ratings and the percentage of pupils giving the 
correct answer for the experimental and control groups pre- and post-test 
(Heat 2) 
Chart 11 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
HEAT 2 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
3.50 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
1.50 
pre-test post-test 
There was a slight increase in the average `sense' score for the misconception 
answer for the experimental group and a slightly larger increase for their scientific 
answer. The results for the control group showed a substantial drop for the 
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scientific answer together with a small increase for the misconception answer. 8% 
more chose the correct answer for the experimental group between the pre-test and 
the post-test compared with an 11 % decrease for the control group. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated in a 
similar way to Heat 1. The t-tests returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - scientific statement p=0.164 
" Experimental group - misconception statement p=0.391 
" Experimental group -'correct answer' p=0.269 
" Control group - scientific statement p=0.047 
" Control group - misconception statement p=0.198 
" Control group - `correct answer' p=0.133 
The only results of significance at the 0.05 level were the control group's sense of 
the scientific statement. 
This topic was difficult to work out the correct answer based on the previous 
work. It seems as though, having seen the absorption experiment, the control 
group become surer that good absorbers are poor radiators. This is supported by 
the low p value for this change. Their replies as to why they had given the answers 
that they had included the following: 
M is a more likely explanation because it is the opposite and 
absorbing and radiation are opposites. osites. (Italics added) 
Other replies were similar in nature without actually using the word `opposite'. 
None of the replies from the experimental group mentioned the analogy directly 
although several used the word `you' as in: 
I think this because when you are good at something, radiating, 
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you are usually good at the other, absorbing heat. (Italics added) 
This use of a personal pronoun possibly indicates an unconscious link with the 
analogy meaning that the p-prim has been cued without conscious thought. 
228 
Light 1 Reflection 
Light 1 
experimental control 
ave. sense S ave. sense M %S ave. sense S ave. sense M %S 
pre-test 4.18 2.23 90.9 4.50 2.00 95.2 
post-test 4.36 2.05 90.9 4.14 2.18 85.7 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation M is the misconception 
Table 36 To show the `sense' ratings and the percentage of pupils giving the 
correct answer for the experimental and control groups pre- and post-test 
(Light 1) 
Chart 12 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
LIGHT 1 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
N 3.50 
c 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
Control S 
Experimental M 
Control M 
1.50+- 
pre-test post-test 
As expected, a slight rise occurred for the experimental group's sense rating of 
the 
scientific explanation together with a small drop 
for the misconception 
229 
explanation. Also, there was an increase for the control group's misconception 
answer sense rating with a drop for their scientific answer. This is surprising as, 
for this topic, the control group had had no further relevant teaching since the pre- 
test, it being the beginning of the topic. 
With the experimental group, there was no change in the percentage who chose 
the correct answer but there was a drop of 10% for the control group. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated in a 
similar way to Heat 1. The t-tests returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - scientific statement p=0.179 
" Experimental group - misconception statement p=0.203 
" Experimental group - `correct answer' p=0.500 
" Control group - scientific statement p=0.118 
" Control group - misconception statement p=0.273 
" Control group - `correct answer' p=0.165 
There were no results of significance at the 0.05 level. Because of this, 
firm 
conclusions could not be drawn for this topic. 
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Light 2 Colour filters 
Light 2 
experimental control 
ave. sense S ave. sense M %S ave. sense S ave. sense M %S 
pre-test 1.90 3.38 19.0 2.32 3.45 18.2 
post-test 3.38 2.71 76.2 3.09 3.45 45.5 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation M is the misconception 
Table 37 To show the `sense' ratings and the percentage of pupils giving the 
correct answer for the experimental and control groups pre- and post-test 
(Light 2) 
Chart 13 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
LIGHT 2 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
3.50 
c 
üi 3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
S 
1.50 4-- 
pre-test post-test 
There was a pleasing increase in the experimental group's scientific answer 
but 
this should be weighed against an increase in the control group's scientific answer. 
Control m 
Experimental M 
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The increase for the experimental group was, however, greater than that for the 
control group (1.48 as opposed to 0.77). The increase for the control group is to be 
expected as they saw the experiment showing that a colour filter blocks the 
passage of the other colours of the spectrum. The control's group sense of the 
misconception answer remained constant while there was a good decline in the 
experimental group's sense of the misconception answer. 
There was a substantial increase in the percentage choosing the correct answer for 
the experimental group (57%) compared with an increase of only 27% for the 
control group. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated in a 
similar way to Heat 1. The t-tests returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - scientific statement p=5.09 x 10-5 
" Experimental group - misconception statement p=0.022 
" Experimental group -'correct answer' p=2.36 x 10-5 
" Control group - scientific statement p=0.005 
" Control group - misconception statement p=0.500 
" Control group -'correct answer' p=0.015 
The only results not of significance at the 0.05 level were those relating to the 
control group's sense of the misconception statement. 
Support for the p-prim for the misconception being an `adding' idea, i. e. adding 
the coloured plastic necessarily means adding colour rather than taking colours 
away, comes from replies from pupils as to why they gave the answers that they 
did. They include the following: 
Because when you put a red piece of plastic you are adding 
it. 
And 
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Because the red piece of plastic has been added to the light ..... 
And 
Because the red plastic has been put in so it's been added ..... 
Interviews were conducted with pupils (see Appendix V) who had changed their 
minds between pre-test and post-test from misconception to scientific conception. 
When asked why they had given their pre-test answer, the following comments 
were elicited: 
In art, sort of, white is nothing and adding to me seemed simpler than 
taking things away. 
And 
Well, it sounds a bit funny for things to be taken away. 
No-one mentioned the analogy directly, either in the written replies or interviews, 
endorsing the idea that this was a low-key analogy. Comments given by pupils 
who chose the scientific statement as the more likely explanation were: 
So I think the other colours are blocked by the red plastic. 
And 
Because the plastic blocks the other colours coming through. 
The latter statement was written by a student who had chosen the misconception 
in the pre-test as being the more likely correct answer. 
It should be noted that these comments came from a later cohort of pupils who, on 
the whole, were not as successful in changing their ideas using the low-key 
analogy. This particular cohort had not seen the effect of putting a filter in the path 
of the colour spectrum. It may be that this is required in order to make the most of 
the analogy. It could be argued that this part of the procedure helps the pupils to 
work out what is happening and, indeed, this probably accounts for the increase 
in 
the sense of the scientific explanation for the control group as has already 
been 
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mentioned. However, the increase for the experimental group is larger and also 
they decreased their sense of the misconception whereas the control group did not. 
The probability levels support these conclusions. 
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Forces 1 Book on table 
Forces 1 
experimental control 
ave. sense S ave. sense M %S ave. sense S ave. sense M %S 
pre-test 3.05 4.24 35.0 2.68 3.70 25.0 
post-test 2.14 4.05 20.0 2.82 3.73 31.8 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation M is the misconception 
Table 38 To show the `sense' ratings and the percentage of pupils giving the 
correct answer for the experimental and control groups pre- and post-test 
(Forces 1) 
Chart 14 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
FORCES I 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
3.50 
c 
üi 3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
1.50 
Control M 
------------------ -- 
Experimental S 
pre-test post-test 
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This was an unusual set of results and did not follow the usual pattern. Rather than 
an increase for the sense for the scientific answer, there was a decrease for the 
experimental group. There was no indication given by the pupils as to why they 
thought what they did. This topic is discussed in more detail on page 262 onwards. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated in a 
similar way to Heat 1. The t-tests returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - scientific statement p=0.011 
" Experimental group - misconception statement p=0.265 
" Experimental group - `correct answer' p=0.134 
" Control group - scientific statement p=0.333 
" Control group - misconception statement p=0.473 
" Control group - `correct answer' p=0.214 
The only results of significance at the 0.05 level were those relating to the 
experimental group's sense of the scientific statement. 
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Forces 2 Stretching 
The final topic was on stretching and did not ask for sense ratings as there were no 
explanations/statements given but just the choice of extension answer. 
Forces 2 
experimental control 
%S %S 
pre-test 47.6 31.6 
post-test 68.2 19.0 
Key S is the scientific answer/explanation 
Table 39 To show the percentage of pupils giving the correct answer pre- and 
post-test (Forces 2) 
As can be seen from the table, there is an increase (21 %) in those choosing the 
correct answer from pre-test to post-test for the experimental group together with 
a decrease for the control group (12%). This followed the pattern of the first four 
topics. 
The probability that these results were not due to chance was calculated in a 
similar way to Heat 1 for the answer the pupils thought was correct. The t-tests 
returned probabilities as follows: 
" Experimental group - `correct answer' p=0.107 
" Control group - `correct answer' p=0.081 
Neither of these results was significant at the 0.05 level. 
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In the experimental group, of the seven pupils who changed their minds between 
pre-test and post-test from the misconception to the scientific conception, none 
could explain why they had written that particular answer. Two wrote nothing or 
nothing relevant and the other five just gave statements such as: 
I think this because if it is twice as long it will extend twice as far. 
And 
The spring will stretch further because it is longer so it will have further 
extension. 
There were no references to the analogy in any of the comments made. 
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6.4 Discussion of results 
The first four topics show a cumulative effect in sense ratings as shown in the 
following graph (the final topic did not ask for sense ratings). 
Chart 15 (Cumulative for Ist 4 topics) change in sense of scientific and 
misconception answers 
m 
N 
C 
d 
N 
4.0 
3.8 
3.6 
3.4 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2.0 
Experimental 
Control M 
Control S 
Experimental M 
pre-test post-test 
The probability that these cumulative results (pre-test to post test change for the 
scientific statement) happened by chance was calculated as follows. Using a1 
tailed t-test for correlated data, with the topics as subjects, p=0.005; this is 
statistically significant at < 0.01. Using a 1-tailed t-test for non-correlated data for 
the individual pupils' results was 0.003; statistically significant at < 0.01. 
The first four and the final topic show a similar cumulative effect when the 
percentage of pupils choosing the correct answer is considered. 
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Average percentage choosing correct answer 
Experimental pre-test 50.8% Control pre-test 43.5% 
Experimental post-test 67.7% Control post-test 41.4% 
Table 40 Cumulative average percentage choosing the correct answer for the first 
four and final topics (pre-and post-test for experimental and control 
groups) 
The results show that this is a relatively successful method for cueing the correct 
p-prims for these topics. However, the results for the `book on table' topic show 
that the low-key use of the bridging analogy plainly did not work for this topic. It 
is thought that the reason for this is because of the deeply entrenched idea that 
inanimate objects such as a table cannot produce forces and merely block the way. 
This supporting or blocking p-prim totally eclipses any attempt at trying to cue 
alternative p-prims. A longer approach is indicated for this sort of problem. This is 
discussed in more detail on page 266. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Analysis of outcomes by topic 
7.1 Heat 1 
The first part of the research used the single bridging analogy approach. Chart 2 is 
repeated below, showing the results. 
Chart 2 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (heat 1) 
50 
U) 45 
40 U 
ö 35 
30 
25 
20 
Q 15 
4 10 
5 
0 
The two groups attain approximately the same average mark for the pre-test and 
this increases substantially for the control group for the post-test. 
The reason given 
for this increase was that of `teaching to the test'. The first question given 
in the 
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pre-test post-test retention test 
test was very similar to one of the control group's practice questions. It was also 
similar to the target question in the bridging analogy approach and the question 
posed at the start of the control group's work. 
The first question in the test was: Sonia touched a metal clamp stand in the lab. 
and noticed that it felt colder than the bench it was on. She wondered why as she 
had not started doing any experiments and neither had anyone else. She decided to 
try other objects and she found that all the metal objects felt colder than all the 
wooden objects. Why do you think this was? 
The control group's similar practice question was: Why does a garden spade's 
wooden handle feel warmer than the metal spade part? 
The target question for experimental group was: Touch a piece of metal and a cork 
mat. Which one feels warmer? Why does metal feel colder than the cork? 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it 
away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than the 
cork. 
It could be argued that both groups had had access to the answer to the first test 
question, but it should be remembered that the control group had also discussed 
the target questions and had been given the same explanation as the experimental 
group had but without the bridging analogies. The control group then went on to 
practise questions similar to this one in the test. 
It was this first question that was the most significant when it came to the 
retention test. The control group's (23 pupils) total for this question dropped by 
3.5 between the post-test and the retention test but the experimental group's (24 
pupils) rose by 2.0. From this it may be considered that the `teaching to the test' 
effect for the control group lasted for only a short while but the effect of the 
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bridging analogy for the experimental group was longer lasting. For all three 
questions together, there was no change for the test mark for the experimental 
group between post-test and retention test but the mark for the control group 
dropped noticeably. 
It was rather surprising that there was not a drop between the post-test and the 
retention test for the experimental group since the bridging analogy approach had 
not seemed to work particularly well in this topic. There was a slight rise between 
initial thoughts and those after the anchor but the main rise did not appear until 
after the explanation (see Chart 16 for this topic). This may provide evidence of 
the pupils reviewing in an unconscious manner the bridging analogy work when 
doing the post-test and the retention test. 
Chart 16 To show progress during single bridging analogy for HEAT 1 
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In the next part of the research another bridging analogy was inserted to make the 
steps involved closer together. This time there was a rise between each step of the 
process for the sense ratings with the explanation now providing a smaller 
percentage of the total increase (see Chart 17 for this topic). This indicates that the 
bridging analogies were being more successful as the steps became closer 
together. It should be pointed out that the overall increase in both cases was 
approximately the same albeit starting from different points. However, this 
included the explanation, which, although vital, did not constitute the bridging 
analogy part of the process. The probability of these results happening by chance 
(between initial thoughts and after the bridge (or second bridge for the extended 
bridging analogies) was much less for the extended bridging analogies than for the 
single bridging analogy approach and therefore these results give firmer 
conclusions. 
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In the final part of the research which involved cueing p-prims using analogy 
given in a very low-key way, the findings are not conclusive. Chart 
10 (reproduced 
--------------------- -a --------------------- 
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below) shows the small increase in the sense rating of the scientifically correct 
statement (p = 0.047) together with the very small drop in the sense of the 
misconception statement (p = 0.431) after the analogy intervention. The control 
group shifted very little in their sense ratings. It may be that this misconception 
requires a longer approach to overcome it. In the first part of the research it had 
been the strongest misconception (according to the initial sense ratings) and in the 
second part it had been the second strongest. This could indicate its entrenchment. 
Chart 10 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
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If this is a particularly strongly entrenched misconception, then its strength may 
be 
explained because of its sensory origins. This is supported by Driver et al (1994) 
who attribute many conceptions that children develop to sensory experiences. 
The 
metal object is felt to be cold and this is naturally interpreted as the object 
being 
cold. Of course, what is being felt is the lowering of temperature as 
body heat is 
being removed by the conducting object. The perception would 
be similar to 
touching an object that was at a lower temperature than the metal object 
but not 
quite so well conducting. The perception of coldness 
is seen as being due to the 
temperature of an object which is caused, at least in part, 
by the material from 
which it is made. It is not seen as being caused by the 
flow of heat from one's 
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body to and through the object. An example of this is the apparent drop in 
temperature due to the `wind chill' factor. Weather forecasters need to remind 
people that it will indeed feel colder when it is windy (due to the increased heat 
flow from us). Children (and adults) need to rely on their senses so if something 
feels cold then it is natural and sensible to perceive it as being cold. It does not 
really matter about the exact temperature when people go out; it matters more how 
quickly their body heat is going to be lost. It can even be essential to survival. This 
being said, it would be no surprise to find this misconception being strong and 
resilient. 
If pupils were to be taught how senses work, then this misconception might be 
overcome. This is supported by diSessa (personal correspondence, 2003-2004) 
who suggests that the pupils need a new model of sense experience involving 
knowledge of how the nerves in the hand need to be heated in order for something 
to feel hot. Then it becomes more reasonable to think that cork or wood, etc. is the 
same temperature as the metal but just does not conduct as quickly. 
Based on these results, it can be seen that cueing p-prims is only partially 
successful as is using bridging analogies. The more overt bridging analogy 
approach is more likely to succeed when there are more bridging analogies 
included. More understanding could be reached if a model of sense perception 
were included which would help to remove the idea that temperature is due to an 
object's natural propensity. 
It is likely that even the more overt bridging analogies used were working by 
cueing p-prims as only just over one third of the pupils who had either changed 
their mind as to the probable correct statement (from misconception to scientific 
conception) or at least increased their sense rating of the scientific conception 
compared with the misconception, specifically mentioned the analogy when asked 
about their answers. 
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7.2 Heat 2 
Chart 3 (reproduced below) shows the results for the tests for the single bridging 
analogy approach. 
Chart 3 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (heat 2) 
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There is not much difference for the two groups. They both show a similar 
increase between pre-test and post-test but the experimental group demonstrates a 
small rise in proceeding to the retention test while the control group shows a slight 
decrease. This is indicative of the analogy approach working at a deeper and more 
lasting level then the traditional approach of doing the experiment, writing a 
conclusion and practising some questions. In this case it may give some mental 
model of `catching' and `throwing' the heat energy. It may not be a sophisticated 
or even scientifically correct model but few models are, at least, in their simplified 
form 
The single bridging analogy approach (see Chart 18) shows a rise in the sense 
ratings for each part of the approach, indicating that each step is of help. This is 
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similar to the percentage of pupils giving the scientific statement as being likely to 
be the correct one. 
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When another bridging analogy was introduced (see Chart 19) there was an 
increase in the sense ratings for each step, again indicating that each step is of 
help. The percentage giving the correct answer followed the same pattern. 
It is thought likely that p-prims were being cued as this happens at an unconscious 
level, as many pupils seemed not to know why they had changed their minds about 
the target question as they went through the bridging analogy process. 
It is hard to compare the overall efficacy of the two bridging analogy approaches 
(single and extended) as they start from different points on the sense ratings scale. 
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Chart 19 To show progress during extended bridging analogies for HEAT 2 
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For the final part of the research which involved cueing p-prims using analogy 
given in a very low-key way, the findings have been discussed (see pages 226-228 
and Chart 11 reproduced below). In summary, it can be said that without the 
analogy intervention, there is a significant marked drop in the sense rating given to 
the scientific statement (p 0.047) together with a comparable, but not significant 
at the 0.05 level (p = 0.198), rise in the sense rating given to the misconception. 
The intervention overcomes this and actually reverses the trend. 
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Chart 11 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
HEAT 2 
5.00 
4.50 
4.00 
3.50 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
1.50 
Control m 
pre-test post-test 
From these results for this topic, it seems as if both a more overt bridging analogy 
approach and cueing p-prims are successful in changing pupils' ideas about 
radiation and absorption. It should be emphasised that even when the more overt 
analogy approach was being used, the pupils were not told it was analogies that 
were being used. They were given the analogous situations and discussed the 
similarities and differences but were not told they had to make use of them when 
answering the target questions. That the pupils had not consciously taken them to 
be analogies became obvious when they were asked why they had given the 
answers they had, for example in the extended bridging analogy approach. In total, 
out of the sixteen pupils who had either changed their mind as to the probable 
correct statement (from misconception to scientific conception) or at least 
increased their sense rating of the scientific conception compared with the 
misconception, only three specifically mentioned the analogy. This reinforces the 
idea that the pupils were having p-prims cued. 
This is not likely to be a misconception that is particularly difficult to change. In 
the first part of the research it was found that, of all the topics researched, this 
misconception was least strong. It has not originated in a sensory manner unlike 
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some of the others and probably has only been considerably strengthened because 
of the conduction/insulation topic. For the first two parts of the research (single 
and extended bridging analogy approaches) the conduction/insulation topic had 
been studied prior to the pre-test so the strengthening of the misconception by this 
topic was not observed. It was only shown by the results of the control group in 
the low-key analogy approach. In this part of the research the 
conduction/insulation topic was studied between the pre-test and the post test. The 
sense rating the control group gave to the scientific conception decreased 
considerably mirrored by an increase in the misconception sense rating. A small 
cue was enough to reverse this trend for the experimental group. 
In summary, this topic lends itself to this type of approach. The more overt use of 
bridging analogies led to a small long-term effect and the cueing of p-prims led to 
a good short-term effect compared with no cueing. A combination of the methods 
using bridging analogies that were pointed out to the pupils and cueing p-prims as 
reminders seems optimal for this topic. 
251 
7.3 Light 1 
A similar pattern to Heat 2 emerges for this topic for the pre-, post- and retention 
tests for the single bridging analogy approach (see Chart 4 reproduced below). 
There is an increase for both groups going from pre-test to post-test (larger for the 
control group) followed by a drop between the post-test and the retention test for 
the control group together with a rise for the experimental group. Again, this adds 
credence to the idea that the bridging analogies are working at a deeper level than 
the traditional method although the traditional method is certainly more successful 
in the short (one week) term. 
Chart 4 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (light 1) 
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During the single bridging analogy approach there was a substantial increase for 
each step of the analogy process for the sense values indicating that each step was 
useful. This can be seen in Chart 20. The percentage giving the correct answer 
followed a similar pattern. 
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Chart 20 To show progress during single bridging analogy for LIGHT I 
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When more steps were used it was decided to make use of the mirror anchor rather 
than a ball bouncing off a board. This was mainly to simplify the analogies as 
explained on page 186. Chart 21 shows that there was reasonable success here 
although there was a drop in the sense ratings and the percentage giving the 
correct answer between `after the anchor and after the first bridging analogy' and 
also between `after the second bridging analogy and after the explanation'. These 
dips were discussed on page 202. 
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Chart 21 To show progress during extended bridging analogies for 
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The overall increase seemed better when only one bridge was used. This could 
have been due to the analogies used or it could have been because the starting 
sense ratings were different. One class in this cohort had been taught about 
reflection the previous year. This meant that they were more likely to give the 
scientific statement as the one they thought was the most likely answer. However, 
the sense ratings still showed an increase during the bridging analogy approach for 
this class. It was felt not to matter too much that this class had viewed this topic 
previously, as, for this part of the research, there was not a control group. It is 
interesting to note that the class who had not done this topic before did not have 
this dip in their sense ratings. It could be that the other class thought they knew the 
right answer because they had `done it before', were encouraged by the anchor 
but 
then wavered somewhat as they began to doubt themselves. This is, of course, 
only conjecture, based on a very small sample. 
One interesting observation is that, when pupils were asked how we can see a 
piece of paper, many answered correctly that it reflects light. However, when 
asked how much sense the alternative statements made, several 
decided that the 
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`misconception' statement made more sense and was the probable answer, not 
realising that they had contradicted their previous answer. 
In the final part of the research where the analogies were used in a very low-key 
manner the analogies used were based on the more overt single bridging analogy 
approach that had seemed more successful than the extended bridging analogy 
approach. It was, however, much simpler than the analogy approach in that it did 
not involve the position of images to be found. 
Chart 12 (reproduced below) indicates an increase in the sense of the scientific 
conception for the experimental group and a comparable decrease in the sense of 
the misconception. As in the Heat 2 topic there is a worrying drop in the sense of 
the scientific conception for the control group together with a rise in the sense of 
the misconception. One explanation is that half of this year group had already 
covered the topic of reflection the previous year. The pre-test was given at the start 
of the academic year whereas the post-test was given some months later so it is 
possible that there was some reversion to the misconception during those months. 
It should be observed, however, that there were no results of significance at the 
0.05 level for this part of the research in this topic. 
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Chart 12 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
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The results from the research for this topic show that this topic is open to bridging 
analogies, both more overt and low-key. Even in using the more overt analogies, it 
is likely that p-prims were being cued. For the extended bridging analogy 
approach, of the pupils who had either changed their mind as to the probable 
correct statement (from misconception to scientific conception) or at least 
increased their sense rating of the scientific conception compared with the 
misconception less than one third made specific references to the analogy. This 
indicates that most pupils were not viewing the experiments as analogies but there 
was unconscious cueing taking place. 
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7.4 Light 2 
There was an increase in the pre-test to post-test scores for the experimental group 
but this was outweighed by the increase for the control group (see Chart 5 
reproduced below). The control group's retention test score dropped as in the 
other topics but the experimental group's score had a greater drop. As far as this 
test part of the research is concerned, this was not an overall success for the 
bridging analogy approach. 
Chart 5 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (light 2) 
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Although the test results for this topic were not promising for the bridging analogy 
approach, an analysis of the approach itself is interesting. Chart 22 shows a 
substantial increase at each stage of the process. From an initial preference of the 
misconception making more sense, after the anchor we find that the scientific 
conception makes more sense. Certainly within the approach, there 
is success. 
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Chart 22 To show progress during single bridging analogy for LIGHT 2 
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This success is repeated in the next part of the research when another bridge is 
introduced (see Charts 23). Again, each of the stages produced an increase in the 
sense ratings. The large increase in the correct answer being given, from 
approximately 36% to 86% (initial to after bridge) for the single bridging analogy 
approach and 15% to 45% (initial to after bridge 2) for the extended bridging 
analogy approach, is not reflected in the test results and it is possible that this may 
be explained by cueing p-prims. 
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Chart 23 To show progress during extended bridging analogies for 
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For the extended bridging analogy approach, of the pupils who had either changed 
their mind as to the probable correct statement (from misconception to scientific 
conception) or at least increased their sense rating of the scientific conception 
compared with the misconception less than one third made specific references to 
the analogy. This again indicates that most pupils were not viewing the 
experiments as analogies. 
It can be seen from Chart 13 (reproduced below) that the low-key analogies 
seemed to work well in strengthening the scientific conception in the short term. It 
gave the largest increase of all the topics. The Light 2 topic gave the smallest 
increase in going from the post-test to the retention test - in fact it was a 
decrease 
for the single bridging analogy approach. This seems to suggest that the p-prims 
are very fluid in their ability to be cued. The bridging analogies may 
have worked 
more in their cueing ability rather than in their ability to provide a mental model 
of mechanism. This seems to have produced a very short term success, 
i. e. during 
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the bridging analogy approach but poor longer term success, i. e. going from post- 
test to retention test. 
Chart 13 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
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Cueing p-prims is not expected to be successful in permanently changing a pupil's 
conceptions. There would need to be many occasions where the correct p-prim is 
cued for it to strengthen sufficiently to become a strong enough p-prim to reliably 
be automatically cued in the relevant situation. However, it is important to 
consider whether analogies work mainly by changing pupils' models or by cueing 
p-prims. If it is the former then it might be expected that pupils will be able to 
answer questions correctly given at a later time without the relevant analogy being 
given again. This may extend to questions set in a slightly different context. If 
it is 
the latter, then one might expect that questions given later, especially those posed 
in a different context might not elicit any more correct answers than those posed 
before the intervention. In other words, cueing p-prims has a very short life 
expectancy unless repeated very frequently. This appears to 
be what is happening 
in this topic. 
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This topic of colour probed the children's understanding of what filters do to 
white light; do filters remove or add colour? For both the single and double 
bridging analogy approach, there was a substantial increase in the sense of the 
science conception compared with the misconception. This could indicate an 
increase in understanding the model of colour separation or it could indicate 
repeated cueing of the filtration idea through the approach. (It should be noted that 
the colour filters were referred to as `coloured see-through' pieces of plastic rather 
than colour filters. ) The drop in going from post-test to retention test suggests the 
latter. If there were an increase in understanding, one would expect the retention 
test results to not have dropped by so large a margin. In fact, it also explains why 
there was little increase from pre-test to post-test. The post-test was carried out 
one week after the intervention and this is probably too long for any p-prim cueing 
to be effective. Any increase was probably due to the explanation given after the 
bridging analogy approach. This may have acted as a partial model change but the 
control group's model change was better. This may be because the control group's 
practice with questions gave them a deeper understanding as these questions were 
given in a diagrammatic form. This is reinforced by the results for the last part of 
the research that tested the pupils' response to low-key cueing of p-prims, which 
was extremely successful for this topic. 
Changing ideas in this topic probably does not undermine any of the pupil's 
fundamental concepts and the p-prims of `adding' and `filtering' are probably both 
easily cued. The fact that the majority of pupils made more sense of the 
misconception to begin with is probably because the p-prim of `adding' is being 
cued because the colour filter has been added. It may not mean that that there is a 
strong idea that this is how a filter works. A small shift in the way the problem 
is 
viewed seems to have easily caused the correct p-prim to be cued. 
This is very 
much in keeping with the theory of p-prims. 
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7.5 Forces 1 
There was an increase for the experimental group from pre-test to post-test but 
there was a larger increase for the control group (see Chart 6). This may be due to 
the practice questions that the control group had being very similar to the test 
questions. 
However, the fact that this topic provided the largest increase of all the topics for 
going from the pre-test to post-test for the experimental group is indicative that 
the bridging analogy approach was being successful. 
There was the same increase for the control group and the experimental group 
when going from post-test to retention test. Previous research has shown 
improvement for bridging analogies (e. g. Clement, 1998). 
Chart 6 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (forces 1) 
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The single bridging analogy approach showed an increase in sense rating at each 
step whereas the extended bridging analogies used in the pilot research had caused 
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a dip in the sense ratings that was not recovered until after the explanation (see 
Charts 24 and 1). 
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It was suggested (see page 146) that this dip could be due to the fact that it was 
integral to the research that the pupils were not told that the experiments were 
analogies but were free to compare and contrast at will. This was the same for all 
the topics but it was only with this one that there was such a drop during the 
process. Another suggestion was that there was a state of confusion while 
misconceptions were being changed to a more scientific view. This could be so 
but it is strange that it was not repeated in the single bridging analogy approach. 
Another possibility is that the pupils regarded the springs as being totally different 
from the table and therefore assumed that they were definitely not meant to be 
analogous. It is possible that in the single bridging approach there was more 
discussion as to the similarities as well as the differences between the two 
situations. In addition, in the pilot research, only the sense that the scientific 
conception made was asked for but, if this analysis is repeated with the single 
bridging analogy approach, the shape of the graph (see Chart 25) is similar to 
Chart 24 where the `sense of the `misconception' statement is subtracted from the 
sense of the `scientific' statement'. 
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The overall changes between tests in the pilot research are too small to be 
significant. More important are the changes affecting individual questions and 
these have been more thoroughly discussed on pages 138-145. 
This topic tests whether pupils thought that there was a reaction force to the 
weight of a book on a table. However, it actually asked about the forces on the 
book, whether there is one force on the book due to gravity with the table just in 
the way or whether there are two forces on the book, one being due to gravity and 
one being due to the table pushing up on the book. For the single bridging analogy 
approach, there was an increase in the sense ratings for the scientific conception 
compared with the misconception for each stage of the process. This could show 
an increased understanding of the `springiness' model of the table or it could be 
due to the springiness p-prim being repeatedly cued. 
The substantial increase between the pre- and the post-test for the single bridging 
analogy approach is suggestive that a better mental model is being produced by 
the pupils. It is unlikely that p-prims being cued would have this much effect 
although it could be the explanation given at the end of the approach that was 
successful. Supportive evidence for the lack of effectiveness of cueing p-prims in 
this topic comes from the low-key cueing of p-prims that did not work positively 
for this topic. The low-key analogies used for this topic had a detrimental effect in 
both the sense ratings and the percentage giving the correct answer (see Chart 
14 
reproduced below). 
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Chart 14 Change in sense of scientific and misconception answers for 
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The idea that forces cannot be produced by an inanimate object has already been 
mentioned. The Earth is seen as the agency of gravity because objects generally 
fall towards the Earth when dropped, even though the Earth is inanimate. There 
may emerge from this some idea of the Earth as being somehow living which may 
be an acceptable viewpoint for children as all life as we know it is on Earth so it is 
not much of a leap to think of the Earth as being somehow living; a Mother Earth 
or Gaia picture. The idea that inanimate objects do not usually produce forces may 
be such a strong idea that the springiness p-prim cannot come into play and it may 
be that a full bridging analogy approach is needed where the links are made 
explicitly and the whole model of forces as interactions is explained together with 
some notion of Newton's third law. 
A physicist would maintain there are two pairs of action-reaction forces to 
consider (see, for example, Pople, 1987). There is the gravity pair that comprises 
the force of the Earth pulling on the book and the equal and opposite 
force of the 
book pulling on the Earth. There is also the contact pair comprising the 
force of 
the book on the table and the force of the table on the 
book. Of course, when we 
consider the book itself, there are just two forces to consider; the 
force of gravity 
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on the book causing its weight and the force of the table on the book. These are 
not an action-reaction pair as they are acting on one object. However, it still needs 
a consideration of Newton's third law, as one of the forces considered is the 
normal or reaction force. Viewed like this it is not surprising that most pupils 
regard the table as just `being in the way'. 
For the single bridging analogy approach and the low key analogies, the two sense 
statements the pupils had to choose from were as follows: 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the 
way to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes 
upwards on the book by the same amount. 
If the scientific statement to the pupils had stated that the table applied some 
upwards force on the book, using the low-key spring analogy may have had more 
success. However, the statement refers to the table pushing up on the book by the 
same amount as the book pushes down on the table. Not only is the blocking p- 
prim available but also the overcoming p-prim (diSessa, 1993) where gravity 
could be viewed as being stronger than any upward force due to the table. Thus, if 
a pupil thinks that the table does push up on the book but not as much as gravity is 
pulling down, they would still choose the misconception statement even though 
they are well on the way to accepting the balanced force situation. 
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7.6 Forces 2 
There was not much difference between the control group and the experimental 
group for the tests for this topic (see Chart 7 reproduced below). Both groups 
showed an improvement from pre-test to post-test and from post-test to retention 
test 
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Chart 7 To show average test marks for experimental and control groups for 
the three tests (forces 2) 
--F-stretching experimental 
--ý - stretching control 
pre-test post-test retention test 
The single bridging analogy approach did not seem successful during the approach 
(see Chart 26). There was not much improvement in the sense ratings given 
between initial thoughts and those after the bridge and the results were not 
significant at the 0.05 level. The dip was discussed on page 173. 
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Chart 26 To show progress during single bridging analogy for FORCES 2 
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There was no extended bridging analogy carried out for this topic as there were no 
clear extra analogies that could be built in. 
When the low-key analogies were used, although neither of the results was 
significant at a 0.05 level, there was a large improvement in the percentage giving 
the correct answer for the experimental group (21 %) and a substantial drop for the 
control group (12%). This indicates that the particular analogies used for this topic 
worked well at cueing the correct p-prim. A different set of bridging analogies had 
been chosen for this part of the research to the more overt bridging analogies part 
of the research since it was felt that the previous ones could not be used in a low- 
key manner as they referred to the topic in question. It was necessary for the low- 
key analogies to be from another area to be surer that the pupils would not 
consciously see them as analogies. 
The cue used was visual and this may be the reason for its effectiveness. 
This view 
is supported by the work of Kokinov and Yoveva (1996) and Kokinov et al 
(1997) 
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who found that diagrams could help as unconscious contextual clues (see pages 
102-103). 
It is likely that it was p-prims that were being cued as, for the experimental group 
in this part of the research, of the seven pupils who changed their minds between 
pre-test and post-test from the misconception to the scientific conception; none 
could explain why they had written that particular answer. There were no 
references to the analogy in any of the comments made. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions and the way forward 
8.1 Conclusions 
1. The first research problem was: 
To investigate whether scientific misconceptions can be overcome by the use 
of bridging analogies 
Bridging analogies might help with concept understanding. This is shown by the 
change from post to retention test in the single bridging analogy approach for the 
topics. In two out of the six topics there was a rise for the experimental group 
going from the post to the retention test coupled with a drop for the control group 
(Heat 2 and Light 1). In the Heat I topic there was no increase for the 
experimental group but there was a drop for the control group. In the Forces 2 
topic there was a greater increase for the experimental group than for the control 
group. In the Forces 1 topic there was the same increase for both groups. Only in 
the Light 2 topic was there a greater drop for the experimental group compared 
with the control group. Thus, for all but one topic, going from the post-test to the 
retention test proved better for the experimental group than for the control group. 
Although this conclusion seems positive, the findings should not be 
misinterpreted. In all the topics the control group showed a bigger increase in 
going from the pre-test to the post-test. This may be a case of `teaching to the test' 
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since some of the questions in the pre-test and post-test were very similar to 
q scions the control group had to answer as part of their lesson. This may (and 
should) have had positive effects on their post-test and possibly their retention test 
results. It is obvious that using the bridging analogies did not have such a positive 
effect in going from pre-test to post-test. It is possible that there would have been 
a better improvement if the analogous nature of the experiments etc. had been 
fully explained to the experimental group. This was not possible during this 
research as has previously been indicated (see page 151). 
It is not always advantageous to increase the number of bridges in the bridging 
analogy approach. Some of the topics worked better with one rather than two 
bridges (Heat 2, Light 1 and Forces 1). 
Bridging analogies do seem to have success during the actual teaching sequence as 
shown by the results to both the single and extended bridging analogies. 
2. The second research problem was: 
To analyse the bridging analogy process using phenomenological primitives 
(p-prims) 
It was possible to analyse the bridging analogy approach using postulated p-prims 
as was shown in chapter six. Both the misconception and the scientific conception 
were analysed in this way and, in fact, this was one way that the particular 
bridging analogies were chosen. The other main feature in the choice of bridging 
analogies was that they started with a concrete anchor with which most of the 
pupils agreed and which could lead step by step to the target. 
272 
3. A research question that was posed was: 
Do p-prims account for any success in this bridging analogy method or does 
the introduction of analogy cause more conscious thought processes? 
Bridging analogies may work by cueing p-prims if the analogous nature of the 
anchor, bridge and target is not specifically pointed out. The research suggests 
that, if it is p-prims which are being cued, then this does not help longer term test 
results. This is as expected since the theory of p-prims is that they need to be cued 
many times before becoming strong enough to reliably be cued on each relevant 
occasion. 
For some topics cueing p-prims on a low-key level can bring short-term success. 
However, this is not true of all topics. In all but the Forces 1 topic there was a 
greater improvement going from pre-test to post test for the experimental group 
compared with the control group. In the Forces 1 topic there was a decrease going 
from pre-test to post test for the experimental group. 
There appears to be two extremes in the topics. At one extreme is the Light 2 
topic. In this topic it was easy to cue p-prims but the long-term success of the 
bridging analogy approach was poor. This may link in with the idea that pupils do 
not have any very strong notions about how colour filters work. Given a choice of 
them working by adding or subtracting colours, many pupils would choose the 
adding model but can easily be persuaded to use the subtracting model by low-key 
use of analogy. The change does not last for long and they quickly revert to the 
adding model. 
At the other extreme is the Forces 1 topic. This had good long term success with 
the bridging analogy approach (comparing the experimental group's pre, post and 
retention tests for the different topics) but there was no success at all cueing p- 
prims in a low-key manner. It seems likely that the analogies need to 
be explained 
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in order to build up a model of what is happening. The idea of the table just being 
`in the way' is too strong to be changed by the use of low-key analogies. 
This study was not designed to allow research into the use of analogy where pupils 
knew that analogy was specifically being used since part of the investigation was 
to see what happened at different stages of the bridging analogy approach. Being 
told an analogy was being used would be like telling the pupils what the correct 
answer should be. Knowing the correct answer might sway their perception of 
how much sense the correct answer and the misconception made. In the majority 
of cases, the pupils did not figure out that bridging analogies were being used even 
in the more overt bridging analogy approaches (main research, parts one and two). 
Less than one-third of the pupils, who changed their mind from the misconception 
to the scientific conception or at least increased their sense rating of the scientific 
conception relative to the misconception, specifically pointed out the analogies 
when asked why they had written what they had (see pages 199-201). 
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8.2 Usefulness of the research 
One of the reasons the author embarked on this research was to improve her own 
teaching and in the process provide information which would be useful to other 
practitioners. Chapters 4 and 5 indicate ways in which bridging analogies could be 
used in the classroom as well as a guide to their likely success. The analogies used 
in Chapter 4 are shown in detail in Appendix Ila and those used in chapter 5 are 
given in Appendix lila 
This research has extended the scope of bridging analogies. It has shown that they 
are potentially useful in various topics as a way of retaining conceptions. They 
were found to be successful in this respect in the Heat I topic (thermal 
equilibrium), the Heat 2 topic (radiation and absorption), the Light 1 topic 
(reflection of light), the Forces I topic ('book on the table' problem) and the 
Forces 2 topic (extension being dependent on original length). Previous research 
had concentrated on forces topics. 
It would be sensible to rewrite these so that they could be used in a more open way 
with the pupils knowing that analogies were being used. It should be noted that, if 
they were to be used in this way, it would be vital to explain the limitations of any 
analogies used as cautioned by, for example, Glynn (1991). 
It is felt that using low-key analogy to cue p-prims has a place in the curriculum. 
Advantages of using analogy to cue p-prims are: 
" P-prims are quick to cue. Long discussions as to the appropriateness and 
extent of the analogy are not required as the analogy is not being used to 
promote a mental model but merely as a cue. 
275 
9 Cueing p-prims can be used to lead pupils to produce the right answer 
without being told what the answer is. This gives pupils encouragement 
and confidence in their scientific abilities. 
" Cueing p-prims can help as a reminder as to the answer to a problem. It is 
obviously not feasible to always give clues, for example, in examinations 
but it is often useful to be able to point a pupil in the right direction. 
9 It may be beneficial to cue p-prims if a problem in a slightly different 
context is given. It seems unfair to penalise pupils who know the right 
answer but do not realise it is the right answer in a particular context. It 
may be that the judicial use of a little Vigotskian scaffolding could prove 
very beneficial. 
Chapter 6 includes scripts that could be used as unconscious contextual clues 
where low-key reminders are required. The topics which proved successful in the 
short-term were the Heat 1 topic (thermal equilibrium), the Heat 2 topic (radiation 
and absorption), the Light 1 topic (reflection of light), the Light 2 topic (colour) 
and the Forces 2 topic (extension being dependent on original length). Previous 
research by such as Kokinov on unconscious contextual clues appears not to have 
included these topics. He and his co-researchers concentrated more on novel 
problem solving rather than recall of concepts. 
If they were to be used in written questions rather than in a teaching situation, then 
they could be given as pictures or diagrams accompanying the text of the question. 
Some comment would have to be made that the pictures or diagrams were to 
be 
ignored as having nothing to do with the question. This was found to 
be a 
successful approach by Kokinov and Yoveva (1996). For example, 
in the colour 
topic (light 2) which worked particularly well, a diagram of a 
liquid with a solid 
settled at the bottom being filtered (anchor) could be shown together with a 
diagram of a solid dispersed in a liquid being filtered (bridging analogy). 
These 
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could be part of another question on the same page which the pupils would be told 
to ignore. The diagrams would be placed so it would be difficult to miss them. 
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8.3 Locating the research in its literature base 
This research has utilised and extended the work of other researchers as follows. 
Clement, Brown, Thijs and Bosch 
As has been previously mentioned, previous researchers in the field of bridging 
analogies have concentrated on forces topics where they have found them to be 
useful. The present research has extended this to examine the efficacy of using 
bridging analogies in different topics utilising the idea that anchor analogies 
should be concrete when the particular bridging analogies were devised (Clement 
et al, 1989). The research has found varying levels of success for the different 
topics. 
diSessa 
diSessa's work on p-prims has been used to analyse the misconceptions and 
scientific conceptions in this research and thus help to identify possible bridging 
analogy approaches for the different topics. This has extended the usefulness of 
the notion of p-prims being small knowledge structures which are capable of 
being cued. This research agrees in part with diSessa's view (1994) that deep 
conceptual learning is unlikely to occur unless there is extended, cumulative 
experience with a concept (see page 77 of this research). An example of this is in 
the topic of colour. It was relatively easy to cue the right answer but this did not 
mean there was any deep conceptual learning. On the contrary, it appeared that 
there had been little or no long-term learning if the post-test and retention test in 
part one of the main research were valid measures of deep conceptual learning in 
this topic. However, other topics showed a more positive outcome. Although the 
post-test results for the experimental group were generally not as good as post-test 
results for the control grouping (compared with the pre-test results), 
in four topics 
there was an increase to the retention test results for the experimental group. 
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Kokinov 
Although explicit hints may be useful in problem solving, Kokinov and Yoveva 
(1996) and Kokinov et al (1997) carried out research which showed that remote or 
unconscious contextual clues could be used to aid problem solving (see page 102). 
It was argued by Kokinov et al (ibid) that three mechanisms play a part in the 
problem context. These are reasoning, perception and memory. When an explicit 
hint is given but it is difficult to use reasoning to understand the analogous nature 
between the hint and the problem, then the hint becomes useless and an obstacle 
to solving the problem. However, if the hint is remote but in the visual field, 
perceptual mechanisms will begin to process it. There will be interactions with the 
memory mechanisms and its links to other memory elements will cue these and 
bring them to the fore. This will happen unconsciously. 
The present research (main research - part 3) used non-explicit analogies as cues. 
In this case, the analogies would have been straightforward to understand if they 
had been used explicitly. However, it was decided to use them at a low-key level 
to see if the correct answer could be cued. This was found to be successful in 
some topics and it was argued that correct p-prims had been cued as the pupils did 
not seem to have made use of the analogies directly as they made no reference to 
them when asked about the reasons for their answers. Thus, there seems to be a 
connection between cueing p-prims and Kokinov's remote hints. This research has 
extended that of Kokinov and his colleagues in that he used analogies which were 
difficult to use as analogies whereas this research has used analogies which were 
easy to understand but still seemed to be processed as visual (perceptual) clues 
rather than as analogical (reasoning) clues. 
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8.4 Reflections on methodology 
It has already been stated that the background of the author is in the physical 
sciences and a decision was taken to use a quasi-experimental design. It is of 
importance to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this and how the 
research could be furthered using different methodologies. 
Advantages 
" This type of design was more familiar to the author than other 
methodologies. 
9 The design used provides a substantial amount of data from class sets of 
pupils and it is classes with which the teacher is dealing. 
9 The data can be analysed using the statistical t-test to give an idea of the 
probability with which the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
Disadvantages 
" In order to control variables as much as possible, it was necessary that the 
pupils could not discuss ideas among themselves. It was pointed out on 
page 40 how this goes against the ideology of social constructivism. 
" No feedback could be given to the pupils where tests were going to be 
repeated. This is an ethical issue and is further discussed on page 283. 
" Although there is breadth of data, there is less depth of data. 
Other design and methodological approaches 
Other approaches were considered for this research and could be used in future 
research topics in the area. These included the following. 
Interview 
Semi-structured interviews could be given which introduce the bridging analogies 
during the interview. An advantage of this type of design is the chance of a greater 
depth of understanding of individual thought processes. 
This should be weighed 
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against several disadvantages. There are not as many pupils involved so the 
breadth of data is lacking and pupils may be unwilling to give up their own time 
for these interviews. Analysis of the interviews may be problematic as in that 
pupils often use words in a different meaning to how teachers use them. For 
example the word `force' can mean something entirely different to a pupil and a 
teacher. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to a small extent in this research in the Light 
2 topic to elicit whether pupils knew why they had changed their minds between 
the pre-test and the post-test. However, they were not used as a means of 
introducing the bridging analogies. 
Semi-structured interviews have been successfully used by Bryce and MacMillan 
(2005) to investigate the use of bridging analogies in teaching about action- 
reaction forces. 
Longitudinal study 
A longitudinal study was considered using either a quasi-experimental or 
interview design. An advantage of this approach is that the development of pupils 
over several years can be investigated. However, it was felt to be inappropriate for 
this research as cueing p-prims was not aimed to be long-term and even the 
retention tests for the first part of the main research were designed to be 
completed within two months. Future research could make use of a longitudinal 
study if it were investigating, for example, how bridging analogies could be used 
to link together topics studied in different years. 
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8.5 Possibilities for further research 
"A severe limitation of this work is the fact that it was carried out in an 
independent selective all girls' school which is obviously not 
representative of the whole population of 12-13 year olds. More work 
needs to be done on the whole ability range of boys and girls in order to 
see whether similar conclusions are reached. One factor that could be 
further investigated is whether practical demonstrations are the best way to 
introduce the analogy for boys. Thijs and Bosch (1995) found that 
demonstration practicals are, for girls, more successful than small group 
practicals. 
" The pupils were not told that analogies were being used as the research 
sought to analyse results within the approach. Further research should 
include allowing the pupils to know analogies are being made during the 
approach together with pre-, post- and retention tests to investigate the 
efficacy of bridging analogies in different topics. This was beyond the 
scope of this research. It is likely that better mental models would be built 
up than in the type of approach used in the present research. 
" The topics were limited in this research to the areas covered 
by the year 
group and more research should cover different topics, e. g. electricity. 
This 
is an area well-known for misconceptions (see, 
for example, Shipstone, 
1988). 
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8.6 Reflections on ethical issues 
Permission for the research to be conducted was granted from the headteacher. 
The pupils were assured that individual pupils would not be identified in the 
write-up of the research and permission was sought from both parents and pupils 
where interviews were carried out. 
One of the main ethical issues in this research was the fact that the two classes 
were having different teaching experiences from each other. This was overcome to 
a certain extent during revision (for the summer examination) lessons at the end of 
the year where approaches which had worked particularly well during the research 
were used with the class which had not already benefited from that approach. This 
was not ideal but was the only way both classes could benefit. 
Another ethical issue was the lack of social interaction during the bridging 
analogy approach and the allied problem of lack of feedback to the pupils where 
tests were going to be repeated. The pupils were used to discussing problems 
unless they were doing a test at the end of a topic. They were not used to being 
given questions under test conditions at the beginning of a topic or even after a 
topic without having had the opportunity of revision. The pupils were clearly 
worried about not knowing the answer to the questions even though they were 
constantly reassured that their answers would not be used as part of their 
assessment for reports, etc. and that (at the beginning of the topic) they were not 
supposed to know the right answers - it was their ideas that the author was 
interested in. In future, it may be better to prepare pupils beforehand for similar 
research by introducing questions to be completed under test conditions at the 
beginning of all topics. The pupils would see this as a normal part of their physics 
lessons and it would also provide valuable information on their conceptions prior 
to being taught the topic. 
283 
References 
Adey, P. and Shayer, M. (1994), Really Raising Standards: Cognitive Intervention 
and Academic Achievement, London: Routledge. 
Adey, P. S., Shayer, M. and Yates, C. (1989), Thinking Science: The Curriculum 
Materials of the CASE Project, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
Adey, P. S., Shayer, M. and Yates, C. (1990), `Better Learning', A Report from the 
Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education (CASE) Project, University of 
London, Centre for Educational Studies, Kings College London, England. 
Airasian, P. (1987), `State Mandated Testing and Educational Reform: Context 
and Consequences', American Journal of Education, 95 (3): 393-412. 
Airasian, P. (1988), ` Measurement- Driven Instruction: A Closer Look', 
Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, Winter: 6-11. 
Anderson, C. W. and Smith, E. L. (1983), `Children's Conceptions of Light and 
Colour: Developing the Concept of Unseen Rays', Paper Presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the AERA, Montreal, Canada. 
Ausubel, D. P. (1968), Educational Psychology: a Cognitive View, New York: 
Holt, Reinhart and Winston. 
Black, M. (1962), Models and Metaphors, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Bliss, J. (1993), `The Relevance of Piaget to Research into Children's 
Conceptions', in P. J. Black and A. M. Lucas (eds. ), Children's Informal Ideas in 
Science, London, Routledge. 
Bliss, J. (1995), `Plaget and After: The Case of Learning Science', Studies in 
Science Education, 25: 139-172. 
Bliss, J., Monk, M. and Whitelock, D. (1989), `Secondary School Pupils' 
Commonsense Theories of Motion', International Journal of Science Education, 
11: 261-272. 
Boo, H. K. and Toh, K. A. (1997), Use of Analogy in Teaching the 
Particulate 
Theory of Matter', Teaching and Learning', 17(2): 79-85. 
Brainerd, C. J. (1978), `The Stage Question in Cognitive Developmental Theory' 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2: 173-213. 
284 
Breslow, L (2001), `The Ecology of Learning: Several Streams of Research Take a 
Broad Approach to Understanding the Learning Process', The MIT Faculty 
Newsletter, Vol. XIV No. 2, October/November, retrieved 2nd July 2005 from 
http: //web. mit. edu/tll/published/ecology. htm 
Brook, A., Briggs, H., Bell, B., and Driver, R. (1984), Aspects of Secondary 
Students' Understanding of Heat, Centre for Studies in Science and Mathematics 
Education, University of Leeds. 
Brown, A. L. (1989), `Analogical Learning and Transfer: What Develops? ', in S. 
Vosniadou and A. Ortony (eds. ), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, (369-412), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, A., Ash, D., Rutherford, M., Nakagawa, K., Gordon, A. and Campione, J. 
(1993), `Distributed Expertise in the Classroom', in G. Salomon (ed), Distributed 
Cognitions, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, D. E. (1993), `Re-focusing Core Intuitions: A Concretizing Role for 
Analogy in Conceptual Change' Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(10): 
1273-1290. 
Brown, D. E. (1994), `Facilitating Conceptual Change Using Analogies and 
Explanatory Models' International Journal of Science Education, 16 (2): 201-214. 
Brown, D. E. & Clement, J. J. (1989), `Overcoming Misconceptions Via 
Analogical Reasoning; Abstract Transfer Versus Explanatory Model 
Construction', Instructional Science, 18: 327-261. 
Brown, D. E. and Clement, J. J. (1992), `Classroom Teaching Experiments in 
Mechanics', in R. Duit, F. Goldberg and H. Niedderer (eds. ), Research in Physics 
Learning. - Theoretical Issues and Empirical Studies, San Diego, CA: San Diego 
State University. 
Brown, G. and Desforges, C. (1977), `Piagetian Psychology and Education: Time 
for Revision', British Journal of Educational Psychology, 47: 7-17. 
Brown, G. and Desforges, C. (1979), Piaget's Theory. - a Psychological Critique, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Brown, H. J. (1977), Perception. Theory and Commitment - The New Philosophy 
of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Brown, J. S. (2000), `Growing Up Digital: How the Web Changes Work, 
Education, and the Ways People Learn, ' Change, March/April: 15, retrieved 
3rd 
August 2003 from http: //www. usdla. org/html/J*ournal[FEB02_lssue/article0l. html 
285 
Brown, J. S., Collins, A. and Duguid, P. (1989), `Situated Cognition and the 
Culture of Learning', Educational Researcher, 18: 32-42. 
Bruner, J. S. (1960), The Process of Education, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Bryce, T. G. K. and MacMillan, K. (2005), `Encouraging conceptual change: 
The use of bridging analogies in the teaching of action-reaction forces and the 'at 
rest' condition in Physics', International Journal of Science Education, 27 (6): 
737-763. 
Bullock, M, Gelman, R. and Baillargeon, R. (1982), `The development of causal 
reasoning', in: W. J. Friedman (ed. ), The developmental psychology of time, 209- 
254, New York: Academic Press. 
Cannell, J. J. (1987), Nationally Normal Elementary Achievement Testing in 
America's Public Schools: How All 50 States are Above the National Average. 
WV Daniels, Friends for Education. 
Carey, S. (1985), Conceptual Changes in Childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Champagne, A. B., Gunstone, R. F. and Klopfer, L. E. (1985), `Effecting Changes 
in Cognitive Structures Among Physics Students', in L. West and A. Pines (eds. ), 
Cognitive Structure and Conceptual Change, Orlando FL: Academic Press. 
Chi, M. T. H. (1992), `Conceptual Change Within and Across Ontological 
Categories: Examples from Learning and Discovery in Science', in R. Giere (ed. ), 
Cognitive Models of Science: Minnesotoa Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Chi, M. T. H. and Slotta, J. D. (1993), `The Ontological Coherence of Intuitive 
Physics', Cognition and Instruction, 10 (2 and 3): 249-260. 
Churchland, P. S. and Sejnowski, T. J. (1992), The Computational Brain, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Clement, J. Brown, D., Camp, C., Kudukey, J., Minstrell, J., Palmer, D., Schultz, 
K., Shimabukuro, J., Steinberg, M., and Veneman, V (1987), `Overcoming 
Students' Misconceptions in Physics: The Role of Anchoring Intuitions and 
Analogical Validity', in J. Novak (ed. ), The Proceedings of the Second 
International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in Science and 
Mathematics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Vol. 3: 84-97. 
Clement, J. J. (1982), `Students' Preconceptions in Introductory Mechanics' 
American Journal of Physics, 50 (1): 66-71. 
Clement, J. J. (1989), `Learning Via Model Construction and Criticism: Protocol 
Evidence on Sources of Creativity in Science', in Glover, 
J., Ronning, R., and 
Reynolds, C. (eds. ), Handbook of Creativity: Assessment, Theory and 
Research, 
NY: Plenum. 
286 
Clement, J. J. (1993), `Using Bridging Analogies and Anchoring Intuitions to 
Deal with Students' Preconceptions in Physics', Journal of Research in Science 
Teaching, 30(10): 1241-1257 
Clement, J. J. (1998), `Expert Novice Similarities and Instruction Using 
Analogies' International Journal of Science Education, 10: 1271-1286. 
Clement J. J. (2004), `Imagistic Processes in Analogical Reasoning: Conserving 
Transformations and Dual Simulations', in Forbus, K., Gentner, D. and Regier, T., 
(eds. ), Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society, 26: 233-238, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Clement, J. J., Brown, D. E. And Ziettsman, A. (1989), `Not all Preconception are 
Misconceptions: Finding `Anchoring Conceptions' for Grounding Instruction on 
Students' Intuitions', International Journal of Science Education, 11: 554-565. 
Coll, R. K. (2005), `The Role of Models and Analogies in Science Education: 
Implications from Research', International Journal of Science Education, 27: 
183-198. 
Cosgrove, M. and Osborne, R. (1985), `Lesson Frameworks for Changing 
Children's Ideas', in R. Osborne and P. Freyberg (eds. ), Learning in Science: The 
Implications of Children 's Science, Auckland: Heinneman. 
Crooks, T. J., Kane, M. T. and Cohen, A. S. (1996), `Threats to the Valid Use of 
Assessments', Assessment in Education, 3 (3): 265-85. 
Cumming, J. (1998), `Why are Misconceptions in Science so Hard to Change? ', 
Paper presented at the BERA Annual Conference, Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
Curtis, R. V., & Reigeluth, C. M. (1984), `The Use of Analogies in Written Text', 
Instructional Science, 13: 99-117. 
Das Gupta, P. and Bryant, P. E. (1989), `Young children's causal inferences', 
Child Development, 60: 1138-1146. 
de Bono, E. (1976), Teaching Thinking, London: Maurice Temple Smith. 
Derry, S. J. (1984), `Effects of an Organiser on Memory for Prose', 
Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 76: 98-107. 
Dewey, J. (1938), The Logic of Inquiry, New York: Henry Holt. 
DIAGNOSER (2002), `The Diagnoser project: Instructional tools for science and 
Mathematics', Retrieved November 7,2002 from 
http: //tutor. psych. washington. edu/ 
287 
diSessa, A. A. (1993), `Towards an Epistemology of Physics', Cognition and 
Instruction, 10: 105-225. 
diSessa, A. A. (1996), `What do "Just Plain Folk" Know about Physics? ', in D. R. 
Olson & N. Torrance (Eds. ), The Handbook of Education and Human 
Development: New Models of Learning, Teaching, and Schooling, Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell. 
diSessa, A. A. (2002), "Why "Conceptual Ecology" is a Good Idea" in M. Limon 
& L. Mason (Eds. ), Reconsidering Conceptual Change: Issues in Theory and 
Practice, Dortrecht: Kluwer. 
Donaldson, M. (1987), Children's Minds, London: HarperCollins. 
Dreyfus, A., Jungwirth, E. and Eliovitch, R. (1990), `Applying the `Cognitive 
Conflict' Strategy for Conceptual Change - Some Implications, Difficulties and 
Problems', Science Education, 74(5): 555-569. 
Driver, R. (1983), The Pupil as Scientist?, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Driver, R. (1989), `Student's Conceptions and the Learning of Science', 
International Journal of Science Education, 11: 481-490. 
Driver, R., Asoko, H., Leach, J., Mortimer, E., and Scott, P. (1994a), 
`Constructing scientific knowledge in the classroom', Educational Researcher, 
23(7): 5-12. 
Driver, R. and Oldham, V. (1986), `A Constructivist Approach to Curriculum 
Development in Science, Studies in Science Education, 13: 105-122. 
Driver, R., Guesne, E. and Tiberghien, A. (1985), `Children's Ideas and the 
Learning of Science', in R. Driver, E. Guesne and A Tiberghien (eds. ), Children's 
Ideas in Science, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Driver, R., Squires, A., Rushworth, P. and Wood-Robinson, V. (1994), Making 
Sense of Secondary Science, London: Routledge. 
Duit, R. (1991), On the Role of Analogies and Metaphors in Learning Science, 
Science Education, 75(6): 649 - 672. 
Duit, R. (1993), `Research on Students' Conceptions - Developments and Trends', 
in The Proceedings of the Third International Seminar: Misconceptions and 
Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Misconceptions Trust, Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University. 
Duit, R. (1994), `The Constructivist View in Science Education - What it Has to 
Offer and What Should Not be Expected from it', The Proceedings of the 
International Conference "Science and Mathematics for the 21 
t Century: 
Towards Innovatory Approaches ", Concepcion, Chile. 
288 
Duit, R. (1999), `Conceptual Change Approaches in Science Education', in W. 
Schnotz, S. Vosniadou, and M. Carretero (eds. ), New Perspectives on Conceptual 
Change (pp. 263-282), Amsterdam, NL: Pergamon. 
Duit, R. and Treagust, D. (1998), Learning in Science - From Behaviourism 
towards Social Constructivism and Beyond, in B. Fraser & K. Tobin (eds. ), 
International Handbook of Science Education (pp. 3-26), Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Duit, R. and Treagust, D. (2003), `Conceptual Change: A Powerful Framework for 
Improving Science Teaching and Learning', International Journal of Science 
Education, 25(6): 671-688. 
Dykstra, D. I., Jr. (2002a), `Why Teach Kinematics? An Examination of the 
Teaching of Kinematics and Force-I', Retrieved May 31,2005, from 
http: //www. boisestate. edu/physics/dykstra/WTKI. pdf. 
Earnest, P. (1993), `Constructivism, the Psychology of Learning and the Nature of 
Mathematics: Some Critical Issues', Science and Education, 2: 87-93. 
Elby, A. (2000), `What students' Learning of Representations Tells Us About 
Constructivism', Journal of Mathematical Behavior 19: 481-502. 
Engel Clough, E. and Driver, R. (1985), `Secondary Students' Conceptions of the 
Conduction of Heat: Bringing Together Scientific and Personal Views', Physics 
Education 20: 176-82. 
Engel, E. (1982), `An Exploration of Pupils' Understanding of Heat, Pressure and 
Evolution', PhD Thesis, University of Leeds. 
English, L. & Halford, G. (1995), Mathematics Education: Models and Processes, 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Erickson, G. And Hobbs, E. (1978), `The Developmental Study of Student Beliefs 
about Force Concepts', Paper Presented to the 1978 Annual Convention of the 
Canadian Society for the Study of Education, June, London, Ontario, Canada. 
Ferguson, G. A. (1981), Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education, 5th 
edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Ferrari, M., and Chi, M. T. H. (1998), `The Nature of Naive Explanations of 
Natural Selection', International Journal of Science Education, 20(10), 1231- 
1256. 
Fetherstonhaugh, T. and Treagust, D. F. (1990), `Students' Understanding of 
Light 
and its Properties Following a Teaching Strategy to Engender Conceptual 
Change', Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the AERA, April, Boston. 
289 
Froufe, J. (1987), 'Feuerstein's Theory Applied to the School Science 
Curriculum', M. A. Dissertation, King's College, University of London. 
Furuya, K. (1993), `A Study on the Teaching of Strategy of Force and Motion: A 
Method of Exchanging the Students' Misconceptions with Scientific Knowledge', 
in The Proceedings of the Third International Seminar: Misconceptions and 
Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Misconceptions Trust, Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University. 
Gabel, D. L., & Sherwood, R. D. (1980), `Effect of Using Analogies on Chemistry 
Achievement According to Piagetian Level', Science Education, 64: 709-716. 
Gentner, D. (1989), `The Mechanisms of Analogical Learning', in S. Vosniadou 
and A. Ortony (eds. ), Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, (199-241), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gentner, D. and Gentner, (1983), `Flowing Waters or Teeming Crowds: Mental 
Models of Electricity', in D. Gentner and A. L. Stevens (eds. ), Mental Models 
(99-129), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Gentner, D., Ratterman, M. J., & Forbus, K. D. (1993), `The Roles of Similarity in 
Transfer: Separating Retrievability from Inferential Soundness', Cognitive 
Psychology 25: 524-575. 
Gentner, D. & Markman, A. B. (1994), `Structural Alignment in Comparison: No 
Difference without Similarity', Psychological Science 5(3): 152-158. 
Gentner, D. and Markman, A. B. (1997), `Structure Mapping in Analogy and 
Similarity', American Psychologist, 52(1), 45-56. 
Gipps, C. (1994), Beyond Testing: Towards a Theory of Educational Assessment, 
London: The Falmer Press. 
Glasersfeld, Ernst von (1989), `Constructivism in Education', in: T. Husen and T. 
Neville Postlethwaite (eds) The International Encyclopedia of Education. 
Research and Studies, (162-163), Supplementary Volume 1, Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 
Glynn, S. M. (1989), `The Teaching-with-Analogy Model', in K. D. Muth (ed. ), 
Children's Comprehension of Text, (185-204), Newark, DE: International Reading 
Association. 
Glynn, S. M. (1991), `Explaining Science Concepts: A Teaching-with-Analogies 
Model', in S. M. Glynn, R. H. Yeaney and B. K. Britton (eds. ), The Psychology of 
Learning Science, (219-240), Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Eribaum 
Associates, Inc. 
290 
Glynn, S. M., Britton, B. K., Semrud-Clikeman, M. and Muth, K. D. (1989), 
`Analogical Reasoning and Problem Solving in Science Textbooks', in J. Glover, 
R. Ronning and C. Reynolds (eds. ), Handbook of Creativity: Assessment, 
Research and Theory, New York: Plenum Press. 
Glynn, S. M. & Duit, R. (1995), `Learning Science Meaningfully: Constructing 
Conceptual Models', in S. M. Glynn & R. Duit, (eds. ), Learning Science in the 
Schools: Research Reforming Practice (pp. 3-33), Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum 
Associates Ltd. 
Goswami, U. (1989), `Relational Complexity and the Development of Analogical 
Reasoning', Cognitive Development, 4: 251-268. 
Goswami, U. (1992), Analogical Reasoning in Children, Hove, UK: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates Ltd. 
Goswami, U. and Brown, A. L. (1989), `Melting Chocolate and Melting 
Snowmen: Analogical Reasoning and Causal Relations', Cognition, 35: 69-95. 
Goswami, U. and Brown, A. L. (1990), `Higher-order Structure and Relational 
Reasoning: Contrasting Analogical and Thematic Relations', Cognition: 207-226. 
Grosslight, L., Unger, C., Jay, E. and Smith, C. (1991), `Understanding Models 
and their Use in Science: Conceptions of Middle and High School Students and 
Experts', Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 28: 799-822. 
Guesne, E. (1985), `Light', in R. Driver, E. Guesne and A Tiberghien (eds. ), 
Children's Ideas in Science, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Gunstone, R. and Watts, M (1985), `Force and Motion', in R. Driver, E. Guesne 
and A Tiberghien (eds. ), Children's Ideas in Science, Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
Guzetti, B. J. and Glass, G. V. (1992), `Promoting Conceptual Change in Science: 
A Comparative Meta-analysis of Instructional Interventions from Reading 
Education and Science Education', Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
AERA, San Francisco. 
Haladyna, T., Nolen, S. and Haas, N. (1991), `Raising Standardised Achievement 
Test Scores and the Origin of Test Score Pollution', Educational Researcher, 
20(5): 2-7. 
Halpern, D. F., Hansen, C. and Reifer, D. (1990), `Analogies as an Aid to 
Understanding and Memory', Journal of Educational Psychology 
82: 298-305. 
Hammer, D (1996), `Misconceptions or P-prims: How May Alternative 
Perspectives of Cognitive Structure Influence Instructional Perceptions and 
Intentions? ', Journal of the Learning Sciences, 5 (2): 97-127. 
291 
Hammer, D. (2000), `Student Resources for Learning Introductory Physics' 
American Journal of Physics (Physics Education Research Supplement), 67, S45- 
S50. 
Harlen, W (1999), Effective Teaching of Science: A Review of Research, Scottish 
Council for Research in Education, Edinburgh. 
Harrison, A. G. (1994), Is There a Scientific Explanation for Refraction of Light? 
-A Review of Textbook Analogies', Australian Science Teachers Journal, 40: 30- 
35. 
Harrison, A. G. (2001), Thinking and Working Scientifically: The Role of 
Analogical and Mental Models, paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Australian Association for Research in Education, Fremantle, WA, 2-6 December. 
Harrison, A. G. and Treagust, D. (1996), `Secondary Students' Mental Models of 
Atoms and Molecules: Implications for Teaching Chemistry', Science Education 
80,5: 509-534. 
Harrison, A. G., and Treagust, D. F. (2000), `A Typology of School Science 
Models', International Journal of Science Education. 22: 1011-1026. 
Hewitt, P. G. (1987), Conceptual Physics, Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Inc. 
Hewson, P. W. (1982), `A Case Study of Conceptual Change in Special 
Relativity: The Influence of Prior Knowledge in Learning', European Journal of 
Science Education, 4: 61-78. 
Hewson, P. W. and Lemberger (2000), `Status as the Hallmark of Conceptual 
Change', in Millar, R., Leach, J., & Osborne, J (eds. ), Improving Science 
Education (pp. 110-125), Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. 
Hewson, P. W. and Thorley, N. R. (1989), `The Conditions of Conceptual Change 
in the Classroom', International Journal of Science Education, 11 (5): 541-553. 
Hodgson, T. (1995), Secondary Mathematics Modeling: Issues and Challenges', 
School Science and Mathematics, 95: 351-358. 
Howe, A. C. (1996), `Development of Science Concepts within a Vygotskian 
Framework', Science Education, 80 (1): 35-51. 
Hudson, L. (1966), Contrary Imaginations, London: Methuen. 
Hughes, M. (1975), Egocentrism in Pre-School Children, Edinburgh University: 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. 
Iding, MK (1997), `How Analogies Foster Learning from Science Texts', 
Instructional Science, 25: 233-253. 
292 
Inhelder, B. and Piaget, J. (1964), The Early Growth of Logic, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Jara-Guerrero, S. (1993), `Misconceptions on Heat and Temperature', in The 
Proceedings of the Third International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational 
Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Misconceptions Trust, Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983), Mental models, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P. and Sonino-Legrenzi, M. (1972), `Reasoning and 
Sense of Reality', British Journal of Psychology, 63: 395-400. 
Johnston, A. (2000), `A Reconsideration of Science Misconceptions using 
Ontological Categories', A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the National 
Association for Research in Science Teaching April, 2000, New Orleans, 
Louisiana. 
Jung, W. (1986), `Alltagsvorstellungen und das Lernen von Physik und Chemie', 
Naturwissenschaften im Unterricht - Physik/Chemie, 34 (13): 2-6. 
Jung, W. (1989), `Understanding Students' Understanding: The Case of 
Elementary Optics', in J. Novak (ed. ), The Proceedings of the Second 
International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in Science and 
Mathematics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Vol. 3: 268-277. 
Kearney, M. (2002), `Classroom Use of Multimedia-Supported Predict-Observe- 
Explain Tasks to Elicit and Promote Discussion about Students' Physics 
Conceptions', Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Perth: Curtin University of 
Technology. 
Kelly, G. A. (1955), The Psychology of Personal Constructs: A Theory of 
Personality, New York: W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Knorr, Karin. (1981), The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the 
Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Oxford: Pergammon Press. 
Kokinov, B., Hadjiilieva, K., Yoveva, M. (1997), `Explicit vs. Implicit Hint: 
Which One is More Useful? ', in Kokinov, B. (ed. ), Perspectives on Cognitive 
Science, Vol. 3., Sofia: NBU Press. 
Kokinov, B. and Yoveva, M. (1996), `Context Effects on Problem Solving', in 
Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. 
Lane, D. (2003), `Variability Simulation. Connexions', July 14,2003, retrieved 1St 
September 2005 from http: //cnx. rice. edu/content/ml 1194/1.3/. 
293 
Latour, B. (1987), Science in Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lave, J. (1988), Cognition in Practice, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1989), Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Levinson, P. J. and Carpenter, R. L. (1974), `An Analysis of Analogical 
Reasoning on Children', Child Development, 45: 857-861. 
Lin, H. -S., Shiau, B. -R., & Lawrenz, F. (1996), T'he Effectiveness of Teaching 
Science with Pictorial Analogies', Research in Science Education, 26: 495-511. 
Linn, M. C. and Songer, N. B. (1993), `Cognitive and Conceptual Change in 
Adolescence', in D. Edwards, E. Scanlon and D. West (eds. ), Teaching, Learning 
and Assessment in Science Education, London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd.: 
139-170. 
Linn, R. L. (1981), `Curricular Validity: Convincing the Courts that it was Taught 
without Predicting the Possibility of Measuring it', Paper Presented at the Ford 
Foundation Conference, Boston College, MA, October. 
Lipman, M., Sharp, M. and Oscanyan, F. (1980), Philosophy in the Classroom, 2°a 
edition, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Lunzer, E. A. (1965), `Problems of Formal Reasoning in Test Situations', in P. H. 
Mussen (ed. ), European Research in Child Development. Monographs of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 30(2, serial no. 100): 19-46. 
Macnamara, J. (1972), `Cognitive Basis of Language Learning in Infants', 
Psychological Review, 79: 1-13. 
Marton, F. and Neuman, D. (1989), `Constructivism and Constitutionalism. Some 
Implications for Elementary Mathematics Education', Scandinavian Journal of 
Educational Research, 33 (1): 35-46. 
Matthews, M. (1993), `Constructivism and Science Education: Some 
Epistemological Problems', Journal of Science Education and Technology, 2 (1): 
359-369. 
Mayer, R. E. (1979a), `Can Advance Organisers Influence Meaningful Learning', 
Review of Educational Research, 49: 371-383. 
Mayer, R. E. (1979b), `Twenty Years of Research on Advance Organisers: 
Assimilation Theory is Still the Best Predictor of Results', Instructional Science, 
8: 133-167. 
294 
Mayer, R. E. (1983), `Can You Repeat That? Qualitative Effects of Repetition and 
Advance Organizers on Learning from Science Prose', Journal of Educational 
Psychology, 75: 40-49. 
Mayer, RE (1989), `Models for Understanding', Review of Educational Research 
59,1: 43-64. 
McCasland, M. (1987), `Engagement in Learning, Resistance to Schooling: Some 
Implications of Conceptual Teaching', in J. Novak (ed. ), The Proceedings of the 
Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in 
Science and Mathematics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Vol. 1: 311-321. 
McCloskey, M. (1983), "Naive Theories of Motions", in D. Gentner & A. Stevens 
(Eds. ), Mental Models (pp. 289-324), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Mehl M. (1985), `The Cognitive Difficulties of First Year Physics Students at the 
University of the Western Cape and Various Compensatory Programmes', Ph. D. 
Thesis, University of Cape Town. 
Minstrell, J. (1992), Facets of Students' Knowledge and Relevant Instruction, in 
R. Duit, F. Goldberg and H. Niedderer (eds), Research in Physics Learning: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Studies, Proceedings of an International 
Workshop, Bremen, Germany 1991 (Kiel: IPN). 
Minstrell, J. (1999), `Diagnoser: Facets of Students' Thinking' retrieved 7th 
November, 2002 from 
http: //depts. washington. edu/huntlab/diagnoser/facetcode. html#400 
Nasr, R., Hall, S. R. and Garik, P. (2003), `Student Misconceptions in Signals and 
Systems and their Origins', 33rd ASEE/IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference 
November 5-8,2003, Boulder, CO. 
Newman, D., Griffin, P. and Cole, M. (1989), The Construction Zone: Working 
for Cognitive Change in School, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Newton, L. (2003), `The Occurrence of Analogies in Elementary School Science 
Books', Learning and Instruction, 31 (6): 353-375. 
Niedderer, H. (1987), `A Teaching Strategy Based on Students' Alternative 
Frameworks - Theoretical Conceptions and 
Examples', in J. Novak (ed. ), The 
Proceedings of the Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and 
Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University, Vol. 2: 360-367. 
Norman, D. A. (1983), `Some observations on mental models', in D. Gentner and 
A. L. Stevens (eds. ), Mental models, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
295 
Nussbaum, J. and Novick, S. (1982a), `Alternative Frameworks, Conceptual 
Conflict and Accommodation: Toward a Principled Teaching Strategy', 
Instructional Science, 11: 183-200. 
Nussbaum, J. and Novick, S. (1982b), `A Study of Conceptual Change in the 
Classroom', a Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Association 
for Research in Science Teaching, Lake Geneva, Chicago. 
O'Loughlin, M. (1992), `Rethinking Science Education: Beyond Piagetian 
Constructivism Towards a Sociocultural Model of Teaching and Learning', 
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29: 791-820. 
Olsen, D. (1978), In `Open Peer Commentary on C. Brainerd's Article on 
Cognitive Stages', Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 2: 173-213. 
Oppenheimer, R. (1956), `Analogy in Science', American Psychologist: 127-135. 
Paatz, R., Ryder, J., Schwedes, H. and Scott, P (2004), `A Case Study Analysing 
the Process of Analogy-based Learning in a Teaching Unit about Simple Electric 
Circuits', International Journal of Science Education, Volume 26, issue 9: 1065- 
1081(17). 
Parida, B. K. and Goswami, M. (2000), `Using Analogy as a Tool in Science 
Education', School Science, Quarterly Journal of Science Education, 38 (4), 
retrieved 10th October 2003 from 
http: //www. ncert. nic. in/sites/publication/sschap 10. htm 
Pfundt, H and Duit, R. (1991), Bibliography: Students Alternative Frameworks 
and Science Education (3`d Edition), Kiel: IPN - Institute for Science Education. 
Phillips, G. (1990), `The Lake Wobegon Effect', Educational Measurement: 
Issues and Practice, Fall: 3 and 14. 
Piaget, J. (1971), Structualism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Popham, W. J. and Sirotnik, K. A. (1973), Educational Statistics: Use and 
Interpretation, 2°d edition, New York: Harper and Row. 
Pople, S. (1987), Explaining Physics, GCSE Edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Posner, G. J. and Gertzog, W. A. (1982), `The Clinical Interview and the 
Measurement of Conceptual Change', Science Education, 66: 195-209. 
Posner, C. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W. and Gertzog, W. A. (1982), 
`Accommodation of a Scientific Conception: Towards a Theory of 
Conceptual 
Change', Science Education, 66 (2): 211-227. 
QCA (1992), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 2. 
296 
QCA (1993), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 2. 
QCA (1994), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 2. 
QCA (1996), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 1. 
QCA (1997), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 2. 
QCA (1998), National Curriculum Key Stage 3 Science Test, paper 2. 
Redish, E. F. (1994), `The Implications of Cognitive Studies for Teaching 
Physics', American Journal of Physics, 62(6): 796-803. 
Resnick, L. B. 1989, `Introduction' in L. B. Resnick (ed. ), Knowing, learning, and 
instruction, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Association. 
Resnick, L. B. And Resnick, D. P. (1992), `Assessing the Thinking Curriculum: 
New Tools for Educational Reform' in B. R. Gifford and M. C. O'Connor (eds. ), 
Changing Assessments: Alternative Views of Aptitude, Achievement and 
Instruction, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Roschelle, J. (1991), Students' Construction of Qualitative Physics Knowledge: 
Learning about Velocity and Acceleration in a Computer Microworld, 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 
Roschelle, J. (1995), `Learning in Interactive Environments: Prior Knowledge and 
New Experience', Public Institutions for Personal Learning; Establishing a 
Research Agenda, the American Association of Museums. 
Rowell, J. A. and Dawson, C. J. (1985), `Equilibrium, Conflict and Instruction: A 
New Class-Orientated Perspective', European Journal of Science Education, 5: 
203-215. 
Royer, J. M. and Cable, G. W. (1975), `Facilitated Learning in Connected 
Discourse', Journal of Educational Psychology, 67: 116-123. 
Royer, J. M. and Cable, G. W. (1976), `Illustrations, Analogies and Facilitative 
Transfer in Prose Learning', Journal of Educational Psychology, 68: 205-209. 
Shultz, T. (1982), `Rules of causal attribution', Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 47: 1-5 1. 
Schunn, C. D., & Dunbar, K. (1996), `Priming, Analogy, and Awareness in 
Complex Reasoning', Memory & Cognition, 24(3): 271-284. 
Scott, P. H., Asoko, H. M. and Driver, R. H. (1992), `Teaching for Conceptual 
Change; A Review of Strategies', in R. Duit, F. Goldberg and 
H. Niederer (eds. ), 
Research in Physics Learning. Proceedings of an International Workshop, 310- 
329, Kiel, Germany' Institute for Science Education at the University of Kiel. 
297 
Shayer, M., Kucheman, D. E. and Wylam, H. (1976), `The Distribution of 
Piagetian Stages of Thinking in British Middle and Secondary School Children', 
British Journal of Educational Psychology, 46: 164-73. 
Shepard, L. (1991), `Psychometricians' Beliefs about Learning', Educational 
Researcher, 20,7: 2-16. 
Sherin, B. (1999), `Commonsense Clarified: Intuitive Knowledge and its Role in 
Physics Expertise', NARST Annual Meeting. 
Shipstone, D. (1988), `Pupils' understanding of simple electrical circuits: Some 
implications for instruction' Physics Education, 23(2): 92-96. 
Simon, S., Black, P., Browne, M. and Blondel, E. (1994), `Progression in 
Understanding the Equilibrium of Forces', Research Papers in Education, 9 (2): 
249-280. 
Slotta, J. D., Chi, M. T. H., & Joram, E. (1995), `Assessing Students' 
Misclassifications of Physics Concepts: An Ontological Basis for Conceptual 
Change', Cognition and Instruction, 13(3): 373-400. 
Smith, J. P., diSessa, A. A. and Roschelle, J. (1993), 'Misconceptions 
Reconceived: A Constructivist Analysis of Knowledge in Transition', Journal of 
the Learning Sciences, 3(2): 115-163. 
Smith, M. L. (1991), `Put to the Test: The Effects of External Testing on 
Teachers', Educational Researcher, 20(5): 8-11. 
Spiro, R. J., Feltovich, P. J., Coulson, R., and Anderson, D. K. (1989), Multiple 
Analogies for Complex Concepts: Antidotes for Analogy-induced Misconception 
in Advanced Knowledge Acquisition. In S. Vosniadou. and A. Ortony (Eds. ) 
Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Stavy, R. (1991), "Using Analogy to Overcome Misconceptions about 
Conservation of Matter" Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 28(4): 305- 
313. 
Stavy, R. and Berkovitz, B. (1980), `Cognitive Conflict as a Basis for Teaching 
Quantitative Aspects of the Concept of Temperature', Science Education, 64: 679- 
692. 
Stead, K. E. And Osborne, R. J. (1981), `What is Friction: Some Children's 
Ideas', New Zealand Science Teacher, 27: 51-57. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1977), `Component Processes in Analogical Reasoning', 
Psychological Review, 84: 353-378. 
298 
Steinberg, R. N. and Sabella, M. S. (1997), `Performance on Multiple-choice 
Diagnostics and Complementary Exam Problems, The Physics Teacher 35(3): 
150-155. 
Sternberg, R. J. and Rifkin, B. (1979), `The Development of Analogical 
Reasoning Processes', Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 27: 195-232. 
Strang, J. and Shayer, M. (1993), `Enhancing High School Students' Achievement 
in Chemistry Through a Thinking Skills Approach', International Journal of 
Science Education, 15(3): 319-337. 
Strike, K. A. (1987), `Towards a Coherent Constructivism', in J. Novak (ed. ), The 
Proceedings of the Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and 
Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University, Vol. 1: 481-489. 
Strike, K. A., and Posner, G. J. (1992), A Revisionist Theory of Conceptual 
Change, in R. A. Duschl and R. J. Hamilton (eds. ), Philosophy of Science, 
Cognitive Psychology, and Educational Theory and Practice (pp. 147-176), New 
York, State University of New York Press. 
Thiele, R. B. and Treagust, D. F. (1994), `The Nature and Extent of Analogies in 
Secondary Chemistry Textbooks', Instructional Science 22: 61-74. 
Thiele, R. B. and Treagust, D. F. (1995), `Analogies in Chemistry Textbooks', 
International Journal of Science Education, 17: 783-795. 
Thijs, G. D. And Bosch, G. M. (1995), `Cognitive Effects of Science Experiments 
Focusing on Students' Preconceptions of Force: a Comparison of Demonstrations 
and Small-Group Practicals', International Journal of Science Education, 17 (3): 
311-323. 
Tirosh, D., Staby, R. and Cohen, S. (1998), `Cognitive Conflict and Intuitive 
Rules', International Journal of Science Education, 20: 1257-1269. 
Tobin, K. (1989), `Radical Constructivism', An Invited Lecture Presented at 
Florida State University, Panama City, US. 
Toulmin, S. (1972), Human Understanding: Vol. I, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Treagust, D. F., Duit, R., Joslin, P. and Lindauer, I. (1990), A Naturalistic Study 
of Science Teachers' Use of Analogies as Part of their Regular Teaching, Paper 
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, Boston, MA. 
Trumbell, D. (1990), `Introduction', in E. Duckworth, D Hawkins, and A 
Henriques (eds), Science Education: a Minds-on Approach for the Elementary 
Years, Hillsdale NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates: 17-40. 
299 
Tyler, R. (1934), Constructing Achievement Tests, Columbus, OR Ohio State 
University. 
Viennot, L. (1979), `Spontaneous Learning in Elementary Dynamics', European 
Journal of Science Education, 1 (2): 205-221. 
Viennot, L (1985), `Analyzing students' reasoning: Tendencies in Interpretation' 
American Journal of Physics, 53: 432-436. 
Vosniadou, S. (1989a), `Analogical Reasoning as a Mechanism in Knowledge 
Acquisition: A Developmental Perspective', in S. Vosniadou and A. Ortony (eds. ), 
Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Vosniadou, S. (1989b), `On the Nature of Children's Naive Knowledge', 
Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (404- 
411), Hillsdale, NJ, Laurence Erlbaum Associates. 
Vosniadou, S. (1994), `Capturing and Modeling the Process of Conceptual 
Change', Learning and Instruction, 4: 45-69. 
Vosniadou, S. (2002), `Exploring the Relationships between Conceptual Change 
and Intentional Learning', in G. M. Sinatra and P. R. Pintrich (eds. ), Intentional 
Conceptual Change, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962), Thought and Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wandersee, J. H., Mintzes, J. J. and Novak, J. D. (1993), `Research on Alternative 
Conceptions in Science', in D. Gabel (ed. ), Handbook of Research on Science 
Teaching and Learning, New York: Macmillan Publishing. 
Watts, D. M. (1983), `A Study of Schoolchildren's Alternative Frameworks of 
the Concepts of Force', European Journal of Science Education, 5 (2): 217-230. 
Watts, D. M. and Zylbersztajn, A. (1981), `A Survey of Some Children's Ideas 
about Force', Physics Education, 16: 360-365. 
White, R. T. (1985), `Interview Protocols and Dimensions of Cognitive Structure', 
in L. H. T. West and A. L. Pines (eds. ), Cognitive Structure and Conceptual 
Change, New York: Academic Press. 
Wiliam, D. (1998), `The Validity of Teachers' Assessments', Paper Presented to 
Working Group 6 (Research on the Psychology of Maths Teacher Development) 
of the 22nd Annual Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of 
Maths Education, Stellenbosch, SA, July. 
Wittrock, M. C. (1985), `Learning Science by Generating New Conceptions from 
Old Ideas', in L. H. T. West and A. L. Pines (eds. ), Cognitive Structure and 
Conceptual Change, Orlando, Florida, US: Academic Press. 
300 
Wolf, A., Kelson, M> and Silver, R. (1990), Learning in Context: Patterns of Skill 
Transfer & Their Training Implications, R&D monograph series No. 43 
Sheffield: Department of Employment, 1990. 
Wong, E. D. (1993), `Understanding the Generative Capacity of Analogies as a 
Tool for Explanation', Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30: 1259-1272. 
Zeitoun, H. H. (1984), `Teaching Scientific Analogies: A Proposed Model, 
Research in Science and Technology Education, 2: 107-125. 
Zylbersztajn, A. and Watts, D. M. (1982) `Throwing Some Light on Colour', 
Mimeograph, University of Surrey, Guildford. 
301 
Appendix la Pilot study bridging analogies used for 
experimental group (1999-2000) 
A book resting on a table. 
What force or forces are acting on the book? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
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Your friend says that the table is pushing up on the book as well as gravity pulling 
down on the book? How much sense does that make on a scale of I-5 (where 5 is 
`it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 1 is `it makes no sense')? 
Experiment 1 Push down on the spring with your hand. Does the spring feel as 
though it is pushing up on your hand? 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 
1 is `it makes no sense')? 
Experiment 2 
. _. .. ýr... a...... _:.. .. ý-ý -. _ .-. 
How much sense does it make to say that the spring pushes up on the book as 
well as gravity pulling down on the book - on a scale of I-5 (where 5 is `it 
makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 1 is `it makes no sense')? 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' 
and 1 is `it makes no sense')? 
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When the book is balanced on the spring, the spring compresses. The further down 
the spring is pushed, the more it pushes back. The spring is compressed by the 
book to the point where it pushes back with a force equal to the book's weight. 
For example, if the book weighs 5N then the spring will compress until it is 
pushing up with a force of 5N. Similarly, if the book weighs ION then the spring 
will compress until it is pushing up with a force of ION. 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 
1 is `it makes no sense')? 
Many people say that the book on the spring is different from the book on the 
table. They say that the spring compresses but the table is rigid. Is the table rigid? 
Experiment three Balance the plastic ruler on the blocks. Put a book on the 
ruler. 
What happens to the ruler? 
Now try the wooden ruler with the same book. Is there any difference? 
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The rulers both bend but the wooden one is less bendy. They both bend until they 
push up with a force equal to the books weight. The wooden ruler does not have to 
bend as far as the plastic ruler. 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 
1 is `it makes no sense')? 
You can think of the ruler as being like the table. It is just that the table is not as 
bendy as the rulers - even the wooden one. The table bends a tiny little bit because 
of the weight of the book. 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 
1 is `it makes no sense')? 
The table is made of particles which are joined to other particles by bonds which 
are 'springy'. If you could look at the table under the book using a microscope 
you would see that the table bends very slightly. The table, just like the spring and 
the rulers is compressed and pushes upwards against the book. It pushes upwards 
with a force that is just equal to the book's weight. 
Now how much sense does it make to say that the table pushes up on the book on 
a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 
1 is `it makes no sense')? 
To summarise, everything is springy, even a table. Gravity pulls down on the book 
and the table pushes up on the book with a force equal to the book's weight. 
How much sense does this explanation make on a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is `it 
makes a lot of sense', 3 is `it makes some sense' and 1 is `it makes no sense')? 
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Appendix Ib Pilot study control group work (1999-2000) 
If forces on an object are balanced then there is no change in speed in that 
direction. 
If the object is still, it will not start moving. If it is moving to begin with, it carries 
on in a straight line at the same speed until the forces become unbalanced. This is 
Newton's 1St law. 
Some examples of balanced forces are: 
1. 
The block is being pulled but the force due to friction is equal to the pull but in the 
opposite direction and so the forces are balanced and the block does not move. 
2. 
A book on a table 
The book on the table has the force due to gravity acting on it which is exactly 
balanced by the force of the table pushing up on the book. 
3. 
In the tug-of-war, the rope has two pulling forces acting on it - one 
from each 
person. If the forces are balanced then the rope will not move. 
306 
4. 
The floating block has its weight pulling it down and the force of the water 
pushing it up (this is called the upthrust). The two forces are balanced and so the 
block stays still. 
5. 
The object has its weight pulling it down and the stretched spring pulling it up. 
The two forces are balanced and so the object stays still. 
6. 
The force of gravity pulling the boy down is balanced by the force of the chair 
pushing up on him. The boy does not move. 
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Some practical examples of forces in balance 
Push the block gently against the wall with the springs in position. See how much 
the springs are squashed. Are they squashed by the same amount or is one 
squashed more than the other? 
Push the block gently against the wall with the push-meters in place. Note the 
readings on the push-meters. What are they? 
Now push a bit harder. What can you say about the readings now? 
2. 
Attach a piece of string to two newton-meters and pull gently. Note the readings 
on the newton-meters. What are they? 
Now pull a bit harder. What are the readings? 
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Some questions on balanced forces 
1. 
(QCA, 1997) 
(a) Megan's dog is pulling on his lead. 
Which arrow, A, B, C or D, shows the direction of this force? 
Give the letter. 
(b) Megan has to pull to keep the dog still. 
Which arrow shows the direction of this force? Give the letter. 
(c) Suddenly the dog's collar breaks. 
(QCA, 1997) 
(i) When the collar breaks, the lead moves. 
Draw an arrow on the diagram to show which way the lead starts to move. 
(ii) Why does the lead move when the collar breaks? 
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2. In a storm, a small ship was blown onto a beach. Now it is calm and 
there is no wind. A tugboat is trying to pull the ship off the beach. 
beach 
tugl 
(QCA, 1996) 
The tugboat pulls the ship with a force of 25 000 N. 
The ship does not move because of the force of friction acting on it. 
(i) Tick one statement to show the size of the frictional force acting 
on the ship. 
Zero 
more than zero but less than 25 000 N 
25 000 N 
more than 25 000 N 
(ii) Add an arrow to the drawing to show the direction of the frictional 
force acting on the ship. 
3. 
(QCA, 1997) 
A railway 
engine is being 
used to try to 
pull a wagon 
along a level track. 
move. 
The wagon's brakes are on, and the wagon does not 
(i) Draw one arrow on the diagram to show the direction of the force 
which prevents the wagon from moving. 
(ii) Is the force which prevents the wagon from moving greater than, 
equal to or less than the pull of the engine? 
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Appendix Ic Pilot study questions including (in italics) how 
each was marked (1999-2000) 
SOME QUESTIONS ON FORCES 
In each of the questions, I want you to think carefully about any forces which 
could be acting on or influencing the object. Sometimes you are asked to carefully 
draw on the diagram any force or forces which are acting on the object. Remember 
to use an arrow to show the direction of any force and also remember that the 
length of the line gives an idea of the size of the force. After each question you 
will be asked about how sure you were about the answer to the question. Try to be 
truthful. 
1. An apple hanging on a tree 
What force or forces are acting on the apple (forget about 
wind blowing or air pressure). 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that 
you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure). 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
2 
A book resting on a table. 
What force or forces are acting on the book? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you 
label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 
1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite 
directions are drawn). 
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3. Jenny is holding a dictionary on her outstretched hand. Gravity is pulling down 
on the dictionary. When she holds it perfectly still, does her hand push up on 
the dictionary? 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
4. You push down on a bedspring with your hand. After you push the spring down 
by 10cm, you hold the spring down, keeping your hand still. While you are 
holding your hand still, does the spring push against your hand? 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
_ 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
5. Alice and Ben are pulling on a rope. The rope is not moving. 
What force or forces are acting on the rope? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
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6. Alice goes home and Ben ties the rope to a sturdy tree. He pulls on the rope and he, the rope and the tree do not move. 
What force or forces are acting on the rope? 
- - 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
7. A large box on wheels stands on the ground. Sara tries to push it along the floor 
but it does not move. 
What horizontal (not up and down) force(s) are acting on the crate as Sara tries to 
push it along? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of I-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
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8. Sam is pushing a block against a wall. Sam, the block and the wall do not 
move. 
What force or forces are acting on the 
block? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
9 
(QCA, 1998) 
lift 
The lift is between floors and not moving. Draw any forces acting on the lift on 
the diagram. Remember to put arrow(s) on to show the direction. Label any forces 
with their name(s). If you have drawn one force, what can you say about its size? 
If you have drawn more than one force, what can you say about their sizes? 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is very 
sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn). 
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10. 
The man is floating as he is swimming 
forwards. Draw any forces acting on 
the man on the diagram. Remember to 
put arrow(s) on to show the direction. 
Label any forces with their name(s). If 
you have drawn one force, what can 
you say about its size? If you have 
drawn more than one force, what can 
you say about their sizes? 
(QCA, 1992) 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is very 
sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(IOi Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn, 
IOii Counted as correct if the two forces are indicated to be the same size). 
11. 
outboard motor 
(QCA, 1992) 
The boat is floating and not moving forwards or backwards (the outboard motor is 
off). Draw any forces acting on the boat on the diagram Remember to put arrow(s) 
on to show the direction. Label any forces with their name(s). If you have drawn 
one force, what can you say about its size? If you have drawn more than one force, 
what can you say about their sizes? 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 (where 5 is very 
sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(11 i Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are 
drawn, 
11 ii Counted as correct if the two forces are indicated to be the same size). 
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12. 
(QCA, 1993) 
The drawing shows a woman sitting in 
a chair. 
The springs in the chair are similar to 
each other. 
(a) Which spring has the greatest force acting on it? 
(b) Explain your answer. 
(c) In which direction do the springs push the woman? 
(d) When the woman gets up what happens to the springs? 
How sure are you that your answers are right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(12c counted as correct if right direction is given). 
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13. A space rocket is on the launch pad. The engines start and an upward force is 
produced on the rocket. 
(a) If the upward force of the engines is less than the weight of the rocket, 
what will happen to the motion of the rocket? 
(b) If the upward force equals the weight of the rocket, what will happen to the 
motion of the rocket? 
(c) if the upward force is greater than the weight of the rocket, what will happen to 
the motion of the rocket? 
How sure are you that your answers are right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(13b counted as correct if a `no motion' answer is given). 
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14. 
sea bed 
(QCA, 1994) 
Forces act on the submarine when it is at rest on the sea bed. The water is still and 
the propellers are not turning. 
Carefully draw arrows from the central dot to show two of these forces. 
How sure are you that your answer is right on a scale of 1-5 
(where 5 is very sure, 3 is fairly sure and 1 is very unsure)? 
(14i Counted as correct if two forces in opposite directions are drawn, 
14ii Counted as correct if the two forces are indicated to be the same size). 
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Appendix le Sense ratings for the bridging analogy 
approach (Forces 1- pilot study, 1999-2000) 
The numbers refer to the sense rating (1-5) of how much sense the scientific statement 
makes at the various stages of the bridging analo a roach 
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3 5 4 4 2 4 3 4 
3 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 
3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
5 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 
3 4 4 3 3 2 5 5 
5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4.5 
3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 4 3 3 4 5 5 5 
5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
3 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
5 5 3 4 4 4 4 5 
5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix If End of year seven physics results for cohorts in 
research 
Cohort Grou I(%) Group 2 
1999- 2000 77.9 77.9 
2000 -2001 65.3 65.5 
2002 - 2003 76.3 72.8 
2003 - 2004 68.5 64.5 
Appendix Ig Key stage 2 results for end of year six 
English results - key stage 2 
Levels Below 3 3 4 5 
Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS 
1999 7 0 20 0 48 52 22 48 
2000 6 0 17 0 46 37 29 63 
2002 6 0 17 0 46 10 29 90 
2003 7 0 17 3 48 21 27 76 
Nat. = national results (rows do not add up to 100% because of absent and 
disapplied pupils. RS = research school results 
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Mathematics results - key stage 2 
Levels Below 3 3 4 5 
Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS 
1999 6 0 23 4 45 65 24 30 
2000 5 0 21 0 47 40 24 60 
2002 5 0 20 0 46 30 27 70 
2003 6 0 20 3 44 26 29 71 
Nat. = national results (rows do not add up to 100% because of absent and 
disapplied pupils. RS = research school results 
Science results - key stage 2 
Levels Below 3 3 4 5 
Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS Nat. RS 
1999 3 0 16 9 51 61 27 30 
2000 3 0 11 0 50 43 34 57 
2002 2 0 9 0 49 30 38 70 
2003 2 0 10 0 46 34 41 66 
Nat. = national results (rows do not add up to 100% because of absent and. 
disapplied pupils. RS = research school results 
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Appendix IIa Bridging analogies used for experimental 
group, 
and control group work (2000-2001) 
HEAT 1 THERMAL EQUILIBRIUM - experimental hup work 
PNee1 
WHY DO METALS FEEL COLD? 
Experiment : Touch a piece of metal and a cork mat. Which one feels warmer? 
Question : Why does metal feel colder than the cork? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it 
away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than the 
cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Page 
Experiment : 
metal rod 
Which pea would drop off first? 
Why? 
glass rod 
tied pea 
HEAT 
Watch the experiment. What happens? 
Discussion : 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than the 
cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it 
away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than the 
cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Page 3 
Experiment : 
mete 
temperature 
probe 
of wate 
beaker lat 
Which cools quicker -a beaker of hot water on a cork mat or one on a metal 
mat (both beakers have lids). 
Watch the experiment. What happens? 
Discussion : 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than 
the cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than 
the cork 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Explanation : Metal is good conductor of heat but cork is a poor conductor of 
heat. The metal rapidly conducts the heat away from the hot water so it cools 
down quickly. Cork does not conduct the heat away very quickly and so the 
water stays hotter longer in this beaker. Our hands are similar to hot water in 
that they are warmer than room temperature. Heat is quickly removed from our 
hands by metal but not by cork. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than the 
cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it away 
and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than the 
cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
Experiment : Take the temperature of a block of metal and a large cork. What are 
the temperatures? 
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WHY DO METALS FEEL COLD? - control group work 
Experiment : Touch a piece of metal and a cork mat. Which one feels warmer? 
Experiment : Take the temperature of a block of metal and a large cork. What 
can you say about the temperatures? 
Explanation : Metal is a good conductor of heat but cork is a poor conductor of 
heat. The metal rapidly conducts the heat away from our hands so it feels cool. 
Cork does not conduct the heat away very quickly and so it feels hotter. If 
anything is left for long enough at room temperature, it will end up at room 
temperature. Heat is quickly removed from our hands by metal but not by cork. 
Write up these experiments and answer the following questions. 
Questions : 
1. Why does a garden spade's wooden handle feel warmer than the metal spade 
part? 
2. Why does a concrete floor feel colder than a carpet? 
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RADIATION AND ABSORPTION - experimental group work 
Page 1 
ARE GOOD ABSORBERS OF HEAT ALSO GOOD 
RADIATORS OF HEAT? 
When objects are hotter than their surroundings, they give out (radiate) more 
heat than they take in (absorb), e. g. a cup of hot water cools down. When 
objects are cooler than their surroundings, they absorb more heat than they 
radiate, e. g. food warms up in a cooker. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1- 
5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
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Pie 2 
Think about this. In general, do you think that people who are good at 
throwing balls are good at catching them? 
Discussion : 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is 
`very good sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
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Think of the balls as packets of energy that can be thrown and caught. 
Discussion : 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is 
`very good sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
330 
Page 4 
Explanation : 
When heat is radiated, it can be thought of as being thrown out in little 
packets. Objects that can throw out well (radiate well) can also catch heat 
well (absorb well). 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is 
`very good sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
Experiment : 
Watch the radiation and absorption experiments. Are good radiators also good 
absorbers? 
What type of surface is a good absorber? 
What type of surface is a poor absorber? 
What type of surface is a good radiator? 
What type of surface is a poor radiator? 
331 
ARE GOOD ABSORBERS OF HEAT ALSO GOOD RADIATORS 
OF HEAT? - control group work 
When objects are hotter than their surroundings, they give out (radiate) more heat 
than they take in (absorb), e. g. a cup of hot water cools down. When objects are 
cooler than their surroundings, they absorb more heat than they radiate, e. g. food 
warms up in a cooker. 
Experiments : Watch the radiation and absorption experiments. 
The conclusion is that 
Questions : 
1. Why are fire-fighters suits made of shiny material? 
2. Why is the back of a refrigerator painted black? 
3. What colour car do you think feels hottest inside on a hot, sunny day? 
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SCATTERING AND REFLECTION 
LIGHT - SCATTERING AND REFLECTION- 
experimental group work 
Pagel 
Question : We can see this piece of paper. How can we see it? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see 
the sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Experiment : 
1. Mark a line on the paper along the front of the board. 
2. Place the ball on the X. 
3. Roll the ball towards A and make sure it bounces off. 
4. When the ball stops, mark its position with an X. 
5. Join the crosses to A. 
6. Repeat the experiment using spot B making sure that the ball starts 
from the same place. 
7. Remove the board and carry on the bounced-off lines backwards. If this was 
a mirror, where the lines meet would be the position of the image. 
\\ 
B 
Discussion : XX 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of paper. 
How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is 
`very good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because 
the roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see 
the sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Experiment : In this experiment do the same as in the last experiment. 
1. Mark a line on the paper along the front of the board. 
2. Place the ball on the X. 
3. Roll the ball towards A and make sure it bounces off. 
4. When the ball stops, mark its position with an X. 
5. Join the crosses to A. 
6. Repeat the experiment using spot B making sure that the ball starts from the 
same place. 
7. Remove the board and carry on the bounced-off lines backwards. Now you can 
see that the lines do not meet. There is no image but the ball has bounced off 
the surfaces according to the laws of reflection. 
A 
B 
X 
Discussion : 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of paper. 
How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go in all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see the sheet of 
paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Explanation : Look at the magnified picture of paper. See how rough it is. Look 
at the magnified picture of a mirror. See how smooth that is. Each little bit of 
paper reflects like a mirror but each bit is at an angle to the others because of its 
roughness so no image is seen. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of paper. How 
can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see the sheet of 
paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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LIGHT - SCATTERING AND RELECTION - control group work 
Question : We can see this piece of paper. How can we see it? 
Explanation :A mirror's surface is very smooth and the light is reflected so we 
can see an image (remember last year's work? ). A piece of paper is actually very 
rough - look at the difference between the mirror and paper using the flexcam. 
Although each ray of light follows the rules of reflection and some of the rays 
bounce off the paper into your eyes, the roughness means that you cannot see an 
image of yourself in the paper. Carefully draw the diagram, making sure that each 
ray follows the law of reflection. 
Questions : 
1. How can we see the Moon when it does not give out any light of its own? 
2. Why can we not see this piece of paper in the dark? 
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COLOUR FILTERS- experimental group work 
Page 1 
COLOURED PIECES OF PLASTIC 
Experiment : Look at a white screen through the red piece of plastic. What 
colour does the screen look? 
Question : Why does the screen look red? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. The red colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving only 
red. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Paget 
Experiment : Use the piece of plastic paper and funnel to separate the sand and 
water. See how the filter paper holds the sand while the water goes through. 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does the screen look red? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. The red colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving only 
red. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Experiment : Make a good spectrum of colour using the prism, lens and ray box. 
Place a red piece of plastic between the prism and screen. Look at the screen. What 
colours can you see? 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does the screen look red? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. The red colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving only 
red. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Explanation : Red pieces of plastic allow only red light to go through them and 
they absorb all the other colours. White light is made of several colours, most of 
which are absorbed by the red piece of plastic. Just the red goes through. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does the screen look red? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. The red colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving only 
red. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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COLOUR FILTERS - control group work 
Colour filters can be made from pieces of coloured but see-though plastic. They 
allow some colours of light through but absorb and do not let through other 
colours of light. White light from a lamp is made up of several colours and 
sunlight can be separated into its `rainbow' colours. 
If we shine white light at a blue filter, the filter will let the blue light through and 
absorb all the other colours. 
Red 
Orange 
Yellow blue 
WHITE Green 
Blue 
Indigo 
Violet Blue filter absorbs 
red, orange, yellow, 
green, indigo and 
violet 
What will happen with a green filter? Complete the diagram. 
WHITE 
Red 
Orange 
Yellow 
Green 
Blue 
Indigo 
Violet 
--ý 
I 
--> 
Green filter absorbs 
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What will happen with a red filter? Complete the diagram. 
WHITE 
Red 
Orange 
Yellow 
Green 
Blue 
Indigo 
Violet 
I 
-> 
Red filter absorbs 
If a blue filter lets through only blue light, then what happens if I look at a red 
object through a blue filter? The object normally looks red because it reflects only 
red light and absorbs any other colours of light. Some of the red light that is 
reflected off the red object goes to the blue filter and is absorbed so no light gets 
through the filter. The object looks black. 
White light 
(R, O, Y, G, B, I+V) 
eye 
blue filter 
red object 
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What will happen with a red filter and a blue object? Complete the diagram. 
White light 
(R, O, Y, G, B, I+V) 
eye 
red filter 
blue object 
What will happen with a red filter and a red object? Complete the diagram. 
White light 
(R, O, Y, G, B, I+V) 
eye 
red filter 
red object 
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BALANCED FORCES - experimental group work 
Pagel 
A book resting on a table. 
Question : What force or forces are acting on the book? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the way 
to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes upwards 
on the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Page 
Experiment 1 Push down on the spring with your hand. Does the spring feel as 
though it is pushing up on your hand? 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again about the book on the table. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the way 
to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes upwards on 
the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Pa2c 
Experiment two Balance a heavy book on the spring. 
What happens to the spring? 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again about the book on the table. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the way 
to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes upwards on 
the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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The table is made of particles which are joined to other particles by bonds which 
are `springy' . 
If you could look at the table under the book using a microscope 
you would see that the table bends very slightly. The table, just like the spring is 
compressed and pushes upwards against the book. It pushes upwards with a force 
that is just equal to the book's weight. 
To summarise, everything is springy, even a table. Gravity pulls down on the book 
and the table pushes up on the book with a force equal to the book's weight. 
Sense : Think about the first question again about the book on the table. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just in the way 
to stop the book falling. 
b. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes upwards on 
the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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BALANCED FORCES - control group work 
If forces on an object are balanced then there is no change in speed in that 
direction. 
If the object is still, it will not start moving. If it is moving to begin with, it carries 
on in a straight line at the same speed until the forces become unbalanced. This is 
Newton's 1St law. 
Some examples of balanced forces are: 
The block is being pulled but the force due to friction is equal to the pull but in the 
opposite direction and so the forces are balanced and the block does not move. 
2. 
A book on a table 
The book on the table has the force due to gravity acting on it which is exactly 
balanced by the force of the table pushing up on the book. 
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3. 
In the tug-of-war, the rope has two pulling forces acting on it - one from each 
person. If the forces are balanced then the rope will not move. 
4. 
The floating block has its weight pulling it down and the force of the water 
pushing it up (this is called the upthrust). The two forces are balanced and so the 
block stays still. 
5. 
The object has its weight pulling it down and the stretched spring pulling it up. 
The two forces are balanced and so the object stays still. 
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6. 
The force of gravity pulling the boy down is balanced by the force of the chair 
pushing up on him. The boy does not move. 
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Some practical examples of forces in balance 
Push the block gently against the wall with the springs in position. See how much 
the springs are squashed. Are they squashed by the same amount or is one 
squashed more than the other? 
Now push a bit harder. What can you say about the readings now? 
2. 
Attach a piece of string to two newton-meters and pull gently. Note the readings 
on the newton-meters. What are they? 
Now pull a bit harder. What are the readings? 
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STRETCHING THINGS - experimental group work 
Pagel 
Question :A 10cm spring has a 2N weight hung on it and it stretches by 3cm to 
13cm. A 20cm spring, identical to the 10cm spring except for its length, needs to 
be stretched by 6cm to 26cm. 
I 
13 
2N 
20cm 26cm 
?N 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. 2N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because the 2N 
weight stretched the 10cm spring by 3cm. Each 10cm of the spring is stretched 
by 3cm. 
b. 4N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because it needs to 
be stretched twice as far as the 10cm spring and that will need twice the weight. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Paffe 2 
Experiment : Pull a short piece of elastic as hard as you can. How much does it 
stretch? 
Starting length Final length 
_ 
Amount stretched 
Now imagine that you had a longer length of elastic and you pulled it as hard as 
you could. Do you think that the stretch would be more or the same as for the 
shorter length? Remember that it is the amount of stretch that we are thinking 
about. 
Try it and see. 
Starting length Final length Amount stretched 
Is the stretch more or the same as for the shorter length? 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again -a 10cm spring has a 2N weight 
hung on it and it stretches by 3cm to 13cm. A 20cm spring, identical to the 10cm 
spring except for its length, needs to be stretched by 6cm to 26cm. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. 2N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because the 2N 
weight stretched the 10cm spring by 3cm. Each 10cm of the spring is stretched 
by 3cm. 
b. 4N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because it needs to 
be stretched twice as far as the 10cm spring and that will need twice the weight. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Experiment : 
newtonmeter 
Use a newtonmeter to pull a 10cm length of elastic with a force of 4N. 
Starting length Final length Amount stretched 
Now use a newtonmeter to pull a 20cm piece of elastic using a 4N force. 
Starting length Final length Amount stretched 
Look at the dot half way along the 20cm piece of elastic (at 10cm). How far has 
the dot moved from the starting position? 
Discussion 
Sense : Think about the first question again -a 10cm spring has a 2N weight 
hung on it and it stretches by 3cm to 13cm. A 20cm spring, identical to the 10cm 
spring except for its length, needs to be stretched by 6cm to 26cm. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. 2N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because the 2N 
weight stretched the 10cm spring by 3cm. Each 10cm of the spring is stretched 
by 3 cm. 
b. 4N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because it needs to 
be stretched twice as far as the 10cm spring and that will need twice the weight. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Explanation : Substances are made up of particles held together by bonds. When 
these bonds feel a force pulling on them, they stretch and the particles move apart a 
little. Whatever the length of the substance, each bond feels the same pulling force 
(as long as the thickness of the substance has not changed). So, if we hang a weight 
on a piece of elastic, each part of the elastic will stretch a certain amount whatever 
the length of the elastic. A 20cm piece of elastic will stretch twice as much as a 10 
cm length because each 10cm part of the length will stretch by the same amount. 
The stretching of a spring works in a similar way. 
Sense : Think about the first question again -a 10cm spring has a 2N weight hung 
on it and it stretches by 3cm to 13cm. A 20cm spring, identical to the 10cm spring 
except for its length, needs to be stretched by 6cm to 26cm. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a. 2N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because the 2N 
weight stretched the 10cm spring by 3cm. Each 10cm of the spring is stretched 
by 3cm. 
b. 4N needs to be hung on the 20cm spring to stretch it by 6cm because it needs to 
be stretched twice as far as the 10cm spring and that will need twice the weight. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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STRETCHING THINGS - control group 
Experiment : Hang a 4N weight on the spring. How much does it stretch? 
Now hang a 4N weight on a spring of twice the length. How much does it stretch? 
What can you say about the stretch for both springs? 
Does this work when the weight is 2N? 
A spring will stretch by a certain amount when we hang a weight on it. It will 
stretch more if it is longer to start with because each part of the spring feels the 
same stretching force. A longer spring will stretch more when the same weight is 
hung on it. 
Examples 
1. A 12cm spring stretches by 3cm when a weight is hung on it. How much will a 
24cm spring stretch by if it has the same weight hung on it? 
2. A 20cm spring stretches by 10cm when 5N is hung on it. How much does each 
1 cm stretch by? 
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Appendix IIc Test Questions (2000-20001) 
SOME QUESTIONS - (THERMAL EQUILIBRIUM) HEAT 1 
1. Sonia touched a metal clamp stand in the lab. and noticed that it felt colder than 
the bench it was on. She wondered why as she had not started doing any 
experiments and neither had anyone else. She decided to try other objects and she 
found that all the metal objects felt colder than all the wooden objects. Why do 
you think this was? 
How sure are you about your answer on a scale of 1-5, where 'I' is `not at all 
sure', `3' is `fairly sure' and `5' is `very sure'? 
2. Vicky was investigating how quickly ice cubes melt. She decided to put 
identical ice cubes on different surfaces. She put one on a metal surface and 
one on a polystyrene surface. Which do you think will melt first? 
Why do you think this? 
How sure are you about your answer on a scale of 1-5, where 'I' is `not at all 
sure', `3' is `fairly sure' and `5' is `very sure'? 
3. Simon was doing an experiment to see how quickly objects cooled. He left 
equal sized and shaped hot pieces of copper metal and cork on a bench and 
took their temperatures as they cooled. When he came to the lesson the 
following week, he again took their temperatures. What do you think he found? 
How sure are you about your answer on a scale of 1-5, where 'I' is `not at all 
sure', `3' is `fairly sure' and `5' is `very sure'? 
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SOME QUESTIONS - (RADIATION/ABSORPTION) HEAT 2 
1. Why does wearing pale colours in hot, sunny weather help to keep us cool? 
2. Why does it help to keep tea warm if the teapot is shiny on the outside? 
3. A house is in a country where it is very hot and sunny in the day and very cold 
at night. It is painted white on the outside. How does this help : 
i. in the hot, sunny day? 
ii. at night-time? 
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SOME QUESTIONS - (SCATTERING/REFLECTION) LIGHT 1 
1. Sara asked Jenny why she could see a book when the book does not shine. Can 
you help Jenny with her answer? 
2. Look at this diagram. The torch is shining on the white wall-papered wall and 
none of the light from the torch can directly reach the white object in the 
corner. There is no other light source at all. Can we see the object? Explain 
your answer. 
White wall paper 
Torch 
White object 
3. My wooden door looked rather dull so I painted it. The painted door was a 
similar-coloured brown but now it looked shiny and I could see a fuzzy reflection 
of the light bulb in it. Can you explain why the door looked different before and 
after painting? 
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SOME QUESTIONS - (COLOUR) LIGHT 2 
1. Alex was looking at a white sheet of paper while she was wearing sunglasses 
which had blue lenses. The sheet of paper looked blue. Can you explain why? 
2. Emma was using a see-through green piece of plastic to look at a blue circle. 
What colour do you think the circle appeared to be? 
Why is it this colour? 
3. A mixture of blue and red light are shone at a see-through blue piece of 
plastic. What does the blue plastic do to these colours of light? 
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SOME QUESTIONS ON FORCES FORCES 1 
In each of the questions, I want you to think carefully about any forces which 
could act on or influence the object. Sometimes you are asked to carefully draw on 
the diagram any force or forces which act on the object. Remember to use an 
arrow to show the direction of any force and also remember that the length of the 
line gives an idea of the size of the force. 
1. An apple hanging on a tree 
ý. 
ýýý, 
ý 'i 
%''' 
________ý'_'-f ; ', 
'r 
ýý ! ýý 
What force or forces are acting on the apple (forget about wind blowing or air 
pressure). 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
2. A book resting on a table. 
What force or forces are acting 
on the book? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
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3. Ben ties the rope to a sturdy tree. He pulls on the rope and he, the rope and the 
tree do not move. 
._ 
What force or forces are acting on the rope? 
Draw the force or forces on the diagram making sure that you label them. 
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SOME QUESTIONS ON STRETCHING 
1. Sarah found that a 5cm spring stretched to 7cm when she hung a weight on it. 
She took a 10cm spring (identical to the first one except for the length) and 
hung the same weight on it. What do you think the new length was? 
2. The graph shows the length (not the extension) of a spring with different 
weights on it. 
Graph of length of spring against weight 
E 
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U) 
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1/' iIi 
+-----'-- --------- F--------i------- "-F ------- 1---------r---"---7 
J__________J__________L__________ 
+- -------4--- ---- ý----'----i---------- F--------'1---- - ---r---------1 
0123456 
weight (N) 
Sketch on the graph what you would find if your spring was only 2cm long to 
begin with. The first dot is shown. 
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3. Alex has a box with a lid which she wants to hold secure with a rubber band. 
She finds that a 20cm rubber band is just the right tightness when stretched 
round the box. It has to stretch to 30cm. 
10cm 
5cm 
1st box 
bber band 
rubber band 
Ocm 2nd box 
She then takes another box and finds that the rubber band has to stretch to 60cm. 
She wants the same tightness of rubber band as for the first box. All the rubber 
bands she has are exactly the same except for their original length. Should she 
choose: 
a. a 50cm rubber band because to be the right tightness, the band will need to 
stretch 10cm so a5 0cm band will stretch to 60cm. 
b. a 40cm band because to be the right tightness, the band will stretch by 10cm for 
each 20cm of band so a 40cm band will stretch to 60cm. 
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Appendix lid Test marks for pre-, post- and retention tests 
(2000-2001) (shaded areas are the control group) 
upil 
ti 
heat 1 heat 2 light 1 light 2 forces 1 forces 2 
1 0.0 9.0 0.5 0.5 2,0 2.0 3.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.0 15 '0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 0.5 0-0 0.5 , 0.5 1.5 2.0 -0.5 0.0 1,0 0.5 0.5 00 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 0.0 2.0 2.5 -0.5 25J 4.01 3.5 0.5 
4 0.5 1.0 05 U. S 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 0,0 2.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
5 0.0 1.5 1: 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.0 -1.5 1,51 0.51 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
6 0.0 2.5 2.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 2.0 -2.0 1.5 1.51 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 0-0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 1: 5 00 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
8 0.5 1: 0 1,0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.51 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
9 0.0 2,0 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
10 0.5 6,5 1,5 -1,0 3.0 2.5 2.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 0,5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 
11 0,0 1: 0 1.0 ° 0.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 0.5 1,5 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
12 0.5 1,5 1.0 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 to 2.0 . 
2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 
14 0.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 00 2.0 3.0 -1.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 
15 0.0 1.5 2.0 -0.5 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 2.0 25 2.5 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.5 -0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 
Ö. Ö 2.0 3,0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
17 0.0 2.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 3.0 3.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 , 
1.0 2.0 3.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
18 0`0 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
19 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 1-0 1.0 0.0 
20 0.5 2.0 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 
21 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 2.0 °-1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
22 0.0 0.5 2.0 -1.5 0.0 1.5 0.5 1,0 0.0 1.0 0.5 05 3.0 
1 2.01 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
23 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.0 -2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
24 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 
u il 
heat 1 heat 2 light 1 light 2,: forces 1 forces 2 
25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 "0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
26 1.0 1.0 0.0 10 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
27 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 
28 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 Z5 2.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
29 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.5 2.5 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
30 0.5 0.5 1.0 -0,5 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 2.0 45 0.0 2.0 
0.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
31 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.5 3.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
32 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 2,5 1.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 
33 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 -1.0 OA 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 
34 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2,5 12-0 1 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 
35 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
36 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.5 0.0 2.01 2.5 -0.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 0,0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
37 0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 
-1.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 -1.0 0,01 0.01 0.0 0.0 
38 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 0.5 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
39 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 -2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
40 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 ' 0.0 3.0 3.0 0.0 
41 0.5 00 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.5 4.0 1.5 - 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 
1 ° 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
42 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.0 . 2.0 2.5 2.5 0,0 10 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1,5 -0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 
43 1.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 2: 0 2.5 2.0 0.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 0.5 0.0 
2.0 3.0 -1,0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
44 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2,0 1,5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 
45 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
46 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 -1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
47 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.5 3.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 
48 1.0 0.0 1.0 -1 0 2.0 4.0 3.0 1,0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
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Appendix IIIa Bridging analogies used (2002-2003) 
WHY DO METALS FEEL COLD? HEAT I 
Experiment : Touch a piece of metal and a cork mat. Which one feels warmer? 
Question : Why does metal feel colder than the cork? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and takes it 
away and cork does not do 
this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature than the 
cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Experiment : 
metal rod 
HEAT 
Which pea would drop off first? 
Why? 
Watch the experiment. What happens? 
lass rod 
dried pea held on 
with vaseline 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than 
the cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature 
than the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make 
and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this 
experiment help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not 
changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Experiment : 
metal n 
temperature 
probe 
hot 
water 
beaker 
Which will warm up quicker - the cork mat or the metal mat? 
Watch the experiment. What happens? 
Drk 
iat 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than 
the cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature 
than the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make 
and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this 
experiment help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not 
changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Experiment : 
meta 
I mat 
temperature 
probe 
hot 
wate 
; ork 
nat 
beaker 
Which will cool quicker -a beaker of hot water on a cork mat or one on a metal 
mat? 
Watch the experiment. What happens? 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than 
the cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature 
than the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make 
and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this 
experiment help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not 
changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Explanation : Metal is good conductor of heat but glass is a poorer conductor 
of heat. The metal rapidly conducts the heat away from the Bunsen flame so the 
metal near the pea soon becomes hot which melts the Vaseline and that pea 
drops off. The glass does not conduct the heat very well and so the pea on the 
glass does not quickly fall off. The situation is similar for the beakers of hot 
water. The metal conducts the heat away quickly and so the temperature of the 
mat a little way from the beaker rises. The temperature of the cork, a very poor 
conductor of heat, stays about the same. The hot water on the metal mat cools 
down quickly because the heat is being conducted away quickly. Cork does not 
conduct the heat away very quickly and so the water stays hotter for longer in 
this beaker. Our hands are similar to hot water in that they are warmer than 
room temperature. Heat is quickly removed from our hands by metal but not by 
cork. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - why does metal feel colder than 
the cork? How much sense do the following statements now make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature 
than the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make 
and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this 
experiment help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not 
changed your mind, please explain why not. 
Experiment : Take the temperature of a block of metal and a large cork. What 
are the temperatures? 
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Are good absorbers of heat also good radiators of heat? HEAT 2 
When objects are hotter than their surroundings, they give out (radiate) more heat 
than they take in (absorb), e. g. a cup of hot water cools down. When objects are 
cooler than their surroundings, they absorb more heat than they radiate, e. g. food 
warms up in a cooker. 
People have different ideas about radiation and absorption. Some people think 
that things which are good at radiating heat must be poor at absorbing heat and 
others think that things which are good at radiating heat must be good at 
absorbing it. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. LI 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. F1 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? M 
Why do you think that this one is more likely to be true? 
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Think about this. In general, do you think that people who are good at throwing 
balls are good at catching them? 
ýýý 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. II 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? F-I 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make and / 
or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this page 
help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not changed your 
mind, please explain why not. 
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Think about this. Imagine an object being able to throw and catch little balls like 
we can. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. F1 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. iI 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make and / 
or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this page 
help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not changed your 
mind, please explain why not. 
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Think about this. Imagine the object throwing and catching little packets of energy 
or waves. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. F-I 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. Q 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make and / 
or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this page 
help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not changed your 
mind, please explain why not. 
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Explanation: When heat is radiated, it can be thought of as being thrown out in 
little packets. Objects that can throw out well (radiate well) can also catch heat 
well (absorb well). 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Good absorbers must be poor radiators. E-1 
b. Good absorbers must be good radiators. Q 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
El 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make and/or 
about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this page help 
to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not changed your mind, 
please explain why not. 
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LIGHT -1 Version 1- used with group one 
Question : We can see this piece of paper. How can we see it? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale 
of 1-5, where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 
is `very good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see the 
sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
379 
It is very important that you write down the ideas you have now. Do not 
worry about what you wrote on the last page. You may have changed 
your mind or you might not have changed your mind. Either way, it is 
fine. Please do not go back and change what you have written on 
previous pages. 
Experiment 1 Put two mirrors on the lines below. 
Put a coin on the cross. Can you see more than one reflection? 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see 
the sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Take a piece of foil and look in its shiny side. Can you see your 
reflection? 
Now make a fold so your foil looks like this: 
Look in the foil. Can you see more than one reflection? 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where I is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place . 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see 
the sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Crumple up your foil and then partly flatten it out so it looks like this: 
Now look in the foil. Can you see your reflection (not your shadow)? 
. 
We know that it is still reflecting because we can still see the 
reflection of the lights. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image 
because the roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all 
over the place . 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we 
see the sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Explanation: Look at the magnified picture of paper. See how rough it 
is. Look at the magnified picture of a mirror. See how smooth that is. 
Each little bit of paper reflects like a mirror but each bit is at an angle to 
the others because of its roughness so no image is seen. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very 
good sense'). 
a. The light reflects off the paper but we do not see an image because the 
roughness of the paper makes the light rays go all over the place. 
b. The light shines on the paper and stays there and that is how we see the 
sheet of paper. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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LIGHT -1 Version 2- used with group two 
Question : We can see this piece of paper. How can we see it? 
384 
People have different ideas about how we can see things that do not give 
out their own light, e. g. paper. 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit like a mirror 
but that we do not see our own reflection in the paper because it is 
rough which makes the rays go all over the place. 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and stays there 
rather than being reflected and that is how we see the paper. 
Sense : How much sense do these ideas make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 
is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit like a mirror 
but that we do not see our own reflection in the paper because it is 
rough which makes the rays go all over the place. Q 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and stays there 
rather than being reflected and that is how we see the paper. Q 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
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It is very important that you write down the ideas you have now. Do not 
worry about what you wrote on the last page. You may have changed 
your mind or you might not have changed your mind. Either way, it is 
fine. Please do not go back and change what you have written on 
previous pages. 
Experiment 1 Put two mirrors on the lines below. 
x 
Can you see more than one reflection of the X? 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do these ideas make now (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit 
like a mirror but that we do not see our own reflection in 
the paper because it is rough which makes the rays go all 
over the place. 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and 
stays there rather than being reflected and that is how we 
see the paper 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation (a or b)? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Experiment 2 Take a piece of foil and look in its shiny side. Can 
you see your reflection? 
Now make a fold so your foil looks like this: 
Look in the foil. Can you see more than one reflection of yourself'? 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do these ideas make now (on a scale of 1-5, where I is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit 
like a mirror but that we do not see our own reflection in 
the paper because it is rough which makes the rays go all 
over the place11 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and 
stays there rather than being reflected and that is how we 
see the paper Q 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? I 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Experiment 3 Crumple up your foil and then partly flatten it out so it 
looks like this: 
Now look in the foil. Can you see your reflection (not your shadow)? 
. 
We know that it is still reflecting because we can still see the 
reflection of the lights. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do these ideas make now (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit 
like a mirror but that we do not see our own reflection in 
the paper because it is rough which makes the rays go all 
over the place 11 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and 
stays there rather than being reflected and that is how we 
see the paper Q 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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Explanation Look at the magnified picture of paper. See how rough it 
is. Look at the magnified picture of a mirror. See how smooth that is. 
Each little bit of paper reflects like a mirror but each bit is at an angle to 
the others because of its roughness so you cannot see your own reflection. 
Sense : Think about the first question again - we can see this piece of 
paper. How can we see it? 
How much sense do these ideas make now (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Some people think that light reflects off the paper a bit 
like a mirror but that we do not see our own reflection 
in the paper because it is rough which makes the rays 
go all over the place. F1 
b. Some people think that light shines onto the paper and 
stays there rather than being reflected and that is how 
we see the paper F-I 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements 
make and/or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain 
why. Did this experiment help to change your mind or was it something 
else? If you have not changed your mind, please explain why not. 
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COLOURED PIECES OF PLASTIC LIGHT 2 
Experiment : Look at a white screen through the green piece of plastic. What 
colour does the screen look? 
Question : Why does the screen look this colour? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Green colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving 
only green. Q 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
Q 
Why do you think that this one is more likely to be true? 
390 
Experiment : Watch the piece of paper and funnel being used to separate the sand 
and water. See how the filter paper holds the sand while the water goes through. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Green colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
Q 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving 
only green. 1-1 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? F1 
Why do you think that this one is more likely to be true? 
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Experiment : Watch the piece of paper and funnel being used to separate the 
cloudy mixture. See how the filter paper holds the solid while the water goes 
through. 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Green colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving 
only green. R 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
El 
Why do you think that this one is more likely to be true? 
392 
Experiment : Look at the spectrum of colours made from white light. A piece of 
coloured plastic is put between the prism and screen. Look at the screen. What 
colour(s) can you see? 
Notice carefully exactly where the colour is on the screen compared with where 
the spectrum of colours was before the coloured plastic was put in position. What 
do you notice? 
Sense : How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, 
where 1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
a. Green colour has been added to the white light by the piece of plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic leaving 
a. only green. Q 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? 
Q 
Why do you think that this one is more likely to be true? 
393 
Explanation : Green pieces of plastic allow only green light to go through them 
and they absorb all the other colours. White light is made of several colours, most 
of which are absorbed by the green piece of plastic. Just the green goes through. 
Sense : Think about that first question again - why does the screen look green? 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 is 
`hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good sense'). 
a Green colour has been added to the white light 
by the piece of plastic. 
Q 
b. The other colours have been taken away by 
the piece of plastic leaving only green. 
Q 
Which do you think is more likely to be true? F-I 
If you have changed your mind about how much sense the statements make and / 
or about which is the more likely explanation, please explain why. Did this page 
help to change your mind or was it something else? If you have not changed your 
mind, please explain why not. 
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Appendix IIIb Table showing 
bridging analoiies (2002-2003) 
progress during extended 
heat 1 heat 2 
pupil 
choice of answer - 
's' correct a correct 
sense of correct 
answer -sense of 
misconception 
, choice of answer -s 
correct b 
sense of correct 
answer - sense of 
misconception 
1 s m s s -2 0 1 2 
2 m m s s s -1 -1 1 2 3 
3 s s s s s 1 1 2 3 3 
4 m m s m s -2 -2 3 -2 3 
5 m m s s s -2 -2 2 3 4 
6 s s s/m s/m s 4 4 4 4 4 
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15 m m m m m -3 -2 -2 -2 -4 
16 s s s s s 3 3 4 4 4 
17 s m s s s 1 -1 2 4 4 
18 m s s s s -2 -2 -2 -2 2.5 
19 s s s s s 1 1 3 2 3 
20 s s s s s 2 2 3 3 4 
21 s s s s s 3 4 3 4 3 
22 m s s s s -2 -1 0 2 4 
23 s s s s s 0 1 2 3 3 
24 
25 s s s 2 2 0 4 
26 m s s s -1 0 2 3 m m m s s -2 0 0 1 2 
27 s m s s 2 0 2 2 m s s s s -2 4 4 4 4 
28 s s s s 1 1 1 1 m m m m m -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
29 m m m m -1 -1 -1 -1 s- -s 
s s s 1 2 2 2 2 
30 s s s m 3 3 3 3 - s s s s s 2 2 2 2 2 
31 m m -2 -2 2 2 
32 m m m -2 -1 -2 -1 s s s s s 0 2 3 4 4 
33 s s s s s 2 1 3 3 4 
34 m s s s -1 1 2 3 s s s s s 3 4 4 3 4 
35 s s s s 3 3 3 3 s s s s s 2 3 4 4 4 
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45 s s s -2 1 3 3 s s s s s 2 2 1 2 2 
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47 s s s 1 2 3 s s S s 3 2 2 0 
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Appendix IIIb continued 
light 1 light 2 
pupil 
choice of answer 
. S' correct a 
sense of correct 
answer - sense of 
misconception 
choice of answer - 
s' correct b 
sense of correct 
answer - sense of 
misconception 
1 
2 m s s s s -1 2 2 4 m s s s -2 -3 2 3 4 3 m s s s s -1 2 2 3 s s s s s 3 1 2 3 2 
4 m s m s m -2 3 -3 3 -1 m s m s -4 1 -2 4 5 m m m s s -3 -3 -1 1 1 m s s m m -1 1 1 -1 -5 6 s s s s s 2 1 1 1 s s s s s 1 2 2 3 2 
7 m m s s s -2 1 1 1 1 m m m m m -4 -4 -3 -4 -4 8 m m m s m -3 -3 -2 4 -4 m m m m s -3 -2 -1 -1 2 9 
10 m m m s m -1 4 -1 4 -4 m s s s s -2 1 2 0 0 11 m s s s s -1 1 1 2 
12 s s s s s 3 3 3 4 4 s s s s s 2 4 4 4 4 
13 s s s s s 3 4 4 1 4 
14 s s s s s 4 4 4 4 4 s s s s 0 2 1 4 
15 m m m s m -2 -3 -2 4 -4 
16 s s s s s 4 4 4 4 4 m m m m s -3 -3 -3 -3 4 
17 s m m m m 0 -3 -1 -2 -1 
18 m m s s s -1 -1 1 1 2 m m m s -2 -2 -2 2 
19 s s m s s 1 1 -1 1 3 m m s s s -2 -1 1 3 4 
20 s s s s s 2 1 1 2 2 m m m m 0 0 0 0 0 
21 s s m m s 3 3 3 1 4 m m s s -2 -3 1 4 4 
22 m m m m m -2 -2 -2 -1 -2 m m m m m -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 
23 m s s 0 0 2 2 
24 m m m -2 -4 -4 -3 -2 s m m m m 3 0 0 
25 s m m s s 3 -3 -1 2 1 m m m mI m -1 -1 0 0 -2 
26 s s s s s 1 1 1 2 2 m m s s s -2 -2 0 2 4 
27 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 4 m m m -4 -4 -4 0 
28 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 1 m s s s s -1 1 1 1 1 
29 s s s s s 2 2 2 2 2 m m m s s -2 -2 -4 2 2 
30 s s m s s 2 2 -1 2 2 m m m m m -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 
31 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 1 m m m m m -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
32 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 1 m m m m s -1 -2 0 -2 1 
33 s s s s s 3 3 3 3 3 m m m m m -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 
34 s s s s 3 3 4 4 4 m m m/s m s -2 -2 0 -1 2 
35 s s s s s 1 0 0 2 
36 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 m m s s -3 -2 0 2 4 
37 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 m m s m m -2 -2 2 2 2 
38 s s s s s 1 3 3 2 3 m m m m m -2 -2 -2 -3 -4 
39 s s s s s 1 1 1 1 1 m m m m s -2 -2 -2 -2 0 
40 s s s s s 2 2 2 2 2 m s s m s -2 0 2 -4 4 
41 s s s s s 3 3 4 4 4 m s s s s -2 2 2 4 4 
42 s s s s s 2 2 1 0 1 m m m m m -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
43 s s s s s 2 4 4 4 4 m m m m m -2 -2 -4 -4 -4 
44 s s s s s 2 4 2 -2 2 m m 
I 
m m m -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
45 s s s s s 2 2 2 4 4 m m M /S s s -1 -2 0 2 2 
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Appendix IVa Questions given before and after analogy 
intervention (2003-2004) 
Heat 1 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
When I touch a piece of metal, it often feels colder than, say, a piece of cork. 
Do you think that this is because: 
a. The metal feels colder because it removes heat from your hand and 
takes it away and cork does not do this as much. 
b. The metal feels colder because it is naturally at a lower temperature 
than the cork. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
Heat 2 
Objects can radiate and absorb heat. Think about sitting in front of a warm 
fire; the fire is radiating heat and you are absorbing it. However, you are 
radiating heat all the time as well as absorbing it. Thermal cameras sense the 
amount of heat given off by different objects and human bodies give off 
quite a lot. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense')? 
An object that is better at absorbing heat than another object is: 
a. Better at radiating heat 
b. Worse at radiating heat 
than the other object (both at same temperature). 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Light1 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). We can see objects because light from a light source (e. g. a lamp or 
the Sun): 
a. Hits the object and stays there, lighting the object up. 
b. Hits the object and is reflected 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
Light 2 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
When white light is shone through a piece of red see-through plastic, red 
light is seen on the screen. This is because: 
a. The red colour has been added to the white light by the piece of 
plastic. 
b. The other colours have been taken away by the piece of plastic 
leaving only red. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
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Forces 1 
Gravity is a force that causes objects to fall down. If a book is on a table, 
then gravity is pulling on it so why does it stay where it is and not fall down. 
How much sense do the following statements make (on a scale of 1-5, where 
1 is `hardly any sense at all', 3 is `quite good sense' and 5 is `very good 
sense'). 
c. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table is just 
in the way to stop the book falling. 
d. There is gravity acting downwards on the book and the table pushes 
upwards on the book by the same amount. 
Which do you think is the more likely explanation? 
Forces 2 
A 2N weight is hung on a piece of elastic that extends by 5cm. The 2N 
weight is then hung on a similar piece of elastic that is twice as long to begin 
with. How much will this piece extend? Circle the correct answer. 
a. 5cm b. 
10cm 
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Appendix IVd 
NAME FORM DATE 
I would like you to think about today's lesson and about your own ideas about the topic 
we were doing. Sometimes lessons help you to change your mind about things; 
sometimes they support your ideas and help you see things more clearly. Either way, you 
should keep track of what you are thinking. Have a go at answering these questions 
(honestly) and you will be thinking about thinking. 
What did you learn in today's lesson? 
Did today's lesson make you change your ideas about anything? If so, how did your 
ideas change? 
What happened to make you change your ideas? 
Are you still confused about which ideas are right? 
Was the way in which the lesson was taught helpful? 
helpful or unhelpful? 
Which parts were 
If there are any more comments you would like to make, please do so. 
What did you learn today? 
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Appendix V Interview transcripts (2004-2005) 
Colour 19.01.05 Pupils A and B (I is interviewer 
I ........ 
Now, last week we were looking at colour and the little sheet is what you 
wrote last week and I asked you to say how much sense certain statements made 
and which you thought was the right statement. Now, you had already done the 
same thing right at the beginning of term and I picked you two to interview 
because you'd actually changed your mind between the two occasions and that's 
absolutely fine but the question is, "why did you change your mind? ". So, if you 
want to remind yourself what you wrote the first time which is number four (see 
Light 2 in Appendix IVd), why, in fact, you both chose a on number four; this time 
you chose b (laughter from A and B). now that's absolutely fine but do you know 
why you changed your mind. And again, it's OK to say no, you do not know why 
you changed your mind but was there anything you had done in between times 
which made you change your mind from choosing a to choosing b? So, in fact b, 
it's the correct answer, b is. These colour filters, these coloured pieces of plastic 
are actually acting as filters and the other colours are being taken away by them, 
leaving only red. Now, I just wondered whether you'd got any idea why you'd 
changed your mind. 
A Because the week we, er, did this we used the filters. 
I Yes, and? 
A And, em, and it had shown that using different filters er like it says here, with 
the red 
I Hmhm 
A Being seen, em, because it had taken the others away and it makes sense to me. 
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I Right, (turning to B) do you have why you 
BI think I chose that one because I didn't know, em, because when you put the 
red light through you couldn't see any white; it was just red. 
I Right 
B And the red light just looked the same as the red plastic. 
I Right, OK, so that 
B And I didn't see where, how the white couldn't be there. 
I Right, so that's why you chose b that time? 
B Yes 
I Any idea why you chose a the last time? I know it's going back a long way to 
the beginning of term and you hadn't done any experiments on colour then so you 
might not know why you chose that but at the time it made more sense to you, any 
A Er, I think because we hadn't done much of this before. In art, sort of, white is 
nothing and adding to me seemed simpler than taking things away. 
I Right, that's absolutely fine and B, have you any? 
B Erm, can I say the same? 
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Colour 19.01.05 Pupils C and D (I is interviewer 
I Now last week we looked at colour. To remind you what you said last week, I 
asked you how much sense certain statements made and which you thought was 
the right statement. Now you'd already done that, the same thing, a few weeks ago 
and the reason I wanted to interview you two and the other two especially was 
because you'd actually changed your mind between these two occasions. That's 
absolutely fine but what I want to know really, is why you changed your mind. 
You might not know and that's absolutely fine but you might have some ideas 
about it. So, just to remind you what you wrote the first time, it's number four (see 
Light 2 in Appendix IVd) so if you just want to see what you wrote, once at the 
beginning of the year and once last week. Erin and, in fact, last week you chose 
the right answer whereas the first time you'd chosen the wrong answer. now, we 
hadn't done the topic at all before the beginning of the year and we'd only done a 
little bit about it by last week but any reasons why you'd changed your mind? 
Canyou remember why you chose b last week rather than a? 
C Isn't white light meant to be made of all the colours of the rainbow? 
I It certainly is. Now, did you know that at the beginning of the year? 
C No. 
I Because we had done it, sort of, a couple of weeks ago, hadn't we? So that 
might be a reason why you had changed you mind. Em, any other reasons why you 
might have changed your mind? D? 
D Well I knew that before, that I didn't know that white light was just, was made 
up of all the colours but I knew that when, like light from the Sun shone through 
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water made a rainbow so I just thought about that and thought it's probably not 
been added `cos because red would have been there before. 
I Right, so, OK, erm but the first time when you did it you actually thought that a 
was the right answer. any idea why you might have chosen that, as I say, it's a 
long time since you did it but any ideas why you might have chosen that there? 
D Well, it sounds a bit funny for things to be taken away. 
I Right, yes, OK, that's absolutely fine. 
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